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CONTENTS OF VOL. IX.

ARTICLES.

	PAGE
ADLER, FELIX. The Parting of the Ways in the Foreign Policy of the United States	1
BAKEWELL, CHARLES M. The Teachings of Friedrich Nietzsche	314
BARNETT, S. A. The Mission of Music	494
BOSANQUET, BERNARD. A Moral from Athenian History	13
CABOT, RICHARD C. Belligerent Discussion and Truth-Seeking	29
CARPENTER, EDWARD. Affection in Education	482
DAVIDSON, JOHN. Luxury and Extravagance	54
FOWLER, THOMAS. The Ethics of Intellectual Life and Work	296
FRASER, D. J. The Ethics of Prohibition	350
KELLOR, FRANCES ALICE. Sex in Crime	74
LAWRENCE, T. J. The Tsar's Rescript	137
LOCH, C. S. Good Citizenship and Athletics	434
LYTTELTON, E. Instruction of the Young in Sexual Knowledge	452
MACCUNN, JOHN. Cosmopolitan Duties	152
MACKENZIE, J. S. The Idea of Progress	195
MILLER, DICKINSON S. "The Will to Believe" and the Duty to Doubt	169
MURRAY, J. CLARK. "The Merchant of Venice" as an Exponent of Industrial Ethics	331
OLIPHANT, JAMES. The Relations of the Sexes	273
SHARP, FRANK CHAPMAN. Some Aims of Moral Education	214
WATSON, JOHN. The New "Ethical" Philosophy	413
WILLOUGHBY, WESTEL WOODBURY. The Right of the State to Be	467

DISCUSSIONS.

CALDWELL, WILLIAM. "The Will to Believe and the Duty to Doubt"	373
DUFF, ROBERT A. A Reply	231
JONES, E. E. CONSTANCE. Character and Circumstance	504
MACKENZIE, J. S. The Oxford Chairs of Philosophy	378
MARSHALL, HENRY RUTGERS. Belief and Will	359
MELLONE, S. H. Can there be a Moral Realization of an Individual Self?	229

REVIEWS.

ASHER, JOSEPH M. *The School System of the Talmud*, by B. Spiers	404
BALCH, EMILY GREENE. *A Directory of the Charitable and Beneficent Organizations of Boston*	532
BALL, SIDNEY. *John Ruskin, Social Reformer*, by J. A. Hobson	388

PAGE

BALL, SIDNEY. *The Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury as Social Reformer*, by Edwin Hodder 133
BONAR, J. *Industrial Democracy*, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb 111
BONAR, J. *Pure Economics*, by Maffeo Pantaleoni 254
BOSANQUET, HELEN. *Problems of Modern Industry*, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb 250
BOSANQUET, HELEN. *The Crowd*, by Gustave Le Bon 521
BOSANQUET, HELEN. *The Psychology of Peoples*, by Gustave Le Bon . . 521
BROOKS, JOHN GRAHAM. *Luxury and Sacrifice*, by Charles F. Dole . . 255
BUTLIN, F. M. *Communism in Central Europe in the Time of the Reformation*, by Karl Kanbsky 265
CAIRD, EDWARD. *Dante's Ten Heavens: A Study of the Paradiso*, by Edmund G. Gardner 239
CHAPMAN, S. J. *The Standard of Life, and Other Studies*, by Mrs. Bernard Bosanquet 252
CHAPMAN, S. J. *Methods of Industrial Remuneration*, by David F. Schloss 391
CHAPMAN, S. J. *Value, Price, and Profit*, by Karl Marx 531
DAVIDSON, THOMAS. *Berner Studien zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte*, von Ludwig Stein 240
DAVIDSON, THOMAS, *Der Aeltere Pythagoreismus*, von Wilhelm Bauer . . 240
DAVIDSON, THOMAS. *Human Immortality: Two supposed Objections to the Doctrine*, by William James 256
DUFF, ROBERT A. *Studies in Philosophical Criticism and Construction*, by Sidney H. Mellone 97
FAIRBROTHER, W. H. *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to Himself, with Introductory Study on Stoicism and the Last of the Stoics*, by Gerald H. Rendall 129
FLETCHER, M. *A Critical Examination of Butler's "Analogy,"* by Henry Hughes 533
HAAS, ALBERT. *Glimpses of Modern German Culture*, by Kuno Francke 408
HAWKESWORTH, ALAN S. *Theories of the Will in the History of Philosophy*, by Archibald Alexander 266
HAWKESWORTH, ALAN S. *Metaphysics*, by Borden P. Bowne 266
HUSBAND, MARY GILLILAND. *The Morality of Marriage, and Other Essays on the Status and Destiny of Woman*, by Mona Caird 131
LATTA, R. *A Concise History of Religion*, by F. J. Gould 122
LATTA, R. *Divine Immanence: An Essay on the Spiritual Significance of Matter*, by J. R. Illingworth 396
LATTA, R. *Doctrine and Development*, by Hastings Rashdall 398
LATTA, R. *The Law of Civilization and Decay*, by Brooks Adams . . . 519
LINDSAY, S. M. *The Elements of Sociology*, by Franklin Henry Giddings, Ph.D. 395
LINDSAY, S. M. *The Coming People*, by Charles F. Dole 409
MACDONALD, J. R. *Democracy: A Study of Government*, by James H. Hyslop 528
MACKENZIE, J. S. *The Metaphysics of Experience*, by Shadworth H. Hodgson 379

PAGE

McINTYRE, J. LEWIS. *Leibniz: The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings. Translated with Introduction and Notes*, by Robert Latta . 401

MILLER, D. S. *Instinct and Reason*, by Henry Rutgers Marshall 511

MOORE, E. C. *Dynamic Idealism: An Elementary Course in the Metaphysics of Psychology*, by Alfred H. Lloyd. 259

MOORE, G. E. *The Science of Ethics, as based on the Science of Knowledge*, by Johann Gottlieb Fichte 92

MOORE, G. E. *A Sketch of Morality Independent of Obligation or Sanction*, by M. Guyau 232

MORRISON, W. D. *Political Crime*, by Louis Proal 109

MORRISON, W. D. *A Jewish State*, by Theodore Herzl 113

MORRISON, W. D. *Jewish Ideals and Other Essays*, by Joseph Jacobs . 113

MORRISON, W. D. *The Dynamics of Religion*, by M. W. Wiseman . . . 126

MUIRHEAD, J. H. *Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy*, by Edwin Lawrence Godkin 101

MUIRHEAD, J. H. *University Addresses and University Sermons*, by John Caird 516

NEWBOLD, WILLIAM ROMAINE. *The Psychology of Suggestion: A Research into the Subconscious Nature of Man and Society*, by Boris Sidis 121

RATHBONE, ELEANOR. *Various Fragments*, by Herbert Spencer 115

RATHBONE, ELEANOR. *A Study of Mary Wollstonecraft and The Rights of Woman*, by Emma Rauscherbusch Clough 407

REINHERZ, H. *The State and Charity*, by Thomas Mackay 245

RITCHIE, DAVID G. *Anarchism: A Criticism and History of the Anarchist Theory*, by E. V. Zenker 106

RITCHIE, DAVID G. *La Dottrina della Coscienza Morale nello Spencer; L'Aspetto Biologico della Condotta secondo lo Spencer; Condotta Buona e Condotta Cattiva secondo lo Spencer; Intorno alle Origini della Morale Utilitaria dello Stuart Mill*, by Giuseppe Zuccante 236

ROYCE, JOSIAH. *In Tune with the Infinite; or Fulness of Peace, Power, and Plenty*, by Ralph Waldo Trine 124

SALTER, WILLIAM M. *The Social Teachings of Jesus*, by Shailer Matthews 112

SETH, JAMES. *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*, by James Mark Baldwin 86

STURT, H. *The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, by Alexander Sutherland 89

STURT H. *An Unknown People*, by Edward Carpenter 261

STURT H. *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, by Havelock Ellis 261

STURT, H. *A Dialogue on Moral Education*, by F. H. Matthews 406

STURT, H. *The Teaching of Christ on Life and Conduct*, by Sophie Bryant 406

THOMSON, J. A. *Neo-Malthusianism*, by R. Ussher 263

THOMSON, J. A. *The Wonderful Century*, by Alfred Russel Wallace . . 263

THOMSON, J. A. *Footsteps in Human Progress, Secular and Religious*, by James Samuelson 265

PAGE

THOMSON, J. ARTHUR. *Degeneracy: Its Causes, Signs, and Results*, by Eugene S. Talbot 524
TILLE, ALEXANDER. *Affirmations*, by Havelock Ellis 138
TOY, C. H. *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, by Morris Jastrow, Jr. 243
TOY, C. H. *The Prophets of Israel*, by Carl Heinrich Cornill 248
TROTTER, W. F. *Studies in Little Known Subjects*, by C. E. Plumptre . 264
VAUGHAN, C. *The History of English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century*, by G. P. Gooch 529
WELTON, J. *The Herbartian Psychology applied to Education*, by John Adams 117
WELTON, J. *The Application of Psychology to the Science of Education*, by J. F. Herbart 117
WELTON, J. *Port-Royal Education*, by Félix Cadet 132
WELTON, J. *Letters and Lectures on Education*, by J. F. Herbart 526
WOODS, ROBERT A. *Labor Copartnership*, by Henry Demarest Lloyd . . 530

LIST OF AUTHORS REVIEWED.

ADAMS, BROOKS 519
ADAMS, JOHN 117
ALEXANDER, ARCHIBALD 266
BALDWIN, JAMES MARK 86
BAUER, WILHELM 240
BOSANQUET, MRS. BERNARD 252
BOWNE, BORDEN P. 260
CADET, FÉLIX 133
CAIRD, JOHN 516
CAIRD, MONA 131
CLOUGH, EMMA RAUSCHERBUSCH 407
CORNILL, CARL HEINRICH 248
DOLE, CHARLES F. 255, 409
ELLIS, HAVELOCK 128, 261
FICHTE, JOHANN GOTTLIEB 92
FRANCKE, KUNO 404
GARDNER, EDMUND G. 239
GIDDINGS, FRANKLIN HENRY 395
GODKIN, EDWIN LAWRENCE 101
GOOCH, G. P. 529
GOULD, F. J. 122
GUYAU, M. 232
HERBART, J. F. 117, 526
HERZL, THEODORE J. 113
HOBSON, J. A. 388
HODDER, EDWIN 133
HODGSON, SHADWORTH H. 379
HUGHES, HENRY 533
HYSLOP, JAMES H. 528

PAGE

ILLINGWORTH, J. R. 396
JACOBS, JOSEPH 113
JAMES, WILLIAM 256
JASTROW, MORRIS 243
KANBSKY, KARL 265
LATTA, ROBERT 401
LE BON, GUSTAVE 521
LLOYD, ALFRED H. 259
LLOYD, HENRY DEMAREST 530
MACKAY, THOMAS 245
MARSHALL, HENRY RUTGERS 511
MARX, KARL 531
MATTHEWS, F. H. 406
MATTHEWS, SHAILER 112
MELLONE, SYDNEY H. 97
PANTALEONI, MAFFEO 254
PLUMPTRE, C. E. 264
PROAL, LOUIS 109
RASHDALL, HASTINGS 398
RENDALL, GERALD H. 129
SAMUELSON, JAMES 265
SCHLOSS, DAVID F. 391
SIDES, BORIS 121
SPENCER, HERBERT 115
SPIERS, B. 404
STEIN, LUDWIG 240
SUTHERLAND, ALEXANDER 89
TALBOT, EUGENE S. 264, 524
TRINE, RALPH WALDO 124
USSHER, R. 263
WALLACE, ALFRED RUSSEL 263
WEBB, SIDNEY AND BEATRICE 111, 250
WISEMAN, M. W. 126
ZENKER, E. V. 106
ZUCCANTE, GIUSEPPE 236

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THE PARTING OF THE WAYS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE writer of this article has been asked, almost at the moment when the present number of the JOURNAL was going to press, to contribute an article on the above subject. A profound interest in the questions involved, the belief which he shares with many, that a critical point has been reached in the career of the American people, and that a false step now may be attended with almost irretrievable disaster, together with the fact that the public mind is not yet conclusively made up, has led him to respond to the invitation. The citizen of a free commonwealth has the right and the duty not only to take part in the actual government of the country, however indirectly, but the no less important duty and right to claim his share in the formation of public opinion, the real "power behind the throne," the source from which emanate public decisions and the force which gives them effect. If he should not, on the one hand, in a spirit of undue self-esteem, exaggerate the value of his contribution, neither, on the other, should he withhold such thoughts as he may have to submit, but should express them freely and let them go for what they are worth.

We stand literally at the parting of the ways. The question before us is, whether we shall adhere to lines of policy which,

until recently, one may say until a few months ago, have had among us the authority of a sacred tradition; or whether on the spur of the moment, as it were, under the sudden effect of what is called an expansion of the political horizon, we shall launch forth on a totally new course, which the sagacity of our statesmen and the instinct of our people have hitherto rejected as repugnant to their highest interests. It is true that circumstances alter cases, that new conditions arising may prescribe a deviation from accepted standards, that the mere fact of a certain course of conduct having been persisted in for a hundred years or more does not of necessity imply that it ought still to be persisted in, if, namely, the reasons by which it was supported have in the mean time become invalid. But then it ought to be convincingly shown that these reasons have become invalid, and the *onus probandi* is upon those who counsel innovation. The attempt will here be made to summarize the chief motives which seem to incline a part of our people towards the policy of Imperialism, and then briefly to set forth some of the weightiest reasons that may be adduced on the other side.

Among the motives that operate in favor of Imperialism may be mentioned, first, national ambition, the desire to play a shining part on the great world stage, to emulate the military and naval achievements of other nations in order to prove that we have the ability to equal or to surpass them. The consciousness of the American people in the early part of their history was mainly self-centred. They were absorbed in the subjugation of the continent and in the development of its resources, and, so far as their relations to other nations were concerned, they felt that they had a mission to fulfil for the benefit of humanity, that they had attained to a degree of perfection in their political life from which others were still distant, and that others, therefore, might learn from them, not they from others. The closer connection between the Old World and the New, which has been brought about by increased facilities of communication, has largely destroyed this narrow provincialism. The jargon concerning the "effete monarchies of Europe" has long since passed

into discredit, if not entirely into disuse. No thoughtful American fails any longer to acknowledge the debt we are under to those nations whose civilization is older than ours, nor to recognize that we must still continue in many ways to be their pupils. Our young men will still go abroad to drink at the fountain-heads of science in foreign Universities, our young art-students will still seek to perfect their equipment in Paris and Rome. And even in the problems of political organization we are all willing to admit that "wisdom was not born with us," at least not all wisdom, that some of these problems have been solved more successfully in other countries than in ours. But it would be the saddest kind of mistake if the revulsion of feeling from the untenable position of our predecessors should now lead us to the opposite extreme; if, after having wrapt ourselves up in the arrogant and juvenile conceit of perfection, we should now become ashamed of the idea that we have a mission to fulfil for the benefit of mankind, and should lose the sense of that mission; if our failure to solve the political problem we have set ourselves should make us forget that the problem itself is a grander and a nobler one than any great nation has ever set itself and that its difficulties are due to its grandeur. Yes, it would be the saddest possible aberration if, instead of learning from others in the sense of adapting to our national genius the best they have to offer, we should become their servile imitators, and especially if we should imitate them where they themselves confess that they are least worthy of imitation; if instead of establishing the *Pax Americana* so far as our influence avails throughout this continent we should enter into the field of Old World strife and seek the sort of glory that is written in human blood. Can there be a more striking contrast than is to be found in the circumstance that at the very time when this young Republic seems about fatuously to assume the burdens of military and naval expenditure, from which it has hitherto been relatively exempt, the Russian Czar in his manifesto should proclaim the intolerable heaviness of such burdens, and should loudly call upon the nations to counsel together how they may be alleviated!

The second motive, and for many the principal one, is the desire to gain access to new markets for the purpose of extending our commerce and stimulating industry. I shall refer to this motive in the latter part of my article, and shall therefore do no more than mention it here.

The third motive springs from a kind of fetishistic attitude towards the flag. It consists in the belief that any territory over which the national flag has at any time been raised thereby becomes taboo to other nations, and that we are bound to defend it as being mysteriously and indissolubly connected with our national "personality." This survival of the notion of taboo with respect to the flag among a civilized people may be highly interesting from the point of view of anthropology, but it is absurd and pernicious when allowed even the slightest influence in deciding a practical question. The flag is a symbol or a sign; its sacredness consists wholly in what it signifies. The American flag in particular is supposed to signify freedom and equality, the government of all by all and for the good of all, and to stand for these ideas, not in the abstract, but as they have been colored and expressed in the customs, habits, and institutions of the people of the United States. Wherever such institutions founded upon such principles are possible, the American flag is in place as the true sign of great things signified; but wherever such institutions are not possible,—as, for instance, in the Philippines,—the presence of the flag would have no meaning whatever. The flag itself, instead of being a sacred symbol, would be a worthless bit of bunting. Nay, the persistent attempt to maintain it in the midst of a population to which the principles it represents are inapplicable would be an advertisement to the world of our own disloyalty to those principles.

The fourth motive is based upon the recognition of a duty owed by the civilized races to the uncivilized. This is certainly the most honorable of all the motives that speak for Imperialism. It may be used insincerely by some as a mere pretext to cloak their ambition or cupidity; but certainly in the case of many it gives rise to a genuine scruple of con-

science, to a feeling that we, as a people, should not isolate ourselves from the affairs of the world, that we ought to help in bringing the backward races abreast of progress, and that this is a duty which, however serious the difficulties in which it may involve us, we ought not to shirk. The existence of a duty to the backward races, it seems to us, must be admitted; but whether it is best discharged by the ordinary methods of land-grabbing, accompanied by the incidental benefits of impartial courts and the externals of Western civilization is, at least, questionable. To this also we shall presently advert.

But let us now endeavor to put before us the chief reasons that tell against the proposed Imperialistic policy. Of these, we mention three. First, the danger it involves to the political institutions of the United States; secondly, the obstacles which it is likely to place in the way of social reform in the United States; thirdly, the influence it is calculated to exert in diverting us from that line of effort along which we can best discharge our cosmopolitan duty towards other nations and towards mankind in general.

First, the danger to our political institutions. This danger has been pointed out by many able writers who have already expressed themselves on the subject. It cannot be too strongly emphasized nor too strenuously reiterated. The danger consists in this, that a democracy is by its nature incapable of ruling subject populations. The principle that an inferior class shall be ruled by a superior is the principle of aristocracies. The principle that no class shall be regarded as politically inferior, but that all shall participate on equal terms in the government is the principle of democracies. The two principles cannot keep house together in the same state. Either the inferior class must be enfranchised, raised to the same level of political rights as the others, or the democracy will inevitably tend to turn into an aristocracy.* The Athenian

* In this connection it is instructive to read the words of Mr. Whitelaw Reid, published in the September number of the *Century*: "The chief aversion to the vast access of territory with which we are threatened springs from the fear that ultimately they must be admitted to the United States. No public duty is more urgent than to resist from the very outset the concession of such a possibility. In

democracy and the Roman republic both tried the experiment of ruling subject populations. The one broke down utterly in the attempt, the other carried the imperial principle to its logical conclusion by means of a transformation in the constitution of the state. But it is said that England has succeeded, and in every discussion of this question the example of England is apt to be put prominently forward, and we are told that what England can do we can do as well. The answer to this argument is that the political institutions of England are thoroughly permeated with the aristocratic spirit, and that England succeeds in governing subject populations precisely because her government is an aristocracy, while we should not succeed because ours is a democracy. The points of similarity between England and the United States are so often accentuated that the points of difference are apt to be lost sight of. It is of capital importance that the points of difference be kept in view and clearly marked off. The English, as Mr. Bagehot puts it, are "a deferential people." The existence amongst them of a class of social superiors is tranquilly acknowledged, the habit of looking up to "one's betters" is deeply rooted. And this class of social superiors, while the political prerogatives which it once possessed have been greatly diminished, still performs a most important political function, perhaps it would not be too much to say the most important of political functions. For in all states the most vital problem is how to bring it about that the best men, the most capable, the most efficient, the most honest shall come to the top as rulers. The hereditary aristocracy of England is an instrument of selection for the sifting out of the best men, or the relatively best, as rulers. It does its work indirectly but none the less effectively. The hereditary aristocracy attracts to itself the aristocracy of wealth and of talent, and in unison with these it erects and maintains a certain standard of honesty and efficiency the influence of which is all-pervasive, and which becomes

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no circumstances likely to exist within a century should they be admitted as a State to the Union."

an unwritten law to which all persons who aspire to prominent positions, whether in the legislative, the administrative, or the judicial departments of the government, must conform. I do not say that the English form of government is better than the American. I merely say that the English are a deferential people, and that we are not; that they possess an instrumentality for solving the chief practical problem of politics,—namely, the sifting out of the relatively best men as leaders,—which we lack. We have set ourselves a new and far more difficult task than theirs; we wish to dispense entirely in the body politic with irrational factors such as hereditary kings and nobles; we wish to build up our political structure with rational elements only; we wish to show, in fine, that it is possible to get the right leaders and rulers winnowed out from among the masses of men, relying solely upon the common sense and the moral sense of the masses themselves to do the winnowing. That in the beginnings of this experiment (for as a great nation we have but just entered upon our career) our efforts should in some respects have met with conspicuous failure is no reason for giving way to premature and pusillanimous despair. Perhaps the machinery of representation which we have employed for ascertaining the popular will is at fault; perhaps minority representation would relieve us of many of our difficulties; perhaps what is called the "organization of universal suffrage" would help;* but, at any rate, it is too early to desert the standard of rational politics and give up the cause as lost because we have met with an initial check, however serious. But, on the other hand, the fact that we have not yet succeeded to the extent that we ought to, and may some day hope to, in bringing to the front as leaders the public-spirited, the efficient, the incorruptible, is an excellent reason why we should not indefinitely increase the chances of corruption by sending such men as would now be likely to be selected to govern subject populations in distant quarters of the globe. The fact that England has succeeded is no reason why we should suc-

* See on this important subject, Charles Benoist, "La Crise de l'État moderne."

ceed; the radical difference in the conditions that prevail in the two countries is patent.

But the danger of increased corruption is not the only one; there is a subtler evil to be dreaded. The identity of the governing and the governed is of the very essence of the democratic principle; let this identity be broken up in any part of the state, let a differentiation take place between the class that governs and another class that is governed, without having completely the right to determine how it shall be governed, and the same differentiation will tend to spread to other parts of the state and become more and more general. Plainly, if we accustom ourselves to see millions of persons who live within the territories which belong to the United States excluded from the rights of citizenship on the ground that they are not fitted to exercise them, the question will presently be raised—indeed, here and there it has already been raised—whether on the same ground millions of persons now exercising the franchise within the limits of the United States ought not to be deprived of their rights. That universal suffrage is the indispensable safeguard of liberty; that no class, however well intentioned, can be trusted to legislate for another; that even the so-called lower classes know where the shoe pinches them better than their superiors in education can know it for them,—these elementary truths will then tend to fall into oblivion, and a habit of mind will be generated consistently with which democratic institutions cannot live. The masses of the people and all citizens who have not yet lost their faith in the capacity of the masses to become politically regenerate have every reason to oppose with the utmost earnestness the proposed policy of Imperialism. It is anti-democratic, as its very name implies.

The second reason against Imperialism, referred to above, is that it is contrary to the interests of social reform. The wage-earning class in particular and all who believe that the progress of society as a whole depends on the improvement of the condition of the wage-earning class have reason to oppose the new policy. And this not only, as has often been said, because the degraded labor of the tropics may thus be brought

into direct competition with American labor, and tend to lower the rate of remuneration and the standard of living, but for another reason. The appetite for colonial dependencies, which is characteristic of the modern industrial nations, is due to the fact that the modern industrial system is top-heavy. That system, founded on the economic maxim of buying cheap and selling dear, when applied to human labor, leads at last to a kind of *reductio ad absurdum*. The wages of labor are depressed as far as possible for the sake of profit, or, if increased, are increased reluctantly in merely arithmetical progression, while at the same time the volume of production is enlarged in something like geometrical progression, and thus a condition of things is brought about in which the great body of manual workers, who are also the natural consumers, are no longer able to absorb the product, and what is called over-production ensues. From the condition of affairs thus roughly described there are two alternative exits. The one is to seek new markets abroad, keeping the wage-earners at home relatively poor, and this has led to the colonial policy of the European nations; the other is to enhance the power of consumption on the part of the wage-earners at home, and this it would seem is the policy which the best traditions of our past as well as our hopes for the future should engage us to adopt. Whatever tends to increase the skill and efficiency of the laborer and artisan, whatever tends to diversify agriculture and industry and to modify mere competition by the encouragement of collective effort of the voluntary sort, and especially whatever tends to deepen the respect we feel for every man in virtue of his character as a man will make in this direction. Mr. Bryce* says, "As regards trade, the United States would doubtless, like every country, gain by an increase in export of manufactured goods. But such an increase is not essential to her prosperity—first, because she relies largely upon her exports of food stuffs and such raw materials as cotton; secondly, because she has in her enormous popu-

* In his article entitled "Some Thoughts on the Policy of the United States," in the September number of *Harper's Magazine*.

lation a splendid and swiftly increasing home market for goods of all kinds." To make this home market increasingly capable of absorbing the present surplus product is, indeed, one of the worthiest aims that our statesmen and reformers can set themselves. But to accomplish this it will be necessary to think less of the market and more of the "home," to regard labor less in the light of a commodity, and more as a condition upon which men, women, and children depend for the attainment of their human ends. It is hardly necessary to add that what has been said is not intended as a counsel of complete isolation, a condemnation of foreign trade, or an attempt to set up hard and fast limits of any kind. The point is that there are two tendencies between which we must elect, the one to keep the wage-earner relatively poor and to unload the inevitable surplus product on the peoples of distant countries, the other to make the masses of our own people increasingly capable of absorbing what is now a surplus product. It is the latter which self-interest and morality alike urge us to adopt.

The last subject to which I wish to allude is that of our cosmopolitan duties. That the civilized races have a duty to perform towards the uncivilized cannot be doubted. But when we come to consider what the nature of that duty is we find ourselves face to face with a large and complex question, which it is barely possible to touch upon here. Suffice it to say that the attitude of the advanced towards the backward races should be educational, and should be governed on the whole by the same principles that are at present everywhere revolutionizing the science of education. We need but substitute the word race or people for the word individual to make these principles immediately and fruitfully applicable. Among the most important of them, perhaps, are the following: that the educator must have at heart the true interest of those whom he wishes to educate, and not make them merely subservient to his own interests. In the present instance this would mean that a civilized people that honestly proposes to uplift an uncivilized must not go among them with the desire for profit in its heart and the language of humanitarian progress on its lips. A second principle, now generally

acknowledged by all educators, is, that education to be genuine must be individualized, which means adapted to the individuality of those who are to receive it; that we may not in arbitrary fashion seek to imprint some stereotyped pattern of excellence that commends itself to us upon another's nature, but rather follow the leadings of his nature and develop him according to his own genius. Applying this rule of pedagogy to the problem of elevating the peoples of the Orient, it would follow that what we need is a new type of Missionaries of Civilization, who, as practical psychologists, will make it their business to study the peculiar genius of the people among whom they live, and will endeavor not so much to implant foreign ideas and ideals as to bring to the light the highest and best things of which those peoples are capable, along their own lines. Another maxim of education is, that while coercion may be used for the purpose of repressing gross violations of law, or of overcoming inveterate indolence, it should ever be employed for the good of those who are subjected to it, and with a view to being discontinued when the occasion for it ceases. According to this maxim, it would be desirable that the civilized nations of Europe and America should agree and combine to jointly repress such outrages as those lately committed by the Turks in Armenia, and it would also be justifiable that where civilized nations come in contact with savages they should for a time subject them, if need be, to a species of military rule in order to help them in acquiring those habits of industry without which progress towards better conditions is impossible. But it should be distinctly added, in this connection, that a monarchical or aristocratic people is far better fitted to assume such a task than a democracy, since the subjection of class to class is congenial to the former types of government, while it is thoroughly repugnant to the latter. A science of education applied to backward peoples, a pedagogy of nations, is a conception so new, opens up such vast fields of inquiry and speculation that the few analogies here set down can but serve to awaken interest, not to satisfy it. And yet it may be permitted in closing to submit one other analogy.

It is not every one's vocation to be a teacher of the young, —that is, of undeveloped individuals; nor is it every people's vocation to be the teacher of other undeveloped peoples. Suppose some one had represented it as a duty to Isaac Newton to communicate to the young a part of his vast acquisitions in the domain of natural philosophy, and for this purpose to spend a portion of his time in teaching school. He might justly have replied that he could be of far more use to his contemporaries and to posterity by devoting all his time and all his energy to the prosecution of the profound researches in which he was engaged until he should have brought them to a triumphant conclusion. And so we may say, without presumption and without vain-glory, that a nation, too, may consecrate itself to the advancement and perfection of the principles of government rather than to the extension of those already accepted. Such is our case. We should join, indeed, with other nations in preventing international outrage; we should send out gifted individuals to dwell as Missionaries of Civilization among the natives of distant lands. But, as a people, we should not attempt to keep school, having backward peoples for our pupils; we should not suffer ourselves to be diverted from the great experiment on which we are engaged. That experiment, on the scale and under the conditions in which it is being tried, is new. It means the attempt to build up a rational state. To establish freedom, not in the sense of the unhampered expansion of the strong, but in that nobler sense in which it signifies the possibility for each, even for the humblest, of "living the best life," by discharging with maximum efficiency the particular social function for which nature has fitted him. Generations must still elapse before the success of this experiment can be assured. All the gifts, all the energies of mind and heart which we as a people possess, will be needed for its prosecution. If we shall succeed, even approximately, in the fulfilment of this great task, we shall have deserved well of human kind, and shall certainly have discharged in the truest and best way our cosmopolitan duty.

FELIX ADLER.

NEW YORK.

A MORAL FROM ATHENIAN HISTORY.

THERE are two problems of human life in communities which have eternal interest. The first of these is how far the higher achievements of life are determined by material conditions; the problem, in short, which, though by no means new, has been forced upon the world afresh through what is known as the economic or materialist view of history. And the second is how far the truest greatness of man is bound up with national self-assertion involving the forcible maintenance of unity in societies against disruption within and hostility without. The problems are, perhaps, the same problem repeated at two different levels. The first, it might be said, asks how far the forces of nature control the destinies of man; the second, how far the relatively natural force of society, its ability to threaten and to exercise physical compulsion, is an agency essential to its highest functions.

On these two problems, it has always appeared to me, very important suggestions may be drawn from the history of Greece. The schism which has hitherto existed between modern sociology and classical studies has had the effect of depriving the theory of society of a set of examples which display, in the clearest and simplest shape, the connection between determinate physical conditions and a singularly lofty social achievement.

In general, and with reference to both problems, we are to note the very high individuality of the Greek race, and the greatness of the results which it achieved within narrow boundaries of space and time. Thus on the one hand the effects are highly determinate, and on the other hand the conditions, both material and political, are tolerably simple and limited; so that both conditions and effects are capable of a fuller correlation than is usually possible in sociological inquiry. And the subject of the present lecture has been suggested by

the fact that both as regards material and economic conditions, and as regards the type and degree of political cohesion, the minds of Greek statesmen and thinkers reflect the circumstances of their world with extraordinary directness and precision. We seem to see the policy of this and that great mind growing out of the soil and the geographical relations, and completing and emphasizing their suggestions, just as wild plants or cultivated crops, or even the dwelling-places of man, follow and mark the lines and surfaces of a favorable habitat.

1. As regards the connection of Hellenic life and character with soil, climate, and geography, we may start from an interesting antithesis which makes itself felt in the simplest economic interpretation of history. Is a very fertile country, or one which demands much care and labor for its returns, more favorable to civilization? Neither side of the alternative, of course, cuts off the connection between conditions and character; but at the same time a certain bias as to the relative importance of factors in the problem reveals itself in the answer which we give. Buckle is inclined to insist upon the fact that the oldest civilizations belong to countries of extreme natural fertility,—India, Babylonia, Egypt. But it seems also important to point out that progressive civilization, in the modern European sense, has as yet only been found within the temperate zone. A nature that affords occasions for struggle, producing definite achievements by success, does more for man in the end than one that seems to do all. Professor Geddes has pointed out how the conditions which induce parasitic degeneration are "freedom from danger, abundant alimentation and complete repose, etc.; in short, the conditions commonly considered those of complete material well-being." *

The sides of the above antithesis correspond with the marked feeling of the Greeks as to the material basis of their own life when contrasted with that of the Asiatics with whom they came in contact. From the Homeric description of Ithaca, "a rugged country, but a good breeder of men," to the saying of the Spartan in Herodotus, "Poverty is always at

* Encycl. Brit., art. "Parasitism."

home in Greece," * a whole series of anecdotes and observations—brought to a climax in the splendidly imagined interview of Solon and Crœsus—show a deep-rooted sense of the sparingness of nature in Greece as compared with her bounteousness in Asia. More particularly, no doubt, the Greek mind was influenced by the immediate contrast between the territory of Greece proper and that of the Greek cities of the Levant, which in the age of mature political experience were always tributary either to Greece proper on the one hand or to Persia on the other. The real reason for their defencelessness was rather their position on the coast line of a continent than the mildness of their climate or the wealth of their territory; but it is remarkable to find an agreement between the historian and the physician that an energetic and spirited disposition could not be expected in a climate so pleasantly tempered. †

Not that the Greeks of Greece proper were discontented with their own country. On the contrary, they believed it to be the best in the world as a breeder of men, whose type was equally remote from the untamable rudeness of Northern Europe and from the cringing trickiness which they ascribed to the Asiatic.

And it is true that their territory had an extraordinary aptness, of which its inhabitants were partly aware, to suggest and respond to definitely specialized forms of civilized achievement.

The maritime character of Greece proper, the ethical and intellectual importance of which was first, I believe, pointed out by Winckelmann, the great student of Greek plastic art, is too familiar to be enlarged upon. It is enough to note how it is suggested by the character of Greek territory,—a coast line of bays and peninsulas, the latter carried on in lines of islands; much like portions of the Scotch coast, where you

* Hdt., 7, 102. The whole passage illustrates the Greek feeling in question. "In Greece poverty is native and virtue is artificial, being achieved by wisdom and the strength of law; and by its help Greece defends herself against both poverty and despotism."

† Hdt., 1, 142. Stein's note, quoting Hippocrates.

send a boat if you need the doctor or minister as naturally as elsewhere you might send a carriage. Look at the peninsula of which Salonika stands at the northwest and Mount Athos at the southeast angle; note how it reproduces on a small scale the outline of the Morea; and then read its history during the lifetime of Demosthenes, how, as an isolated bit of Hellenic ground, it was the first to fall under the dominion of the non-Hellenic * powers.

Consider again the cantonal character of the Greek territory; how the greatness of the several states followed from the size of the plains which were enclosed within their respective mountain walls; and how the structure of the Achæan league, the earliest Federal Government, was prefigured by the row of valleys, attached to each other side by side and not rounded into a centralized unity, which made up the state of Achaia. A classical example of this kind of study has been given by the historian Curtius in his great work on the Peloponnese; and those who desire an object lesson in the correlation of character and circumstance might do worse, if prepared to familiarize themselves with Greek history, than take him as their guide.

The position of Greece proper in the Mediterranean, and in relation to the Levant and the islands of the Ægean, is no less significant for history than its internal structure. The whole country is, so to speak, turned towards the East. The bays and natural harbors of Greece proper, and the lines of islands which guide and encourage the voyages of early mariners, lie to the East; and the basin of the Ægean, as the well-known opening sentences of Curtius's history point out, is rather a bond † than a division between Europe and Asia. Here in this predetermined focus of life, commerce, and ideas, continuous with the Euxine, with Asia Minor, and with Syria, Egypt, and Cyrene, we have the central area of the Greek

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* This illustration, as all in these remarks that is worth anything, I owe to my teacher, Mr. W. L. Newman, of Balliol, the editor of Aristotle's Politics.

† *Cf.* the relation of the Hanse towns to the North Sea, pointed out by Professor Geddes in lectures.

dispersion, the basis of leagues and empires under Athens, Sparta, Alexander, and Rome, forming a homogeneous world of civilization, the field of Hellenistic and of Greco-Roman culture, and ultimately the seed-plot of Christianity.

Turning to our immediate problem, the natural endowments of Attica in particular, in relation to the conceptions of Athenian statesmen, we note in them simply an intensification of the characteristics belonging to Hellenic ground as a whole.

First of all we have to observe the central position of Athens in the world of maritime commerce of the fifth century B.C. She lay in the centre of the water-ways of the Mediterranean much as England lies in the centre of the maritime world to-day; and her natural harbors, of ample extent according to ancient standards, though not comparable with the vast harbor spaces of London, of New York, or of modern Marseilles, made it possible for her to use her position to the full.

In the next place, the internal resources of Attica point in the same way to an artificial—a commercial or industrial—type of life. The soil was not first-rate cornland, and no large population could have been maintained upon it by agriculture. The home corn-supply was probably enough for from half to two-thirds* of the year, when the population was at its maximum; in the United Kingdom the supply of foreign wheat began to exceed the home product about 1870. What Attica did possess was a good soil for olive, vine, and fig culture,† an inexhaustible store of the choicest marble, a supply of clay adapted for pottery, a sea well stocked with fish, a flora which gave the choicest honey, and above all, silver mines, from which a considerable revenue was drawn, and owing to which the Attic silver coinage had a general currency like that of English gold, and Athens could always pay for her

* It is interesting to see Socrates putting this question to the young would-be statesman as one of the first things he ought to know. But the young man has not given it his attention. Xen. Mem., 3, 6, 13.

† The soil of Greece requires irrigation, and it is interesting to see the process going on to-day just as it is described by Homer.

imports in specie if commodities suitable for export were not forthcoming.

Now, the instructive point is that we observe, from the beginning of recorded history, a perfectly definite grasp of these conditions in the minds of Athenian statesmen. It would lead us too far to furnish details of the legislation and government of the sixth century B.C. But it may be taken as well known that the great legislator and the great prince who are the prominent figures of that century at Athens felt themselves to be dealing with a community whose future lay in industry, commerce, art, and letters. The admission to citizenship of foreigners exercising a trade, which is ascribed to Solon's legislation, stands out as an act of far-sighted liberality against the policy advocated in many quarters even to-day.

By the end of the sixth century, then, what we may call the suggestions of nature had already found their response in the Athenian mind. Athenian sculpture and building were fast rising into fame; Athens was becoming noted for pottery and for other products depending for their value upon skill in manufacture, such, for example, as olive oil; and the silver mines were producing a revenue to the state and to individuals, though the later and fateful application of that revenue had not yet been devised. Further, the city had already stations and factories over-sea, and more particularly had laid on the region of the Hellespont the grasp which it afterwards tightened with economic results of the highest importance.

Thus the mind of Athens is from the beginning a mind racy of the native ground and the native sea; and when we look at the cutting and setting of the marble blocks and drums on the sacred hill of Athene, we feel that above all things we have to do with a people to whom the working of marble and the building of walls and columns came as naturally as farming to an Englishman or horse-breaking to an Australian.

Omitting many things which would illustrate our point of view if it was possible to go into them,—for example, the decisive democratic reforms which closed the century in question,—let us look for one moment at the inherent logic of the

Athenian mind as its world shaped itself further in the two great fifth century statesmen, Themistocles and Pericles.

In the first thirty years of the fifth century, or thereabouts, the attempt of the Persian empire to extend itself over European Greece was defeated, very greatly by the services of those poorer classes at Athens who formed the crews of the Athenian war-galleys.

Now, according to the story, which there is no reason to doubt, the existence of this powerful fleet of galleys was first made possible by the success of Themistocles in persuading the people to abandon the annual distribution per head of the silver revenue and apply it to building year by year a certain quota of ships. And the creation of this powerful fleet involved three closely connected results: first, the defeat of Xerxes and the liberation of the Levantine cities from his power; secondly, the maritime supremacy of Athens among the Greeks, and consequently her leadership and ultimately her empire; and, thirdly, the intimate and inherent connection of the democracy at home and the empire abroad, inasmuch as the latter rested on the skill and energy of the maritime populace who rowed the galleys.

But such a war fleet, not to speak of the commerce which it was to support, needed a defensible harbor. Here, again, the mind of the statesman revealed itself at the critical moment as penetrated with the individual and determinate capacities of his native territory. The selection and fortification of the headland of Peiræus with its three natural harbors, one of them a bay three-quarters of a mile in its greatest length, may seem no very gigantic conception to us who reckon our wharf frontages by miles and miles. But it was enough to secure a sea-power to Athens adequate to deal with anything that could be brought against it within the Greek and Phœnician world, and it presented itself with extraordinary felicity as the complement of the other capacities of Attica and the condition of their being effectively realized. The harbor town which grew up round the new harbors was the favorite work of Themistocles. It was to Athens what the East End is to London, because of its including the harbors and docks,

the commercial and democratic centre. Themistocles, we are explicitly told, thought the Peiræus more valuable than Athens itself, and constantly advised the Athenians, if they should ever be overborne in a war on land, to take refuge in its fortifications and hold the sea.

In this there was something of the peculiar stamp of Themistocles's mind: a want of balance, of completeness, characteristic of one who it is said was not of full citizen birth, and reminding us of his answer, when invited to join in the music at a party,—this being an ordinary social accomplishment of an Athenian gentleman,—that "he could not fiddle, but he could make a petty town into a great city."

However this may be, if we summon before our mind's eye the appearance of Attica, say, ten years after the repulse of Xerxes, with Athens and Peiræus both successfully fortified by Themistocles's suggestion and contrivance, and the growing energies of the city making their mark triumphantly in art and industry, in war and external politics, we shall perceive in every characteristic of the busy scene at once a gift of nature and the stamp of great intelligences, working, through the logic of events, as a single intelligence.

And now, bearing in mind that we are only selecting a point here and there out of a mass of material, let us turn to Pericles.

Comparing his characteristic policy with that of Themistocles, we find it written on the face of the country by the famous Long Walls, impregnable fortifications extending a distance of five miles from the fortified city to the fortified harbor. Pericles, then, was resolute to sacrifice neither element of Athenian life, neither power nor splendor, neither democracy nor the pride of culture. He was determined, as it seems, to give a national value to his ancient city, which had such capacities for magnificence and refinement; and to do this he was aware that he must weld it into inseparable unity with the instruments of its maritime supremacy.

And in the great works by which he gave this imperishable value to the life of his city we may trace once more a wonderful continuity between the gifts of nature and the creations

of genius. Pericles, of course, was not the first to deal with that rocky elevation in the centre of the Athens of his day, which became under his direction the most glorious sanctuary of art in the whole world. From time immemorial its surface had been used as a fort or palace or both; it had, indeed, been the ancient city. And in the course of centuries, by the work of kings and statesmen, the sloping rock had been built up and levelled into a spacious surface, bounded by sweeping curves, supported upon huge retaining walls, whose varied workmanship indicates the succession of generations occupied upon the construction.

So, then, when we see to-day the vast marble floors, the walls and columns, with their blocks and drums fitted to a hair's-breadth, standing on a spacious and grandly outlined surface, we should call to mind that while part of this surface is the living rock, part of it again is the work of man.* And we may say without a paradox that if the greatness of Athens is in one sense a gift of nature, yet the central endowment of its nature, the very ground in which its glory is rooted, is a creation of the national mind.

Thus the life of Greece and of Athens is an emphatic object-lesson in the relation of natural data to genius and character. A great life is, as it were, the flowering of nature in the medium of great intelligence. The highest genius does not make the least but the most of the nature which is its world. Aspects and characteristics of material things, which are silent to others, tell their secret to the gifted race or to the great statesman. But in making the most of nature, we must not forget that genius transforms nature. Nature, we may say, ceases to be mere nature when it becomes "a world" for mind. Its rough circuitous selection is replaced by an ideal selection which is rapid and direct. Its imperfect forms of unity are replaced by the forms of intelligence, making possible, for instance, such a transformation as that of the animal brood into the human family. The very surface

* The Parthenon, with its thousands of tons of marble, showing no trace of settlement, stands at one side on the living rock, at the other on thirty to forty feet of made earth and foundations.

of the earth becomes, as we have seen, not, indeed, something which is other than nature, but a larger nature charged with mind.

The error of commonplace materialist views of history seems to lie in the old blunder of separating two inseparable factors and then trying to substitute the one for the other. Mind and its world are inseparable correlatives; the wealth of its world is the wealth of mind, is its very substance, and the driving force of its logical or ethical operation. Mind, it might be said, is the world taken as alive and focussed. "Circumstances" are "what stand around;" they stand around a centre; the centre is the unity of consciousness, and when we speak of "circumstances" we are already within a sphere which is not merely "natural," but transformed by presentation to intelligence. Cut the correlatives apart at a line which must be arbitrary, and the world or circumstances are dead, and the mind is nothing. And then it is natural to exclaim that here is nothing left but dead circumstances, material data, conditions; and they must be the essence of life, for we can find nothing but them in life. This is because at some arbitrary level of their unity you have killed them by dissociating them from mind, and now you say that they "really" are what they happened to be when you killed them. But in truth they are not a dead structure, prior to mind; they are a living fabric whose variety, as penetrated with a conation towards unity, is the mainspring of mind itself. Such an economic factor as the "standard of life" shows in a moment how futile is the attempt to represent economic conditions as mechanical or material, in the sense in which material or mechanical means external to intelligence.

The Greek thinkers knew better. They knew that the function of the statesman is to elicit the idea that lies in the conditions, as the artist finds the statue in the marble. They knew that the matter of life is not alien to the aims of mind, nor a fetter upon it, but rather is the individual form or idea in its less explicit phases, pressing forward and springing up into higher shapes of unity. And they knew that economic structure is not a sort of iron framework or foundation,

affecting life but unaffected by it; but is simply one way in which the characteristic unity of any system of life expresses itself, partaking of the nature and degree of completeness of the unity attained.

The idea to be got rid of is the idea that specialized circumstances are a fetter upon individuality and genius. Homer and Shakespeare, for instance, are characteristic individual voices each of his country, race, and climate. Do we wish that it were not so? Do we think that they would be more themselves if they were not? What is the world there for if it is not, with all its rich individuality, to come to utterance in mind?

2. With the Periclean works on the Acropolis we pass naturally to our second problem, the place of force in the maintenance of a national unity. For all this splendor of Athens, all the culture and comfort of the democracy, meant imperialism; the position of a national capital maintained by force.

I will try to summarize the familiar story in a few lines. After the repulse of the Persian invasion by the services of the rowers and at the cost of a retirement which left the property of the wealthy classes a prey to the enemy, Athens had become, by the force of events, head of a naval alliance, offensive and defensive, against Persia. In time, as the object of the alliance was attained, a tendency grew in the allied cities to commute their personal services for money payments. This commutation Athens accepted, following, it is said, a far-sighted policy. But she would permit no further relaxation of obligations; and, in short, within a lapse of twenty years the alliance was transformed into an empire of some five or six hundred tributary cities, held together by overwhelming force, the fleet of the alliance being now simply the Athenian fleet maintained in part at the cost of the allies, the treasury being at Athens and under Athenian officials, and the Diet or Congress having ceased to exist. The splendor and comfort of Athenian life was greatly dependent on this relation. Athenian commerce "followed the flag." The corn trade was concentrated at Peiræus. Athens became

the judicial and political centre of a large part of Greece, and was necessarily, therefore, a place of constant resort, besides being, in consequence of the Periclean works, partly paid for by the "tribute," a centre of artistic industry.

Undoubtedly there was a serious risk of selfishness in this state of things. Every Athenian citizen might be the better in purse and was the better in prestige because of the empire. A few sentences from a contemporary pamphlet, obviously written by a shrewd anti-democrat, and not the work of Xenophon, among whose writings it has come down to us, will tell us more than pages of inference and discussion:*

"Some people think that the Athenian democracy is ill-advised in forcing the allies to come to Athens for their law-suits; but others reckon up the advantages which this brings to the democracy; first, they get their fees as jurors throughout the year out of the costs; then, again, they can sit at home and control the allied cities without sending out ships; for they favor the democrats and ruin the other side in their law courts; now, if the allies had kept their law work at home, as they dislike the Athenians, they would have ruined those of their own people who favor the Athenian democracy. In addition to this, the Athenian democracy profits by the system in the following ways. The percentage (harbor dues) at Peiræus is increased; every one who has lodgings to let is advantaged; so is every one who has a horse or a workman (slave) to hire out; the public attendants are profited by the allies coming to town." . . . "The shortage of the corn crops, which depends on the weather, matters less to a sea power than to a land power. For the shortage is not all over the world at once; and the corn from the districts where there is a full crop comes to those who have the sea power." . . . "Whatever desirable product there is in Sicily, in Italy, in Cyprus, or in Egypt, in Lydia, or in Pontus, or in Peloponnese, or anywhere else, it is all concentrated into one spot by the operation of the Athenian sea power." . . . "So, too, as regards sacrifices and temples and festivals and consecrated

* De Republ. Athen., C. 1, 16.

grounds; the democracy understands that it is impossible for each individual of the poorer classes to have sacrifices and banquets and temples of his own and to live the life of a great and beautiful city; and it has devised how this difficulty may be overcome. For they conduct their sacrifices on the method that great numbers of victims are provided by the city at the public expense; and it is the common people that banquets and has the breaking up of the victims. And so with gymnasia and dressing-rooms and baths. Some of the wealthy have these of their own; but the democracy itself builds on its own account many gymnasia and dressing-rooms and baths, and is better off in these respects than the few and the wealthy." Then follows a passage pointing out that all the various requisites for ship-building—metals, timber, flax, etc.—are not produced in any one country, and that consequently the city which has sea power is the only one which can make sure of having them all at its disposal, and can hinder any other country from acquiring them, and so from creating a fleet. We should note in addition that the free entrance to the theatre for those who chose to claim it was a characteristic point of Pericles's policy towards the democracy.

His idea evidently was that the citizens of Athens should accept the great position which was open to them, and should make themselves worthy of it by energy, justice, culture, and bravery. He would tread on the dangerous path of profit from dependencies, partly direct but especially indirect, so far as to secure the realization of conditions which would make these qualities possible for all Athenians. There are signs that if he could have found political forms adequate to the creation of a citizenship of the empire he would have tried to make use of them. But the thing, whether attempted or not, was impossible, and he turned to the other pole of government; not to be representative, or based upon consent, but to be worthy and efficient. That the immediate objects of the alliance were carried out under the Athenian empire is certain. No hostile ship nor any pirate showed its beak in the eastern Mediterranean while Athens retained her power. No account

was rendered of the tribute, but the work was done. And if the artificial pre-eminence of Athens in trade was oppressive to the greater powers among the subject states, it was probably advantageous to the lesser. The trader from a small island would do better for himself at Piræus, than if there had been no such central market, and might also obtain better justice in the Athenian courts against a member of a powerful state than he could have done apart from such a system.

Probably the position of Athens, attained at the cost of a certain aspect of selfishness, was far more deeply connected with her services to the world than has generally been admitted. The question is not merely whether the works on the Acropolis were paid for by the tribute of the allies. It affects the whole concentration of experience, the whole brilliance of life and variety of intercourse, and sense of political headship, which gave its peculiar note to the Athenian mind. Plato belonged to the Athens which had been imperial as characteristically as Ruskin to imperial England. The work of Athens was national, not merely in the cost and style of her buildings —the Parthenon was a Doric temple—but in the varied and representative quality of her thought. Even Sparta, the silent sister, bequeaths her spirit to us through Athenian writings. Athens, said Pericles, was the school of Greece; and it is worth observing that the four great cultured nations of the world—France, Germany, the United States, and Great Britain —are to-day maintaining schools at Athens. It is a great thing that men and women who mean to play their part in modern life should think it worth while to-day to put themselves in contact for a time with the spirit and memories of the Greeks.

"I have lengthened out my account of the city" because it is important to approach our problem in no half-hearted spirit. It is easy to pretend, of course, that the services rendered by Athens to the world might equally well have been achieved without the aspect of force, absolutism, and selfishness, which by universal consent attached to her empire. To me this seems quite incredible, and the suggestion savors of running away from the difficulty. Her services rested on a basis of national unity; and when men's minds were wedded to the

politics of the city-state, it was inconceivable that national unity should find a genuine political expression. It was a choice between such a unity—brief and fragile—as could be realized by force, and the privation of those achievements which Athens has given to the world. And we must say, I think, that Pericles was right, and that, if the choice was what it seems to have been, it would have been wrong and cowardly to take any other part.

But are we, then, subscribing to the gospel of "blood and iron"? What is the theoretical justification of the judgment I have suggested if it is not that for a laudable end you need stop at no oppression? And as all ends are laudable to those who desire them, it would be held to follow simply and absolutely that might is right.

I venture to put forward an explanation which at least would give room for applying criticism to such an evangel. Force, it may be suggested, is necessary and permissible in inverse ratio to political maturity. The substantive capacity of a race or people for unity and achievement may be much in advance of the formal development of their political consciousness. Then, if force is applied to break through to the latent unity and realize the full powers of the group, its members will not be more aggrieved than somebody always is under the most reasonable self-government. The force is justified or not, and on the whole is justified or not even for those subjected to it, according as it breaks through to a life worth living—a substantive unity of will—or fails to do so. For example, it can hardly be said that the subjects of Athens resented a strong ruling hand when her rule was at its best. The errors and weaknesses incident to absolute rule brought the system to an end, and it is well that this should generally happen, and that absolutism should be incapable of permanence.

But what is justifiable when the political consciousness is immature, is monstrous in face of a developed political capacity. Force, indeed, I believe that there will always be in a state, as the mere fly-wheel of the machine, to insure regularity and carry out what has become automatic in the general mind.

But absolute government becomes irrational in as far as self-government becomes possible. Self-government, however, depends on the permeation of men's minds by forms of political co-operation adequate to the task imposed upon the community. Minds which are not thus permeated are as solid a barrier against unity as a range of mountains. What was a statesman to do with five hundred towns, united for common defence and possessed of a markedly national mind,* which had no conception of representative government, and would have rebelled if a common citizenship had been imposed upon them?

If men cannot work out the obvious problems of the time for themselves, owing to the inadequateness of their mental machinery, some one else must and will do it for them. But they learn, in time, to deal with their own affairs, and I trust that our conclusion, therefore, is not so bad as it might seem. We accept, indeed, the priceless gift which Athenian statesmen gave us, without turning up our eyes and regretting that they won it by force; but we understand for ourselves that the alternative to violence is education, and that absolutism becomes progressively less justifiable as men's minds become capable of expressing themselves effectively in the forms which constitute true political unity.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

LONDON.

* When the dependencies of the imperial democracy are of a different race, and on a different level of political capacity, from the democracy, we have a complication which did not exist in the case of Athens.

BELLIGERENT DISCUSSION AND TRUTH-SEEKING.

It is a sign of the times, and a most encouraging one, that polemical writing is losing caste. If seriously attempted, the classical attempt to "refute" a doctrine produces a smile to-day. The animus of the heresy trial is apt to return like a boomerang upon those who undertake it. All this is as it should be. Yet it sometimes seems as if the pendulum had swung so far the other way that people were beginning to distrust their capacity for profitable discussion on any terms. Many a discussion is little better than a wrangle, and to some persons all discussion seems to be practically such. On the other hand, there are few who cannot remember certain talks with old friends when insight seemed to advance more than in months of lonely thinking. Sometimes discussion is pure gain to all concerned, and makes us feel as if we could never get enough of it. For discussion is only thinking writ large, and we can scarcely give it up unless we are to give up thinking altogether. A group of friends can make up their group-mind precisely as a solitary thinker makes up his individual mind. The different sides of the question which in solitary thinking are turned over and considered within a single brain may be represented each by a single speaker. When thinking alone there is always danger that we may forget altogether to consider certain important aspects of the question, or that, from want of definite expression, the whole thing may be so murky and dim that the actual collisions or re-enforcements, the relative proportions and places of the different parts, may escape us. But get each view represented by a living companion and the resulting division of labor is as effective as in manufactures, or in a court of justice. We have decided that, as a rule, the court can make up its mind better if the pros and cons which the jury would otherwise have to remember and consider for themselves are impersonated by separate individuals,—the

prosecuting and defending attorneys and the judge,—each of whom is responsible, like any specialist, for a certain portion of the problem in hand, and undertakes to present what is to be said from a given point of view. This method works so well that it is sometimes applied too literally to ordinary discussion. But in satisfactory discussions the general principle of division of labor is supplemented by the stimulating effect of mind on mind. We think more clearly when we have to present and defend our views in speech or writing, and the simple statement of a view contrasting with our own often sets our mental machinery humming in a most gratifying way.

Discussion, then, is not at all likely to be given up, and in studies other than philosophical there does not seem to be any dissatisfaction felt corresponding to our increasing distrust of philosophical polemics. Students of pedagogy, for instance, are constantly converting one another, modifying and enlarging each other's views, and getting from one another an increased power to deal effectively with the problems before them. But it is the rarest thing in the world to hear of a philosopher's conversion. Need this be so? What is it that makes one discussion more profitable than another?

In attempting to answer these questions, I shall simply state the results of the personal experience of one inveterately fond of discussion. In my own experience it has appeared that discussions have been satisfactory and instructive to all concerned in proportion as the following beliefs have been more or less unconsciously acted on:

1. That the essence of proof is exemplification or a reference to experience common to the disputants.

2. That all dissent should take the form of an attempt to reinterpret in a more comprehensive way the common experience under discussion.

3. That no opinion can be criticised adversely unless it has been understood so thoroughly that one feels decidedly tempted to adopt it; while, on the other hand, no opinion can be supported by one who has not felt the objections to it so strongly that he is tempted to reject it.

4. That there are many important views of life which we cannot hope to understand without a pretty complete knowledge of their relations to the rest of the life of him who holds them.

5. That our instinctive aversion towards an opinion which differs from our own is not infrequently strong just in proportion to our ignorance of its actual significance, and that, hence, such natural hostility should be discounted in advance.

6. That we should attempt no paraphrase of an opponent's views, except in such phrases as we genuinely believe he might himself use.

7. That in characterizing another's doctrine we should never affix such adjectives as "mere," "bare," "dead," "brute," "abstract," and the like to his expressions (*e.g.*, "mere, dead atoms," "pure abstract idealism," etc.).

I believe in these rules chiefly because I have seen them *work* well, and accordingly my argument consists of attempts to exhibit their working in contrast with that of other rules followed (as before, unconsciously) by the participants in many current philosophical discussions spoken or written. I shall now try to exemplify each of them.

I.

For purposes of discussion the essence of proof is exemplification.

Obviously there can be no rational discussion without a common topic; there must be a set of experiences common to the disputants, which they try by discussion to interpret and understand. No doubt, all of us have been through the irritating experience of finding at the end of a long discussion that our opponent has been talking of one thing and we of another. I have seen two men come almost to blows in supposed disagreement about temperance, only to discover in the end that one of them *disbelieved* in temperance, supposing it to signify total abstinence from alcoholic drinks, while the other *believed* in it in the sense of moderate use of alcohol. One was talking of abstinence, the other of moderation. They

agreed entirely in their conduct, and differed only in words. But my present point is that they never *intended* to talk of different things, else their discussion could never have arisen.

But what is there in discussion besides an announcement of the subject? I should say that in the most profitable discussions we do nothing but describe or point to the topic in such a way that certain less obvious aspects of it become clearer to all concerned. In relatively unprofitable discussions we do a great deal else, but wherever much progress in thought is made we find (according to my experience) that the words and opinions of the disputants are much like *gestures of pointing*. They are like the motions of a showman as he points out the less obvious characteristics of an animal to a knot of interested spectators. As he points, they look on and verify or modify his descriptions of the parts. They see the end of the elephant's trunk, which the showman says is like a finger, but they comment to themselves that it would be a very short and flabby finger.

Similarly, in trying to convince any one on a topic in philosophy, most first-rate disputants begin by getting clearly before the audience a case of what they mean. In the twenty-sixth chapter of his "Psychology," Professor James describes to us the state of mind of a man who is trying to decide about getting out of bed on a cold morning. This is to illustrate the doctrine of the Will, and the description is so good that the case is before us as vividly as though it were a patient wheeled into a medical lecture-room to illustrate the lecturer's views. "The nature of Will is such a thing as *there* occurs," Professor James might say, and we can hardly fail to understand him, for all his arguments are gestures. The kind of metaphor used shows a persistent attempt to keep the concrete facts clearly before the audience. This "*obviously*" is so and so—this is *evident*, this you *see*, we call your *attention* to this. By derivation, an illustration is that which "lights up" or makes clear; a *demonstration* is a "pointing out" (evidently with the showman's gesture in view); proof is a "testing" or "sampling," while "exemplify" is a word which goes back to

the movement of a buyer who picks up an article to test it that he may judge of its value.

But derivative meanings are often superseded, and I rest my argument for the statement that proof is exemplification on an appeal to any one's experience with successful and unsuccessful discussions. Is it not true that the successful and profitable arguments have been those where the appeal to examples was frequent and skilful? Our friends who were disputing as to "Temperance" would have got down to business much quicker, had either of them given a case of what he meant. The whole misunderstanding would thus have been avoided, for their meaning—what they cared about—was identical. To begin by defining our terms is tedious and often impracticable. It may create as many misunderstandings as it removes, for the terms used in the definition need defining themselves. But a case or a story defines our symbols very easily. I do not mean an allegory, or an analogy, but an incarnation of the principle itself.

In his brilliant essay on "Education," Mr. J. J. Chapman says of Froebel: "His intention was so concentrated upon fact" (the facts of children's development) "that his terminology does not mislead. It can be translated into the language of metaphysics, of Christian theology, or of modern science, and it remains incorruptibly coherent.* What an oasis is an illustration in the pages of a difficult writer! Eagerly we scan the horizon till we see one, struggle along to it, and when we reach it we get strength to go on. In Hegel, an illustration is like the first gulp of air to the diver as he rises to the surface after a long submersion. And yet, with any writer who is alive and earnest, the doctrines he preaches are the reflex of his experiences. Often one wishes he would give us the experience and leave out the doctrine. Emerson's account of a preacher who thought to prove without exemplification is very typical of what I mean. "A snow-storm was falling around us. The snow-storm was real, the preacher merely spectral. . . . He had lived in vain. He had no one word in-

* "Causes and Consequences," by John J. Chapman (Scribner), p. 84.

timating that he had laughed or wept, was married or in love, had been commended or cheated or chagrined. If he had ever lived and acted, we were none the wiser for it." (Divinity Hall Address.)

It may be said that in pure deductive reasoning or logical construction, illustrations are not needed; but I think the illustrations are still there, though in a slightly different form. In proving a proposition in geometry, what we do is to point out by diagrams and other devices certain aspects of the axioms which at first sight are less obvious than the axioms themselves. This is just what the showman does with his elephant, or the psychologist with his case of will.

Again, when one shows a statement to be self-contradictory what one does is to exhibit its failure to *work* when actually applied to a case. Thus, if our opponent makes the statement: "There exists an unknowable Being or Force," the attempt to show that this is self-contradictory naturally begins with some such question as this: "What makes you think so?" or "How do you know it?" The answer must contain some appeal to a case in point and the original proposition is thus upset, since it appears that in practice one knows a good deal about the unknowable.

Or, once more, to deduce a corollary from a principle is to exhibit a new or unfamiliar *working* of the principle, as is done in the second term of a syllogism. If the Monroe Doctrine be that no aggression of European powers in the United States is to be tolerated—the corollary, "The Venezuela boundary-dispute must be submitted to arbitration," is deduced *via* the decision that England's action in the matter is an example, or illustration of aggression such as the Monroe Doctrine means.

The examples given in the last few pages are what I mean when I say that in profitable discussions all proof is essentially exemplification. In Professor Royce's recent paper on the "Psychology of Invention," * he says, "These experiments do not indeed prove, but do in miniature illustrate a thesis

* *The Psychological Review*, 1898.

whose proof I should leave to the whole history of invention." Here, obviously, proof means only the results of *more* illustrations upon the mind. The history of invention is to complete the proof by the accumulation of supplementary illustrations. In a similar sense I should say that the proof of my thesis that demonstration is illustration is to be left to the *whole history of discussion*, out of which I have selected certain bits which seemed suggestive of the rest.

II.

In progressive or convincing discussions, all dissent from another's views takes the form of an attempt to reinterpret, in a way more comprehensive than his, the common experience which is under consideration.

When a person says, "I understand your meaning perfectly, but I differ from it entirely," we can only take his words to signify this: "I see what you mean, but I think it badly expressed," or "Your meaning does not reach me at all."

If these latter phrases express dissent, why then dissent has a most vital function to perform in all discussion. But any other kind of dissent, any dissent which is of the type of the classic "refutation," or which implies that any view can be totally false or meaningless, does not exist, so far as I know, in the kind of discussion that widens mental horizons and nourishes character.

I remember a lady who repeatedly expressed the belief that all men are cross before dinner. What are we to do with a statement like this? The most useless thing that we could do would be to dissent and call it false. There must be some meaning there behind the words, some experience badly described. Inquiry showed that the lady in question was a person cut off by the nature of her duties from all masculine society except that of her husband and her son, both of whom were usually cross when their stomachs were empty. This was what she meant, as, on questioning, she admitted. From her meaning I could not dissent. Her facts were facts, and it was these she had in mind. It is easy to say: "The mean-

ing is the inference, the personal reaction upon the facts, and thus may be wholly false and deserving of our hearty dissent." But with serious people it is rarely true, I think, that the meaning is all in the inference. A serious man "means business;" he means to state the truth, and means that you should get behind both his words and his inference to the facts he is trying to express. There is no occasion for going to the dictionary and trying to read the man's meaning out of the definitions of his words, for it is not *the* words but *his* words that you wish to understand. His words are a piece of the expression of his life, to be understood not in their isolated, dictionary signification, but, so far as may be, as he uses them, or as a part of him. He genuinely sees something and we have got to see it too, if we are to get his meaning. After that, we can consider the question of terms and adopt his language or make him adopt a better. In the same fine essay, from which I have already quoted, Mr. Chapman says,—

"If you wish to convince a man that you are right, concede that from his point of view he is right; *then move the point*, and he follows." (Italics mine.) To "move the point" we must first *get* it entirely; we must assimilate and, so far, adopt it. Then we are in a position to move it, and to dissent, in so far as moving it implies dissent. But this is not very far. You can only oppose that which offers resistance, and if you entirely understand a point of view before you try to move it, you and your opponent will progress together and without opposition against the common enemy,—ignorance.

Swift * writes that once, when half asleep, he fancied that he could not go on writing unless he first put out some water which he had taken into his mouth. Here there is so obviously some mistake that one could hardly be tempted to take the words literally or dissent from them. A moment's thought shows that they meant a fact,—namely, the fact that he could not *speak* without first emptying his mouth.

This is an extreme case of the sort of misunderstanding which, in less obvious forms, underlies a large percentage of

* Quoted by Bosanquet, "Essays and Addresses," p. 192.

the disagreements among philosophers. Sometimes the difference is little more than a matter of terms, and yet leads to a good deal of waste of time and strength. Mr. Bosanquet tells of a discussion between two theologians which presumably was long and heated until at last a thought flashed upon one of them and he exclaimed, "Oh, I see, my dear sir; your *God* is my *devil!*" After that understanding was possible.

If I am right in what I have been saying, our position is this: we may understand a man's meaning, or we may fail to understand it, or we may not feel clear as to whether we understand it or not. If we understand it, we have possession of the facts, or the kind of facts, which he sees, and can differ from him only as to the best method of "boxing them up for shipment from mind to mind." (Phillips Brooks.)

If we do not get at the facts on which his argument rests, we do not understand *his* argument, though we may know the dictionary meaning of every word and be able to parse the sentences. If we do not understand him, or are not sure whether we do or not, of course we can neither agree nor differ.

III.

No opinion should be criticised adversely, unless one feels decidedly tempted to adopt it, nor can any opinion be reasonably supported by any one who does not believe himself to feel the full force of the objections to it.

We all of us recognize the *naïveté* of any attempt to support a doctrine like, say, that of "innate ideas," without recognizing the obvious objections to it. It is like going into a modern naval battle in a dory, with bows and arrows for artillery. But we may fail to see the equal absurdity of attacking a doctrine in which we see no considerable truth. The figure of the straw man who is then our adversary ought to rise before our minds. In presence of any serious argument that seems to upset or contradict our own, or to be devoid of meaning, our first duty is to understand it; our second is to understand it; our third is to understand it. We have no other concern. This, of course, applies only to serious dis-

cussion, in which our companions are presumably as sane as we are, and as desirous of reaching the truth about the matter in hand. Otherwise, discussion is a farce. And yet in practice it is rare to hear or read a discussion in which none of the arguments imply that the "opponent's" opinion is a riddle with no answer, an utter mystery, a "*Ding an sich.*"

Some years ago I wrote a college thesis in criticism of Professor Royce's ethical system. That thesis seems to me today a very fine example of the wrong way to criticise,—the way which condemns a view without having ever personally experienced its force. "Remember that the opponent's view is convincing to him, and should be at least plausible to you." *

In the thesis to which I refer I have the best of reasons for knowing that I was judging adversely something the meaning of which I never had seen. I had read over many times the pages which I criticised, but never with any attempt at sympathetic comprehension. Instead of that, I pointed out with great glee seventeen respects in which I held that Professor Royce had contradicted himself. As I look over that thesis now, I see that not only did I fail to get an inkling of his meaning, but that I never for a moment attempted to do so. I was too busy warding off what I took to be attacks upon my own beliefs. To believe my own truth, I thought it necessary to knock over everybody else's.

A classical example of this attitude is to be seen in the long controversy which took place in the English magazines some years ago between Professor Huxley and the Duke of Argyle. To me the most striking thing about the contest was the absence of any attempt on either side to understand the other's meaning. It was "sparring for points" throughout,—efforts to raise a laugh at the opponent's expense, to put him in an uncomfortable position, to show his utter absurdity, insincerity, and incompetence. Apparently no suspicion crossed either combatant's mind that his opponent meant facts of some kind, and must have some sort of human expe-

* I think this sentence is from a lecture by Professor G. H. Palmer.

rience behind his words. Oh, no! The opponent was always assumed to be a "*Ding an sich*" whom it was out of the question to understand, and who was to be crushed and forgotten as quickly and thoroughly as possible. Such judgments argue the incompetence of the critic, for they always prove too much. They prove not simply that the opponent's doctrine is mistaken, but that he has no doctrine at all: that his words are the babblings of one temporarily insane or wilfully blind to truth, which, of course, reduces the criticism to an absurdity.

In literary criticism it is fast getting to be an accepted canon that one cannot criticise an author unless one likes him. No one would think he could understand and judge a character in history without feeling the force of the motives that moulded his life. The scientific observer does not go at stubborn new facts with a club to crush them into submission. The translator does not try to "refute," terrify, or abash his text; yet it would be hardly more unreasonable for him to do so than for a philosopher to treat his opponent's opinions as "essentially false." Huxley was probably not very seriously tempted to hold the Duke of Argyle's position. He was like the schoolmaster, of whom Hegel tells, who gravely pointed out to his scholars the wicked selfishness of Alexander's vaulting ambition, and compared it with his own unselfishness in forbearing to conquer the East.

There is the same element of incompetent self-righteousness about any man who ventures to condemn as false a doctrine which he is not tempted to believe. The opponent's opinions are to the philosopher what the facts are to the scientist, the records to the historian, the text to the translator. They are something to work at, something to take in and find a place for, if possible; if not, they are "some of our failures," as Beau Brummel's vâlet said of the cravats he could not tie.

It may be thought that I have mistaken the vocation of the philosopher, and conceived it as too nearly akin to that of the student of history, or of natural science. "The scientific man has his definite facts before him to which he is subordinate, to

which he can constantly refer, and his whole work is to record, not to judge. But philosophy deals with opinions, with abstract ideas, general conceptions and universal truths, rather than with particular facts. It rises above them, and is to be judged rather by its inner self-consistency than by its correspondence with facts."

There is no doubt that many have attempted to work at philosophy in this way, and have brought it into disrepute thereby. The popular idea that the philosopher lives in a world of very abstruse conceptions, "heights of metaphysical argument which he scales easily and in the rare atmosphere of which he is able to sustain himself" * gives him a very unenviable position in society. For no one else wants to scale these dizzy heights, and ordinary air contains none too much oxygen for common-sense lungs. The work of the sage in this rare atmosphere is generally agreed to be the splitting of hairs and the spinning of cobwebs of "pure thought" out of his inner consciousness. What else can he do, since he has forsaken the world of facts? If philosophy can cut loose from experience, if it has any use to which to put abstract ideas and general conceptions, except to make them concrete and practical as fast as possible, why then it certainly seems to me to deserve the contempt and neglect which it now receives from so many sources.

But what is important for my present purpose is to recognize that such a conception of philosophy renders discussion impossible. The typical dealer in abstract general ideas was the New England Transcendentalist of forty years ago. A speech by Mr. Alcott or one of his disciples was (very possibly) a phenomenon similar to the biblical "gift of tongues," in which the sentences were themselves the experience, and referred to nothing beyond. It was like music:—no one was supposed to receive any definite impression, and as each had his own "gift of tongues" no discussion could take place. It was a mistake to try to get our bearings through reference to examples. There were none.

* See Mr. Lushington's introduction to Professor Ferrier's "Lectures on Greek Philosophy," p. xxiv.

I suppose this conception of philosophy has mostly died out, or at any rate become subconscious. Any "general truth" or "abstract idea" is agreed to *be about something*, and that something is the experience which the idea endeavors to convey. An example of it could always be given. Yet now and then something crops out which shows that "ideas" are still interpreted in some quarters as something else than accounts of experience. With the sterility of such philosophy as this, I am just now concerned only in so far as it makes discussion impossible. If the philosopher has not his data to interpret, as much as the student of history has, there is nothing to discuss and no way of holding the disputants together.

But does not one differ utterly and entirely from the burglar when one throws the coal-hod at him? Need one sympathize with his motives before venturing to judge them? No judgment about his motives is necessary for action. To fight the burglar or get him shut up, one need not judge his actions, nor the "opinions" or motives from which they spring. One acts against him, as one makes any quick, forced decision, under a suspension of judgment as to the precise merits of the question. We can differ, then, so far as action demands, without judging at all; but such a difference cannot be put forward as an argument. It has no claim to truth and is therefore excluded from discussion. But if we are to judge fairly we must appreciate the full force of the temptation to do or to believe any of the alternatives offered, before we can support or condemn any.

IV.

My fourth observation about the most profitable discussions is that in them the participants realize that:

"*There are important views of life which we cannot hope to understand without a pretty full knowledge of their context in the life of him who holds them.*"

It may be thought that my frequent reference to "experience" or "facts" as contrasted with abstract, or "pure" thought, implies that I hope to separate the matter of knowledge from

its form, and get at the simple sensations or bare uncategorized data.

But I intend no such separation. By the "facts" I mean nothing more sensuous or immediate than the examples to which any truth refers and in which it is verified. In seeking to understand a companion, I simply desire to see the matter in hand as he saw it before he constructed his sentences, or made the special gestures through which it is to be conveyed to me. Now, as a piece of technique useful to accomplish this, it has seemed to me that in difficult cases, where differences of opinion are chronic and apparently incurable, nothing is so effective as an inquiry into the *natural history* and *philosophical ancestry* of the opinions concerned. If we can find out under what conditions a given belief grew up, we may, by subjecting ourselves, imaginatively or actually, to similar conditions, get a similar point of view. It is natural then to ask, "How long have you thought that? What appeared to develop the opinion? Out of what earlier opinions did it grow, and was the growth influenced by reading certain books, by intimacy with certain friends, by the experience of success, of passion, of contemplation, of grief?"

In many cases I doubt whether there is any shorter way to get at the meaning of another's views than to investigate his biography. Such helps to comprehension as are used in trying to understand an historic character are, I think, too much neglected in the case of living companions whose views we think very strange yet worth understanding. The method is slow and laborious, and perhaps rarely worth while, except from a purely psychological interest; but my point is that unless we have the opportunity for such methods of studying an opinion, we should not expect to comprehend it, and so, of course, should not be willing to differ from it.

It has been suggested in many recent philosophical discussions, and from various points of view, that beliefs are inseparable from motor attitudes,—*i.e.*, from plans of action nascent or expressed. Our ideas about fire express our knowledge about how to produce it, how to prevent its going out, how to avoid being burned, how to answer a question as to its chemical

basis. It is from this point of view that I say that it is often impossible to understand a man's beliefs without such a knowledge of his corresponding activities as would be furnished by living in the same house with him and watching his behavior in the details of practical life.

It has happened to me more than once to differ from a friend very strongly upon some philosophical question, and then to get at the whole root of the difficulty by climbing a mountain with him, trying to help him in drafting a resolution, or in managing private theatricals.

All this seems natural enough if we think of a man's opinions as an integral part of him, and not as something which can be taken off or put on like a mask. They must be affected by all he does, and, in turn, color all his actions. "Here is the most excellent gentleman in America, an old idealist, untouchably transcendental. To your amazement he thinks that it is occasionally necessary to subsidize the powers of evil. He was bred a banker. . . . What has happened to that radical that he seems to have become so moderate and reasonable? You find that for six months he has been clerk to the Civil Service Reform Club. . . . This man is an optimist. It means that he has struggled. That man is a pessimist. It means that he has shirked." *

In these quotations the opinions are, perhaps, too easily accounted for. Their source is probably not so plain as all that. Yet such a method of approaching the study of an opinion as is here suggested seems to me of the greatest value for philosophy. Men who *must* understand each other, those whose life and fortune depend upon a considerable degree of mutual comprehension, men of action and of affairs, use this method day in and day out. They could not get on without it, and I believe that if we took our philosophical labors as seriously, if we always "meant business," and desired truth not only as "good seekers" but as "*good finders*," we should never neglect investigation along this line.

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* From Chapman's essay quoted above.

V.

I do not intend to say that the task of mutual comprehension is an easy one. On the contrary, I wish to emphasize its difficulties, for I think that the unprofitableness of many discussions is due to our failing to recognize how arduous it is to understand any one, and how costly of energy. As I watch men in discussion, it often seems to me that they get oblivious and their attention is distracted just when the most difficult part of the undertaking is at hand. When the differences of opinion begin to crop out, I often catch myself paying less attention and thinking chiefly of my own forthcoming retorts, instead of buckling down to the desperately hard task of interpretation and reconstruction. If an idea means more than the words that express it, it means an attitude towards life, a way of dealing with experience. To take in, assimilate, and use an idea relatively new to us is about as much of an undertaking as to learn to paint in water-colors or to run a large hotel. It means prolonged effort and skill,—skill which I may be as incapable of acquiring as of learning to jump a six-foot fence. It means a wrench and a strain of our mental ligaments, and *it hurts*. It hurts to grow, and every relatively new idea means growth. Mental habits are even harder to change than physical habits, and a new idea may mean so thorough an overhauling and rearrangement of our mental furniture that the change wracks us as abstaining from tobacco wracks an inveterate smoker. Naturally we do not care to go through such changes often; possibly we could not stand it.

As we read a new work on philosophy, we often notice that there are certain passages which stand out very clear and luminous, while others are misty and easily drop out of sight. Some of us have to go through the mortification of finding on reflection that the luminous, sensible passages were just our own old shop-worn opinions given back to us, while the misty and easily forgotten parts were those which had a message for our ignorance. We notice over and over again the familiar traits of a friend's character, the birds whose names we already

know, so that no attention is left for the new which we may need most to see.

But besides the travail of the birth of new ideas and the fatal tendency of attention to stick to the familiar and shun what we most need, there is another hinderance to our getting any new ideas,—viz., our disposition to regard anything that we don't understand as hostile and dangerous. This is not peculiar to the hide-bound conservative. Most radicals have a few favorite, weak points, about which they are solid conservatives. On these points a new idea seems to mean a charge of inefficiency. That an idea is new to us means that we have been slack in our work, and we naturally resent the imputation. Suggest to any country almshouse superintendent a cheaper method of making bread for the inmates, and nine times out of ten, even if it lessens his own work, his instinct is expressed in objection to the innovation. For besides the natural inertia towards any mental readjustment, there is a general uneasiness as to the security of his tenure of office. If one flaw can be found, why not more? This last fear has its parallel in thought. The new idea may upset the whole fabric of our personality. In simple self-defence we resist, and all our forces of resistance rush to repel the invasion, as in a child who begins to cry for the loss of his pudding, but goes on crying for all the accumulated disappointments of months. It is more than selfish conservatism. It may be a life-and-death struggle. "To take away a man's belief," said a friend of mine, "is like taking off his skin. Perhaps you can put on a better skin, but he'll die meantime."

So it happens that as new ideas rise above our mental horizon we often tend to resist them more strongly the more important they are for our development. To look away from such ideas, to dissent from them vigorously, even to feel some irritation towards them, is only to obey the natural reflex of self-preservation. But once become clearly conscious of this, and we can never do it again with the same *naïve* assurance. We begin to "discount" our own enthusiastic opposition. The clean-cut dissent that used to seem so virile, so independent and original, henceforth appears as simple

Jingoism. It is natural at certain stages of development, but it is destroyed, like any form of innocence, by clearer self-consciousness. Discussions full of vigorous self-defence and gross misunderstanding are still useful. They stimulate mental activity and develop mental muscles. Each man goes home more firmly convinced than ever of the truth of his own doctrine and the falsity of his opponent's. The increased clearness about his own views which each disputant gets through such a discussion is of value both in itself and because the clearer any one-sided view gets, the sooner the difficulties in it appear, and the more likely it is to enlarge, so as, in the long run, to include even the wicked opponent's views.

But this is a very slow and round-about process compared with the method described, by using which we spend *all* our force in trying to enlarge our views by comprehending those of our companions, instead of wasting half our strength in punishing every one who is so malicious as to differ with us.

Eighteenth century controversies on religion or on philosophy very commonly took the form of sharp, decisive collisions. Christianity was either unalloyed truth in every particular or pure superstition and fraud. A philosopher had to be either an empiricist, who denied any contribution to knowledge on the part of the mind, or a pure intuitionist, for whom ideas were wholly innate and gained nothing through the use of the senses. "Either-or," true or false, was the order of the day. This was characteristic of a time not dominated, like ours, by the idea of evolution, but prone to think of every change as essentially a revolution. On the other hand, the idea of evolution, as has been often pointed out, is *a reconciling idea*, and tends to make it possible for disputants to organize their respective fragments of truth into a whole much truer and more satisfying than any of them could have achieved alone.

I have called attention already to the fact that the evolutionary idea has already remoulded biology, history, economics, and politics, and, to a much smaller extent, philosophy. In the modern histories of philosophy it has attained firm

footing, but our current philosophical discussions still retain a surprisingly large element of eighteenth century methods.

For example, in the introduction to Professor Royce's recent book on the "Conception of God," Professor Howison says (if I understand him) that neither he, nor Professor Mezes, nor Professor LeConte has materially modified his opinion as a result of the discussion in which they took part. To me this seems as humiliating a confession as could be made. Philosophy as represented by these three writers seems to me distinctly discredited by the fact which Professor Howison so coolly states. It does not surprise him, and I suppose that few of his readers were surprised by it; but in any other department of life it would be thought a reproach to a body of workers to have to make such a confession, not because they differed, but because, apparently, they did nothing else.

VI.

I think I can make my thesis a little more clear by exemplifying its workings when applied to the method of stating an opponent's doctrine.

There is a rule observed, I think, by most fair-minded writers on non-philosophical subjects and by a few writers on philosophy (notably by Mr. Bosanquet),—viz.:

"*In stating an opponent's doctrine use only such terms as you think he himself might use regarding it, or, conversely, do not put into his mouth any words which on reflection you know he would not use.*"

This means that we cannot paraphrase any view which has not an organic relation to our own. If we thoroughly get the opponent's view (*i.e.*, share his experience), our voice can be as well used as his in stating the case. But if we cannot make it fit the facts of experience, if we can make nothing of it, if we cannot make it work, onr attempts to paraphrase it are pretty sure to be libellous and unfair. In any such case all we can do is to quote directly.

In a philosophical seminary which I recently attended, a speaker described his opponent's doctrine as "reducing every-

thing to the dead level of brute fact," or, again, as "a rigid, static world of naked fact."

Now, can any one sincerely believe that a writer would himself describe his own experience in such terms? If not, what rationality is there, what fairness in so describing it? So to state it is surely a misrepresentation of the opponent's doctrine, though it may be a correct picture of some one else's irritation and disgust. What we attempt in discussion is to get at the truth, the meaning, in one another's interpretations of our common experience, and to state this meaning. Descriptions of our own states of emotional reaction are relevant only when they are the topic under discussion. Take the sentence just quoted, "Reducing everything to the dead level of brute fact." Omit from this the expletives, the expressions of aversion, and we have left the statement that the writer under criticism "reduces everything to fact." "Fact" is often used synonymously with "reality," and one need not shudder at the charge of "reducing everything to reality."

Without the "swear-words" the statement is quite harmless.

Professor James's recent book of essays, entitled "The Will to Believe," has been to many a great source of help and enlightenment. Yet I think that the book will do its work more slowly and less thoroughly than would be the case had the writer been more sparing of philosophical expletives of the type just exemplified, and kept to the rule of stating an opponent's views in terms which the opponent would accept as fair. All through Professor James's brilliant and stirring book, whether it be in the treatment of the poor scientist of the earlier essays, or of the ossified logician, or the befuddled Hegelian of the later ones,—in each case the eighteenth century method is adopted and the opponent's views stated in terms which are bound to seem to him unfair and prejudiced. His conversion is just so much postponed.

A sneer begets a sneer. To speak of the imaginary rationalist's "snarling logically" is not likely to produce any immediate result except a snarl in return. It does not set the opponent to pondering on the error of his ways.

Contrast with this method that employed by Mr. Bosanquet in his "Psychology of the Moral Self." He is constantly obliged to differ from other writers, but never without first assimilating their views. His paraphrases and summaries would always be accepted as fair by the writers criticised.

Professor Dewey is as little of a Hedonist as Dr. Martineau. But the latter's description of Hedonistic doctrine makes it seem inconceivable that any sincere person could ever have held it,—while Professor Dewey shows how valuable a contribution the Hedonists have made to ethical theory, though he does not accept their results as the last word on the subject.

VII.

Finally, I wish to call attention to the use of certain question-begging adjectives in a way which I hope to see largely eliminated from philosophical discussion.

In characterizing another's doctrine, we should rarely, if ever, affix such adjectives as "mere," "bare," "brute," "dead," "abstract," to his expressions.

In the first place, take the word "mere." Any one who will take the trouble to notice the usage of this word as applied to an opponent's doctrine, cannot fail, I think, to be convinced that it is doing a wondrous amount of harm. It has, of course, important uses as applied to one's own doctrine, but I think I can show by a few examples that when used in characterizing an opponent's opinion it is very apt to express primarily irritation, and the attempt to ridicule, to threaten, or to embarrass, an opponent. If it does not possess these implications it is pleonastic, like any oath. It is especially scathing when coupled with such words as "brute," "bare," or "empty," "abstract," "dead." So, for example,—

A writer is discoursing on the deep wealth of the emotional life. His opponent straightway aims and discharges his heavy artillery at the absurdity, fickleness, and triviality of "*mere* sentiment." Of course, this is caricature and not description, for "mere sentiment" is not what is meant.

Or, again, a speaker attempts to be *consistent* and *reasonable*,

and is attacked by an opponent who says that this is all a trick of the "mere logical intellect." But this is misrepresentation, unless you can believe that the speaker will be willing *himself* to describe his remarks as expressing "mere logical intellect," which few if any would agree to do.

Critics of materialism are prone to point out the inability of "mere" atoms to make up the concrete world we know. But no man ever described his *own* materialistic opinions in terms of "mere" atoms. It is a libel. What was meant was not mere atoms, but atoms in their context of wealthy relations.

"No *mere* negation," says Professor James, in his essay on "Some Hegelianisms," "can be an instrument of a positive advance in thought." Of course Hegel would be the first to insist upon this. Nothing is more profitless than *mere* negation, unless it be *mere* assertion, and it is unfair to represent Hegel as an upholder of *mere* negation.

I have the same objection to make against such terms as "bare," "arbitrary," and "abstract," when applied in criticism of another's doctrine. Such terms seem to be making the point at issue very clear by isolating it and clearing away the *débris* about it. But, in fact, they usually have the effect of belittling a writer's meaning by misrepresenting it. Suppose you were a real estate agent and knew a rival agent to whom had been given several houses to let. Now, if before seeing any of those houses you were to describe them in conversation as "horrid, disagreeable, little houses," you would be generally thought to have done a very mean thing. Yet, supposing a certain temperament, your offence might be no greater than is committed every day by writers or speakers on philosophic questions when they speak of another's doctrine as "mere, crass materialism," or bare, abstract idealism or "pure, arbitrary freedom."

The word "abstract" is one of which I have myself been especially fond, but always, I find, in characterization of other people's ideas, never of my own. I have hurled it like an anathema at various doctrines which I could not understand. Well, I can only say that I heartily repent and am endeavoring to do so no more. I used to throw about terms

like "mere," "bare," "arbitrary," and "wilful" in the same way. But the habit of using the word "abstract" I have found an especially tenacious one, as difficult to get over as a drug habit.

Yet what, after all, are we saying of a man's statement in criticising it as "abstract"? We are saying that it is imperfect, that it does not cover the whole ground, and needs to be supplemented. But this seems to imply that a statement could be made that would not need to be supplemented, but which would cover the whole ground, and express the whole wealth of experience, which is obviously impossible. Every statement is abstract, or it would not be a statement, but a conscious universe. There is no possibility, so far as I can see, of making a statement which is not more or less one-sided. All that we can do is to show by our statement that we know there is another side,—that the story we are now telling is vitally interrelated with myriads of "*other stories*," as Kipling recognized in his favorite turn of phrase. Certainly there is a great difference between a conscious and an unconscious abstraction. It is one thing to isolate for purposes of study the physical processes and materials concerned in the making of music. Here is a conscious justifiable abstraction which one who did it might himself characterize as such. It is quite another thing to describe a string quartette as nothing but "a scraping of horses' hairs on cats' bowels." This is the attitude of special pleading,—the advocate's attitude; what philosophy calls for is the judicial attitude.

Instead of calling a doctrine abstract, why should we not begin at once by pointing out what should be added to make it truer? To call a man's idea "abstract" is a promise to tell later what they lack; similarly to call one's own stripe of idealism "a true idealism" is a promise to exhibit its convincing force later on. It is a dangerous procrastination and inertia in each case.

I have tried thus to suggest some details of the application of the method which I am describing. To eliminate such words as "mere," "bare," "abstract," and "arbitrary" from our description of others' views would, I am sure, promote

that co-operative spirit which makes discussion fruitful. Our current philosophical discussions seem to me to have too much of the competitive about them; they remind us too much of competitive debates. Such dissent as is present in really co-operative study is the kind of dissent that completes the view dissented from as contrasted with the dissent which amounts to a flat contradiction.

VIII.

It may be felt that if we give up vigorous and radical expressions of disagreement, as I have advocated, we are left with what Emerson called a "mush of concession," where every one agrees at once with whatever is said, like a shy girl at her first ball. Or one might anticipate the formation of a mutual admiration society or a group of submissive disciples around a leader. But this is as far as possible from being my meaning. The difficulty of really taking a new view into our lives makes easy acceptance as impossible as easy refutation. In either case no progress in thought is made and the primary object of discussion is missed. You end no wiser than you began. If you demolish your opponent, or agree with him from the first, nothing has been gained.

So far from desiring to eliminate differences of opinion, I desire to have them prized even more highly. They are full of new truth for us if we treat them not as ultimate ("agreeing to differ"), but as the beginning of a new insight for both sides. Dissent that asserts the incomprehensibility or total falsity of an opinion is *sterile*. But dissent that is only the prelude to a series of questions, tentative interpretations, and comparisons of experience is the most fruitful element in discussion.

Discussion can be very lively and very instructive and yet consist wholly of descriptions, tentative interpretations, and questions. If a man says that telepathy is a fact, or that we are all Hedonists or all socialists, two courses are open to us. We can agree at once, which is profitless, or we can contradict and maintain the exact opposite, which is usually as fruitless as tame agreement, though more gladitorial and so more

entertaining. On the other hand, we may begin with questions such as "What do you *mean* by telepathy?" and go on to tentative interpretations or extensions of the view in question; then, if all attempts to get into organic relations with it fail, we can only confess that it baffles us, that it does not reach us, that we cannot get hold of it.

The upshot of my argument is this: There are two ways of approaching an opinion which differs from yours.

1. You can swear at it, smother it with expletives like "mere," "abstract," "dead," "brute," etc., or you can put down your head and butt it aside, get it out of your field of vision, so as to leave your own cherished opinion monarch of all it surveys; or,

2. You can attempt to get into relations with it, to modify and enlarge your present ideas so as to include it, the test of understanding it being your strong tendency to accept it.

The penalty of refusing to enlarge our ideas so as to include what seems at first bound to upset us, the penalty of not taking the inclusive attitude, is that we are *excluded*,—we are "*out of it*."

If we see no valuable truth in Hegel or in Herbart, we are just so far "out of it,"—as much as the unmusical man at a symphony. It is nothing for us. Any action based upon the attitude of total dissent is the same as an action based on total ignorance of the facts in question.

If a philosopher takes this position, he is falling back from the essentially modern co-operative method of thinking and working employed in other most highly civilized regions of life. History, literary criticism, physical science, government by discussion (instead of by arms), co-operation in all forms, the organic conception of experience of any kind,—all these have got beyond the stage of "either-or." Philosophy is slowly working in the same direction. Her advance will be the swifter the more she insists on pointing to specific yet common experience as the warrant and the essence of every statement.

RICHARD C. CABOT.

BOSTON, MASS.

LUXURY AND EXTRAVAGANCE.

ECONOMISTS are probably over-confident in their opinion that the truth once demonstrated makes way by its own weight. Each succeeding generation of men seems to fall into the same fallacies as its predecessors, and the work of an economist in informing public opinion is an unceasing task. The advances which the science is making do not appear to make any impression on the public mind, which, indeed, is more apt to regard the controversies among specialists as an additional reason for reasserting the common sense fallacies which have been so often disproved. The tendency of modern economics towards specialization renders the duty more imperative on each economist, at times, to insist on those views on which substantial agreement has been reached, and to give his attention periodically to a restatement of the arguments against the fallacious views so often promulgated. There is no hesitation whatever among economists, of whatever shade and variety of opinion or school, in declaring that no man benefits a community by the services he can demand from it, or otherwise than by rendering services of some sort to it. There may be a legitimate difference of opinion regarding the kind of services which are really valuable to a community. Some may hold that the existence of a leisured class, living out of the proceeds of the labor of others, is an indispensable condition of the cultivation of art and literature; while others may hold, with William Morris, that true art cannot be based on distributive injustice. But all are agreed that it is work, whether physical work, or mental work, or moral work, which makes wealth, and that the mere spending of wealth is not a service to a community, such that a man may plume himself upon it and regard himself as a benefactor of the species.

Yet, in spite of this agreement, whenever there has been a more than usually vulgar and ostentatious display of wealth, whenever large masses of wealth have been destroyed by "the

hand of God or the king's enemies," whenever there is a threat of war, the old fallacy is brought out from the lumber-room of ideas and decked in the phraseology of the hour to justify some senseless expenditure or to bolster up some bad cause. The first comment the writer heard on the news of a disastrous fire, which swept the town of Windsor (Nova Scotia) from the surface of the earth and rendered thousands homeless and dependent on charity through the long rigors of a Canadian winter, was that it would be good for trade. And some newspapers and makers of public opinion were prompt to urge on the war with Spain, because it would be good for business. The fallacy in these statements has been exposed a hundred times, sometimes wittily, sometimes weightily, but always apparently in vain. Bastiat covered its advocates with ridicule, and Professor Sidgwick has pursued them to their last retreat; but it makes its appearance with the same effrontery. It may be an obvious fact to the economist that you cannot eat your cake and at the same time give it away, or give employment, that is, cake, or, at least, loaf bread, to the baker; but what is obvious to Professor Sidgwick is apparently to the ordinary mind a truth which cannot be grasped. Bastiat probably hit upon the reason of the vitality of the fallacy when he spoke of the half of the truth that is seen, while the half that is not seen is entirely neglected. It is the duty of every economist, and, indeed, of every educated man, to insist on the half that is not seen, and to emphasize the fact that it is work, not waste, which makes national wealth. An economist owes a duty to the public as well as to his science, and ought, therefore, periodically to direct his attention to the practical fallacies, as well as the practical problems, which are engrossing the public mind.

The strength of the fallacy is in part due to the fact that when economists have given their attention to the subject, their interest has been hitherto mainly in the fruitless search after a flawless definition; and, although much has been written on the history of luxury, the public have been left without that authoritative declaration that is required. The half of the truth which the public did not see has been rightly

emphasized; but the half which they did see, and naturally regarded as the more important, has not received sufficient recognition from the economist.

It is an easy matter to show that on economic grounds there is no justification for private or public luxury or extravagance. They see only half who ask such questions as these: Does not luxury give work? Does not war stimulate industry? Is not the destruction of wealth good for trade? But it is easier to refute the arguments than to convince those who use them. They point to the fact that there has been a boom in the building trades in Nova Scotia, as a result of the Windsor fire, and ask if the prosperity of one trade is not ultimately communicated to all others. We are members one of another, they say, and the advantage of one is in a certain sense, in a remote sense it may be, the advantage of all. They point to the fact that the property destroyed was, in part at least, insured; and, forgetting that Nova Scotia is not the world, they assume that had it been fully insured the burning of Windsor would have been a national benefit. The half of the truth which they do see need not be ignored. If the wealth produced be not consumed, work must cease and men will be thrown out of employment, and in some cases the physical destruction of wealth, or rather of that which stood in the way of wealth, has been an economic benefit to the community. There is a sense in which the burning of Chicago was a national benefit. The economic crash in Newfoundland, which brought the "oldest colony" to the brink of ruin, has proved its economic salvation. There had grown up there an evil system of doing business, and, though every one deplored it, no one was prepared to take the heroic step of doing away with it. It required an economic cataclysm to secure the reform which was needed. Wealth was destroyed and businesses which it had taken centuries to build up were overthrown. There was a real loss to the community; but the final result has been a great gain. I have heard it said that it was a pity the St. John fire did not carry its work a little farther; that there are districts of mean streets and unsanitary houses which are

still a blot on and a danger to the town. But it must be remembered that the benefit in these instances consists in the destruction of inconveniences which are just useful enough to stand in the way of improvement, or which, owing to social conditions, may yield wealth and income to individuals or be supported by vested interests strong enough to baffle reform. Chicago, before the fire, was a city of mean streets; it rose from its ashes a city adapted for commerce and worthy of its destinies. Business was hampered in Newfoundland by the old financial system; but when the ground was cleared they imported the Canadian banking system and started on a new basis and on a new career of prosperity. The destruction of wealth in these cases was analogous to the pulling down of some poor building or shanty which occupies an expensive lot in the middle of a city.

But such cases are exceptional. In general, the destruction of wealth is a social as well as an individual loss. The wealth that is used up in riotous living is diverted from better uses. Extravagance is not necessarily luxury. The mere transfer of wealth from one hand to another does not involve destruction. Consumption means using up. When a nation spends two hundred and fifty thousand dollars for a great picture the wealth is not destroyed: it is simply transferred. When the Jubilee Plunger ran through two million five hundred thousand dollars in twelve calendar months, the wealth of the world was diminished only by the amount of it he and those who sponged on him put down their throats and otherwise wantonly destroyed. In so far as it was simply transferred to others to whom he paid extravagant prices, it was not destroyed. To give high prices for articles which are rare is not necessarily luxury, for the price and the rare edition or the old master both remain. It is true that extravagance may mean the transfer of wealth to those who will not use it well; but it does not usually mean this. It generally involves a transfer to the hands of those who will use it more wisely.

But, though luxury may not make wealth and may merely divert industry to reproduce wealth which has been unavoidably used up, does it not make money circulate? This plea

is the last infirmity of purblind minds. It does make money circulate, but so does every other kind of trade and *non-trade* in existence. Money always circulates unless it is hid in a napkin. The most luxury can do is to make it circulate in unfruitful ways. The pool-room and the lottery make money circulate, and if mankind played dice till the last man starved, money would still circulate. The important thing is that in circulating, in passing from hand to hand, it should fructify the channels of industry and increase the utilities and not the futilities of life. The plea that luxury makes money circulate does not absolve any one from his duty to spend on rational wants only, a duty which lies on all of us, whether our means be great or small. Luxury consists in using up the results of our labors in unworthy and irrational ways, and luxury is, therefore, unfortunately as much within the reach of the poor as of the rich.

Moreover, while there is little or no economic justification for either luxury or extravagance, there is a great social and political danger in it. The distribution of wealth in the world is not so just that the rich can afford to flaunt social inequalities in the face of the poor. There is grave enough discontent with the present system without aggravating it by emphasizing class distinctions. The discontent is not removed by the patronizing assurance that luxury is good for trade. Even if this were true, there is no reason why the rich should have the monopoly of doing good to trade. The only justification for the possession of great wealth is its wise and rational use; and extravagance is not a rational use. Luxury is but the worst and most aggravated and aggravating form of extravagance where wealth is not transferred, but used up in the form of costly dishes and expensive wines, in rare exotics and splendid fireworks. Those forms of extravagance where actual wealth, the product of many days and many lives of hard, unremitting labor, is consumed in the revels of a single hour, constitute luxury. And in the present temper of the body politic it is well that luxury and extravagance and all that emphasizes the distinction between the *haves* and *have-nots* should at least keep itself as modestly as may be in the back-

ground. To attempt to justify it is madness. Further, the existence of luxury and a luxurious class is the cause of much of the social inequality that exists. In a notable book on the poverty of West London, Mr. Sherwell has shown how the existence of luxury has degraded the poor of Western London to a depth of degradation unknown in the East, where there are no districts of mansions and magazines of luxury to relieve the monotony. He lays great stress on the evil influences which the luxury and vice of the leisured classes have on the working portion of the community.

"It cannot be doubted that the vicious excesses and selfish extravagances of the richer districts of West London have left an unmistakable mark in the degradation of the poorer districts. It is in this direction that we have to turn for the true explanation of many of the darkest and most painful problems of life in West London."

"The poor of West London are made to feel that they are aliens from life on the very borders of their own homesteads."

Practically, the only ground on which any justification, and that a limited one, for luxurious expenditure may be based, is that it may be preferable to mere waste of wealth. All wealth is produced to be consumed, and if it give not the slightest satisfaction after it has been produced it has failed of the object of its being. The physical destruction of wealth is the only way in which this can happen, when it passes away without having given even the most momentary and most trivial gratification to any one whatsoever; and luxurious expenditure is better than that. There are, it is true, conditions when for moral reasons absolute physical destruction is preferable. Wealth may have been produced to satisfy desires which ought to be suppressed, and from the suppression of which society would be a gainer; but, apart from such considerations, even the most trifling use to which the stored up energy of years may be put is better than the absolute waste of the results of such efforts. If the alternative were luxury or physical destruction, there would be little question which is preferable; but, fortunately, we are not tied down to the alternative.

Luxury, again, may be preferable to indiscriminate charity. It at least makes men give work in exchange for the wealth they receive; and, although it may result in the moral deterioration of some of the workers, its effects are not so disastrous to the moral character as the effects of indiscriminate charity-giving. On the other hand, it may blind the rich to their duty and to their responsibility. It may be used, as it has often been used, as a sophistic reason for the existence of an unjustifiable distribution of wealth. Under the influence of current economic fallacies, it may lead the rich to imagine that they are doing all their duty by God's poor and make them forget that great wealth is but a stewardship for which account must be rendered.

From another point of view luxury might be partially justified. Society may be saving too much, devoting too much to the production of wealth and using too little of the annually accruing product, with the result that the productive energies of society may be confined within too narrow a circle of consumption, leaving no outlet for new energy and causing the grave social phenomenon known as over-production. There may be an over-production of the necessaries of life, for which there is, after all, but a limited demand; and luxury may provide an irregular outlet from an economic *impasse*. But this is, at best, a desperate remedy for a desperate state of affairs. Irregularity of employment is one of the great industrial evils; and it is an invariable concomitant of a state of affairs where the means of production have run ahead of the consuming power. Luxury may, in part, prevent this irregularity by preventing some capital from being accumulated, and opening up an irregular channel for what already exists. But it probably creates as much irregularity as it prevents. Industries which produce articles of luxury are peculiarly subject to irregularity because peculiarly subject to human caprice. Luxurious expenditure, by its very nature, involves irregularity, for luxury does not seem to be luxury unless it can frequently, and at a moment's notice, change its form.

That is the only real justification, and it does not go very far to offset the evils luxury brings in its train. Luxury is

not the only remedy for over-production; and, although there is a great need for a better adjustment of productive and consuming power, it does not follow that the only method of remedying a wrong state of affairs is to encourage irrational and unwise expenditure. Wider opportunities may be opened for human energies by emphasizing Herbert Spencer's teaching, that the future is not necessarily, or always, preferable to the present; that saving is not always justifiable in itself, but only in so far as a wiser use of what is saved is made in the future than can be made in the present.

The definitions of luxury have been so various that the perplexity of the public is almost excusable. The notion seems clear, and yet it is elusive, for no definition seems to be generally accepted, and many of them seem to convey a false view of life. We must steer a clear course between the position of those who regard everything as a luxury which does not minister to the bare necessities of life, and that of those who, regarding luxury as essentially variable, seem to regard the luxurious rich as the protectors of civilization and the promoters of social progress. The first view is that most generally accepted, and is supported on what seem to be thought to be moral grounds, but really are immoral and anti-social grounds. Luxury is unproductive consumption. Such is the definition which seems first to occur to those who turn their attention to the subject; and it is as fallacious as obvious answers usually are. The assumption in such a definition is that man lives to work, and that all expenditure not intended to maintain the elements of physical life or to promote efficiency is in its nature superfluous. But consumption is an end in itself. It is the aim and the object of all effort, of all saving, and of all production. Man works to live, and to live well; and the fact that consumption may be the starting-point of a new economic cycle, while no doubt of very great social importance, does not alter the other fact that the end of all economic effort is enjoyment. Moreover, the definition in question simply raises the old problem, What is production and what is produced? If we limit the term to the production of material wealth, half of the active population are non-

productive consumers; and it would be flying in the face of facts to declare that all these were guilty of luxury. Such an interpretation unduly restricts the rightful activity of man, and condemns by implication the activity of the artist and the teacher of literature, the minister of the gospel, and all those who render services to the community which are not of the kind which tend to promote or preserve the productive capacity of the community,—*e.g.*, the services of the medical man and the domestic servant. The progress of civilization means the devotion of an increasing proportion of the energy of society to non-material ends; and while we regard such ends as valuable, we cannot accept the definition of luxury as unproductive consumption. Moreover, we can with some accuracy determine the amount of wealth necessary to maintain the laborer in his efficiency; but by what standard are we to determine the necessaries of life for a great artist or musician, or even the necessaries for a humble student? To an outsider much of the expenditure of these classes must appear superfluous, and, judged by individual results, may really be wasted; while yet, in the long run, such expenditure may result in the creation of the suitable *milieu* for a great poet or a great scholar. Unless we are prepared to go the length of reducing life to its barest physical elements, we are not at liberty to denounce such expenditures as unproductive and luxurious. It is, of course, possible that a society may overspend its income in hiring services; and some communities would benefit, for instance, by indulging in less politics and more business. The edifice may be raised on too narrow a foundation of material wealth, and thus be insecure; but such cases are exceptional, and there is more danger that a society will spend too little than that it will spend too much on non-material ends.

Another explanation of luxury comes too readily to our fallen nature. Luxury from this point of view consists in the indulgences of others. Our own indulgences, we can readily show, are necessary for our happiness and for our effectiveness; but we are not so ready to allow the same privileges to others. Taxation has been justified on this narrow ground.

Every one is agreed that luxuries ought to be taxed, but it is not clear who is to determine what are luxuries and what are not. What is a luxury? Tobacco, urges the ex-Finance Minister of Canada, who does not smoke, ignoring the fact, which his own speeches demonstrate by tables of figures, that the consumption of tobacco is yearly increasing, and apparently ignorant of the fact that to some tobacco is a condition of work, that lumbermen have been known to quit the woods because the supply of tobacco ran short, and that in literary work, for instance, there is a practical consensus of opinion that tobacco is a necessity of production. Luxury cannot be defined with reference to any supposed scale of necessaries, comforts, and luxuries. On the basis of the old proverb "early to bed and early to rise," it might as reasonably be made out that coal oil is a luxury; and though from a revenue point of view the taxation, either of tobacco or kerosene, may be justified, it is not because they are luxuries. In short, what to some may be, or appear to be, a luxury, may be an absolutely necessary expenditure to others. I have heard a country minister blamed because he bought books, while his church starved him on six hundred dollars a year; and men who spend a small fortune annually on cigars or fast horses seem to have no hesitation in condemning others who spend a tithe of the sum on books or on pictures. It is doubtful whether a New Brunswick House of Assembly would be found willing now, in spite of the increased liberality of its estimates, to authorize the expenditure of five hundred dollars for a princely bound hand copy of "Audubon's Birds," which is now, to the literary world, one of the glories of the province. It would be denounced as unqualified luxury and extravagance, and might lead to the defeat of the government that proposed it. A new steel bridge is a necessity, a university or an expensive book is a luxury!

The truth is that no absolute scale of necessaries, comforts, and luxuries can be drawn up. A "Kelmscott" edition may or may not be a luxury, not necessarily according to a man's means, but according to the use to which it is put. If it serves to edify and improve the taste even of one individual,

the ten or fifteen dollars so expended may have been usefully spent; if it serves but to gratify a passing whim or a permanent vanity it may be a luxury, whether it cost ten cents or ten dollars. Each man must be left to a certain extent free to decide the form of his own expenditure. We have not all the same tastes and the same inclinations; and it is the height of arrogance to condemn the expenditure of another simply because our own inclinations lead us in some other direction. In the necessity of freedom of consumption Schaeffle finds his weightiest argument against Socialism, forgetting, perhaps, that under the present distribution of wealth for the great majority of mankind there is no real freedom of consumption. It is going too far, indeed, to assert that we shall pass no judgment upon the expenditure of others; but our criticism must be reserved for the end, not for the means. The necessity of living up to a conventional standard may or may not be admitted; but if we do admit it we are not free to criticise the expenditure requisite for that standard; and in many cases conformity to an admittedly false standard may be easier than dissent. There are undoubtedly cases when what seems luxurious expenditure is a social (or anti-social) necessity. One must live according to his means, and the conventional standards of decency may demand such a style of living as for others, with the same means, may be both unnecessary and extravagant. Adam Smith has included among the necessaries of life whatever public opinion considers it indecent to be without; and by a debased public opinion many are forced to live beyond their means. A French writer finds in this necessity the explanation of much of modern luxury, especially the luxury of female dress, in which, in his opinion, women must indulge to support even the business credit of their husbands and their fathers. This condition of public opinion we may deplore, but while we admit the standard of life as at least justifiable, we ought to refrain from criticising the means necessarily adopted for living up to the standard. Public opinion may be right or may be wrong, and there is always the ethical question of conformity to be decided; but while the standard is accepted,

even ostentation may, under the artificial and anti-social conditions of modern life, be a social necessity. Diamonds may be a luxury to the great majority of people; in some classes they are undoubtedly necessaries. We may make our quarrel with a scheme of distribution which sanctions such distinctions of class, and demand in the name of equality that no man shall have the chance of using what is obviously out of the reach of the great majority of his fellow-men; but that is another and a more serious matter. While we permit the existence of such class distinctions we must admit the consequences,—that is, necessaries of life may vary greatly according to the class in which an individual lives. So long as we deal with conditions as they are we must recognize the common sense of a recent decision (1897) of the Supreme Court of Iowa, in which it was held that:

"The make of a shirt or the taste of the wearer may be such as to require some kind of button or stud. If the inexpensive pearl were used . . . it might be as much out of place on the shirt front of a person of fashion or fortune as a diamond in that of one who earns his bread by the sweat of his face."

The court wisely declined the task of deciding whether persons of fashion or fortune should exist. The question raised was not the justifiability of the present distribution of wealth which condemns many to earn their bread by the sweat of their faces, and permits some few to lead a butterfly existence in which diamond shirt studs are a social necessity. The gist of the decision was that, as things are, ornament and ostentation are as much a necessity for the rich as bread and warm clothing are for the poor.

The view of a large number of writers, of whom M. Leroy Beaulieu may be taken as the example, that luxury is essentially variable, and may be considered simply as "that superfluity of enjoyment which exceeds what the generality of the inhabitants of a country at a given time consider essential not only for the necessities of existence but also for decency and comfort in life," renders it difficult to account for the general condemnation of luxury except upon grounds of envy, and

the reprobation is far too sincere to be inspired merely by such a low motive. The condemnation—and condemned luxury certainly is, or at any rate apologized for, which is the same thing—is based rather on moral than on economic gounds; but it can hardly be accounted for on this theory. This view really makes the attempt to remove an obvious inconsistency in economics which condemns luxury and at the same time regards the creation of new wants as the means of social progress. It shows how every decade some luxury ceases to be such in consequence of becoming more common and cheaper. The articles which satisfy these new created events are undoubtedly luxuries. Fashions and customs may change, but the fact that, generations hence, many articles of luxury will have become familiar to every consumer does not alter the fact that they are luxuries now; and surely that which is worthy of condemnation when practised by the few is still more blamable when practised by all, and surely also the basis of all that is highest in our civilization cannot be practices which in their origin were worthy of condemnation. A luxury is not an article consumed by the few, or a commodity which satisfies a want experienced now only by a few; and a luxury does not cease to be a luxury simply because the demand for it has become universal. The question of luxury is ultimately the ethical question of the worth of the want satisfied, and generally the mere fact of a want becoming universal is an evidence that it has some worth. It may be condemned in its origin, but it is wrongly condemned. If it is rightly condemned in its origin it ought to be condemned even when all mankind indulge in it. We have here a contradiction to be reconciled, that luxury is condemned, and yet that some of those things the use of which is condemned will become necessaries, or at least decencies of life, and will no longer be condemned. The contradiction is one of the most obvious facts in social history, and proves little more than that our social judgments are not infallible and that "causes that are judged this day may be rejudged."

The explanation of this contradiction may be reached

through a clear understanding of two episodes in sacred history, one from the Old Testament, the other from the gospels:

"And David was then in an hold, and the garrison of the Philistines was then in Bethlehem.

"And David longed and said, Oh, that one would give me drink of the water of the well of Bethlehem, which is by the gate.

"And the three mighty men broke through the host of the Philistines, and drew water out of the well of Bethlehem, which was by the gate, and took it and brought it to David: nevertheless he would not drink thereof, but poured it out unto the Lord.

"And he said, Be it far from me, O Lord, that I should do this: is not this the blood of the men that went in jeopardy of their lives? therefore he would not drink it." *

The passage from the gospels also relates to an event which occurred in Bethlehem:

"Then took Mary a pound of ointment of spikenard, very costly, and anointed the feet of Jesus, and wiped his feet with her hair: and the house was filled with the odor of the ointment.

"Then saith one of his disciples, Judas Iscariot, Simon's son, which should betray him,

"Why was not this ointment sold for three hundred pence, and given to the poor?

. . . . . .

"Then said Jesus, Let her alone: against the day of my burying hath she done this.

"For the poor ye have always with you; but me ye have not always." †

And as the parallel passage in St. Matthew's gospel adds:

"Verily I say unto you, Wheresoever this gospel shall be preached in the whole world, there also shall this, that this woman hath done, be told for a memorial of her." ‡

In these two episodes, which teach apparently contradictory lessons, we have but the one idea, that the worth of the object for which the sacrifice was made determines whether it ought to have been made or not. The mere amount of the sacrifice

* 2 Samuel, c. xxiii. 14–17.
† St. John's Gospel, c. xii. 3–8.
‡ St. Matt., c. xxvi. 13.

is not considered except in relation to the importance of the end. David would not have hesitated to accept the sacrifice made by his three mighty men had its end and object been the freeing of Israel from the Philistines; but because the end was individual and trivial, the satisfaction of a merely physical desire and of a passing whim, he felt that he was not justified in using what had been so dearly purchased; while our Lord was not approving of extravagance, but asserting his divine mission. The end in the latter case justified the means. The enforcing of that lesson, in his opinion and in the opinion of eighteen Christian centuries, was of more importance than the temporary alleviation of the sufferings of the poor; for man shall not live by bread alone.

All wealth is produced to satisfy human desire, but all wealth also requires effort for its production. The question of luxury is one of proportion between the importance of the desire satisfied and the effort necessary to satisfy it. Luxury consists in using up or consuming a disproportionate amount of human effort in the satisfaction of a trivial desire. Luxury, therefore, does not necessarily imply expense, although it usually exists only in the case of articles which have cost much to produce. A worthy end will justify even a very large expenditure, and an unworthy end perhaps should not be sought even at the smallest expenditure of time and energy. An article, therefore, may be a luxury to one man and a necessary of life to another. Their judgments of the worth and the importance of the desire may differ, and the satisfaction may be obtained at very different individual sacrifices. The poor are largely withheld from luxury by force of circumstances. The desires they can satisfy are but the most elementary. But should they prefer to satisfy some less important or worthy want and to expend in that way some of the effort they have exerted they may be guilty of luxury. There are two points of view of the effort required for a given satisfaction: an individual and a social. The individual may give too much of his time and energy to the satisfaction of unimportant desires, and may waste his substance in riotous living. But that is mainly an individual question, and so far as he has

a right to do what he likes with his own, he is free to expend his income as he chooses. From the individual point of view, the poor are almost as likely to be guilty of luxury as the rich. An income of five hundred dollars from manual labor may be earned at an infinitely greater expenditure of time and energy than an income of one hundred thousand dollars from ground rents or railroad bonds, and from the individual point of view a rich man may spend ten thousand dollars a year in physical indulgence without being open to the charge of luxury, while a poor man who spends fifty or a hundred dollars may lay himself open to the charge. But the individual is not the only, nor the most important, point of view. We need not raise the question of the justice of the present distribution of wealth to recognize that consumption must be taken from a social standpoint as well. Production involves social sacrifice, and the expenditure of twenty thousand dollars in personal indulgence may not be justified, because it involves the using up of much social effort for an insignificant result. Here we come upon the real meaning of the condemnation of luxury. Society, in self-defence, condemns the waste of its efforts. It may have committed a large portion of this world's goods to the stewardship of a few individuals, but none the less it demands an account of that stewardship and marks its disapprobation by means of moral censure of luxury and extravagance, of those who have not wisely used that which was committed to their keeping. It insists, in an imperfect way, it is true, that the satisfaction obtained shall be in some sort equivalent to the sacrifice made by society in producing. Its right so to insist may not be admitted, but in the socialized section of the community the right is at least partially admitted. David would not drink of the water, saying, "Is not this the blood of the men that went in jeopardy of their lives?" yet he poured it out in an act of worship. The water which had been obtained at such a sacrifice was consumed; but it is to the irreligious mind alone that it seems that the sacrifices of the three captains of the host were in vain, or, in other words, that the water was wasted. Yet the end to which it was devoted was higher and nobler than the

end for which it was so perilously procured. To what extent the social conscience is developed in modern society as it was in the warrior king of Israel is an interesting question for the sociologist. The rich may still need the lesson which Hood taught,

> "It is not linen you're wearing out,
> But human creatures' lives."

But the poor have long been conscious that as the fishwife said to Monkbarns in "The Antiquary," "It's no fish ye're buying; it's men's lives;" and they have judged hardly those who for their selfish gratification hazarded the lives of their fellow-men. For a worthy end they are willing that such a sacrifice should be made; but they condemn as luxurious expenditure on any end which does not commend itself to them.

The end of all wealth is to be consumed, and in being consumed to satisfy some human desire. To consume means to use up and in a sense destroy. The food we eat may give us strength for future work and enable us to produce further supplies of food; but in the using it is consumed and destroyed. And although all articles are not consumed in a single use, as food is at an eating, yet sooner or later the power of satisfying a human desire passes and the article is consumed. There are, of course, great differences in consumption goods. Some are exhausted in a single use, like fireworks, for instance; and some, like clothes, may yield their harvest of use during many months; while a great picture may elevate and refine generations of men during hundreds of years and remain almost as fit to render such services for hundreds of years to come. In some cases the use must be individual and exclusive: in others to share with other men in no way lessens the individual's enjoyment. Some are social, some are individual and exclusive, and some anti-social and immoral. We might classify consumption goods as present and future, social and individual; and although a cross division is for practical purposes involved, the classification will serve. But the present use is not necessarily unsocial, nor is the future necessarily social. The water

which David poured out to the Lord was as immediately consumed as if he had drunk it; and social goods may be diverted to exclusive uses, as when an individual encloses some fine view or shuts up a great picture in some private cabinet. Before an expenditure is fully justified we must answer two questions to ourselves and to society: Is the end aimed at worthy? and is it obtained at the cost of a disproportionate amount of sacrifice? Men will differ in their estimates of the worth of the end, and consequently in their judgment of the amount of sacrifice which may be made to obtain it. A man may consume thirty, fifty, or a hundred dollars a year in smoking, and many hasten to condemn the consumption as waste; yet a smoker may be convinced that in no other way could he obtain so much satisfaction at so low a cost. Even then there may be a question whether the satisfaction thus obtained is, from a social point of view, worth the sacrifice. Our judgment of any given expenditure really depends in the long run upon our judgment of the end it serves. Neither the judgments of the individual nor the judgments of society are to be accepted as final. There is need often for the community, as well as for the individual, to revise its estimate of the worth of certain ends. We all accept too readily the received standards and order our lives according to conventional notions. All wealth may consist of utilities, but some utilities may be futilities; and the last word has not been said when we claim that an object satisfies some desire. We need still to inquire whether the desire is one which under present circumstances, or under any circumstances, should be satisfied. Our mode and manner of life are often highly artificial; and a plea for a simpler life might easily be made on the ground that we derive no real pleasure from the habits we are slaves to and the customs we adhere to. Many of us are wearily doing simply what others expect of us, and they do what they think we expect of them; and no one is satisfied with the result. The judgment of the individual must be formed with a certain deference to the judgment of the community, although in many cases it would be well that we should confine our judgments to our own actions.

Otherwise the liberty of the individual may be unduly restricted and the progress of society in civilization hindered. Social history shows how the luxury of one generation has become the necessity of the next, simply because individuals were bold enough to defy the judgments passed on their luxurious expenditure. These pioneers decided, and as the event showed rightly, that the article in question satisfied some permanent and deep-rooted desire. They may have been animated by no lofty motive of promoting civilization; but, as Adam Smith said, "men are often led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of their intention." The desire which the article satisfied with what appeared to be a disproportionate sacrifice turned out to be a wide-spread desire, and the machinery of production was adapted accordingly. On the other hand, experience has shown and common sense teaches that certain luxuries satisfy no wide-spread desire that ought to be satisfied. The Roman epicure who entertained his friends with a dish of the tongues of birds which had been taught to speak was criminally luxurious because no gratification of vanity could justify such an expenditure and consumption of human energy. The social conscience must condemn such expenditures at all times, and the mere fact that they have become more common does not detract from their culpability. It is, perhaps, the exception for a luxury to become a necessity. In so far as the consumption panders only to vanity and a desire for ostentation it cannot become a necessary of life, although vanity may remain one of the strongest human motives. Yet the first tea-drinkers and the first tobacco-smokers have perhaps proved themselves benefactors of their species because they braved the ignorant condemnation of their own generation.

It is the end which justifies. A merely individual satisfaction stands on a lower plane than a satisfaction which is not exclusive. A temporary and passing satisfaction is not so worthy, and would, therefore, not justify so large an expenditure as a more permanent would. It is better probably to spend on dress than on food, at least on food beyond the limit of the amount necessary to maintain efficiency; it is better to

spend on books than on wine, on pictures than on revelling, on travel and education than on picnicing, on the external adornment of house and grounds than on fine furniture. John Ruskin tried to teach the citizens of Edinburgh this lesson in 1853. Perhaps they and others still need the same lesson.

"Your separate possessions of pictures and prints are to you as if you sang pieces of music with your single voices in your own houses. But your architecture would be as if you sang together in one mighty choir. In the separate picture it is rare that there exists any very high source of sublime emotion. But the great concerted music of the streets of the city, when turret rises over turret and casement frowns beyond casement and tower succeeds to tower along the farthest ridges of the inhabited hills; this is a sublimity of which you can form at present no conception, and capable, I believe, of exciting almost the deepest emotion that art can ever strike from the bosoms of men." *

But his teaching must not be carried too far. It is the end that justifies, and the noblest end is not the only end. There may be occasions when expenditure on champagne may be justified. Yet we rightly condemn as luxurious the man who drinks champagne or Bénédictine at every meal; for in this case the end does not justify the means, which involve the destruction of the labor of many days and many years for the gratification of an unimportant moment.

JOHN DAVIDSON.

UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK, CANADA.

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* Ruskin, Lectures on Architecture and Painting, 2d ed., p. 92.

SEX IN CRIME.

THOSE who view superficially the psychical and physical differences existing between man and woman, and those who tenaciously hold the theory of separate creation, are the most ardent supporters of a belief, which has become quite general, that woman was created from a finer clay, and is inherently more moral, more virtuous, more æsthetic than man. Accordingly she is held to be less criminal; and, apparently, statistics sustain this view. Is woman's apparently lesser degree of criminality attributable to this congenital moral superiority, or is it due to sexual and social considerations and conditions over which she has had no control, such as her having been selected as the anabolic organism, having had the burden of parturition placed upon her, and having been the favored sex in the progress of civilization? Have not these facts combined to render her life one of restricted activity and slavery rather than one of freedom of activity and independence? and are not the latter necessary elements for an extended and varied commission of crime? One prominent class of anthropologists considers woman as midway between child and man in her development.

To demonstrate the hypothesis that woman's moral superiority, if she possess it, is not due to congenital causes, involves the necessity of investigating her evolution from both biologic and sociologic stand-points. Preliminary to this inquiry, however, cognizance should be taken of the inaccuracy in ascertaining the criminal class. A criminal becomes such only by legal process,—that is, when he has been arraigned in a court of justice and convicted of some violation of the law. In a comparative study of sex in crime, it becomes necessary to use a mathematical basis, and only prison statistics are available for such a basis, and those who sustain the theory of the lesser criminality of women use them unhesitatingly. This use is manifestly partial to woman for many reasons, among which the following may be mentioned: Women are

less rigorously prosecuted; judgments against them, when indicted, are more difficult to obtain; and their punishments, when convicted, are less severe.* This is due to the sympathy and consideration which men give women, and those connected with the enactment and enforcement of laws are almost exclusively men. This prejudice in favor of women is well illustrated by the recent attempt in the Georgia Legislature to pass a bill providing that no woman shall be executed for the crime of murder except when the jury stipulates for such punishment. The passage of this bill was intended for the benefit of a woman already under sentence of death for murder. The fact of electrocution existing in New York undoubtedly influenced the jury in their verdict in the Fleming murder trial and in others. Prostitution is the most natural form of crime in women,† and indicates a low morality, lower than that of the crimes which men commit as a means of securing a livelihood,—larceny, burglary, etc. Convictions are most disproportionate to the prevalence of this crime, and, when secured, are usually for a short period. Woman is frequently the instigator to crime, man being the committer, but, unless the former can be proved to have been an accessory before or after the fact, she is rarely indicted and convicted, and when she is, her sentence is for so short a time that she is at liberty and instigating others to fresh crimes, while her male companion in crime remains incarcerated, thus year after year increasing prison statistics. If the statistics of the United States are used, of a country where, it may be argued, there is great independence of women, but no corresponding increase in crime, three additional factors must be considered,—namely, that the male population exceeds the female by nearly two millions; that foreigners constitute a large proportion of the criminal class,‡ and that immigrants consist mostly of men and include many who have been malefactors in their native country; that negroes furnish an abnormally large percentage of criminals in proportion to

* This is substantiated by a study of municipal police court records.

† "Criminal Sociology," E. Ferri.

‡ United States Census Report, 1890.

their population, their crimes being generally those of sexual passion which woman is incapable of committing.* Were the determination of the criminal and non-criminal classes less legal and more sociologic; less based upon the crime and more upon the criminal, and upon the amount and nature of crime rather than upon the number of convictions, which are less than one-third of the actual number of crimes committed, the proportionate rate of the crime in the two sexes would be much more uniform. There are numerous conditions and acts indicating a low morality and a criminal nature, acts which are injurious to the community and state, of which the law takes no cognizance, but which would be indispensable factors in an accurate study of comparative crime in the sexes. This inaccurate determination of the criminal class, combined with the following biologic and sociologic considerations, will to a great extent eliminate the variance in the statistical rate of crime for the two sexes.

Before considering these biologic and sociologic conditions, the general causes of crime are important. There are two current theories,†—the first being that heredity is the great factor, that the tendency is inherent, and that the individual acts independently of his environment; the second, that the environment, social institutions, and the character of the law and government determine the nature and extent of crime and who shall commit it. If the former theory is accepted, the tendency would be for both sexes to inherit equally, and crime would be neither dependent upon nor peculiar to sex. If the latter view is accepted, it will be evident that the environment does not operate equally upon the two sexes, as both are not subjected in a similar manner and to the same degree to sociologic conditions and influences. The Italian school of criminal sociologists ‡ supports the former view and the French school the latter; § but the tendency is to consider

* United States Census Report, 1890.

† Consult reports of the last two meetings of the Criminal Anthropologic Congress held in 1895, and in 1897.

‡ Consult "Criminal Sociology," Ferri; "Female Offender," Lombroso.

§ Consult "Reports of School of Anthropology," Paris.

crime as the product of both inherent and sociologic causes, both sexes equally inheriting the *tendency*, but the *expression*, *form*, and *extent* being much modified by reason of its remaining latent in woman, while in man it is developed by his more varied nature and more complex external relations.

The greater amount of criminality in man is remotely due to his more katabolic nature.* Previous to the differentiation of life into the higher organisms, many of the lower species were bisexual, parturition not being confined to either sex. Higher in the vertebrate series by a process of variation in which the male organism participated to a greater extent, and, through the necessity for economy of labor, as the environment became more complicated, the sexes became more specialized. The male was carried farther away from the anabolic existence, to which the female is more closely allied, and in him was developed a stronger physique, greater passion, and larger brain capacity. These became modifying influences upon environment, and were strengthened by heredity. When the stage of human existence was reached in the process of evolution,† woman, by reason of her tendency to conserve rather than to expend energy, did not pass along the rapid and varied lines of man's development.‡ She thus developed an inferior physique and less activity and mental power. This accumulated difference between the two sexes has been accentuated by the added influence of environment. In the tribes where woman is equally strong and intelligent, it is seen that mere sex is no barrier to her progress. This is illustrated by the matriarchal system of government which has prevailed in many countries. In Nicaragua the husbands are the slaves and perform the labor while the wives attend to matters of war and government. The women of the Dyaks of South-

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* Consult "The Evolution of Sex," Geddes & Thomson.

† Consult "Psychic Factors in Civilization," Ward; "Origin of Species," "Descent of Man," Darwin; "Metabolism of Sexes," Thomas, in *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1897.

‡ "The Chances of Death," by Carl Pearson, appeared before the writer too late for reference; but the statement therein made that woman is more variable than man is entitled to much consideration.

east Borneo lead the men in war and exercise the authority of chiefs over the tribes. Among the Naiars on the Malabar coast of India the husband is a mere incident to the social organization, and woman's power is autocratic and absolute. It is well known that the female warriors among the Dahomeyans were much more dangerous than the men. These illustrations are given to support the theory that there is nothing essentially repugnant in the nature of woman to participating with man in all his varied life. If such repugnance exists, it is the result of the environment and lesser physical strength of women, and is due to the effects of artificial civilization. Woman's capability for good or evil depends not so much upon mere sex as upon the conditions determining the characteristics of sex and their development. That habit and environment have a great determining effect upon psychical traits and physical development is illustrated by the class of mammals given by Darwin,* where parturition remained the function of the females, but the male assumed entire charge of the young after birth. In this instance the female acquired all the pugnacity and prehensile organs of the male, while he remained docile and without these organs. The females also strive for the favor of the males.

When through the long process of variation the stage of human existence was reached and there dawned a moral sense, the two sexes must have been upon an equality. Because woman was less exposed to the influences of environment, was more inert, and possessed a less developed mind, she did not necessarily possess a superior moral conception. There must be the *opportunity* as well as the *inclination* to be immoral, and woman in the then existing civilization, slave that she was, was incapable of creating this opportunity. Notwithstanding that man committed the crimes which his greater strength and opportunity permitted, woman's criminal nature was shown, not by her compelled obedience alone, but by her sanction of these crimes and by her commission of such crimes as lay within her power. Infanticide prevailed to an

* Darwin, "Descent of Man."

alarming degree and was largely committed by women.* The prevalence of this crime always argues a low moral standard among women. Individually women may rise above the prevailing moral standard, but collectively they assist in establishing that standard.

Among the distinctively biologic considerations, the following may be briefly considered:

Women are physically incapable of committing many of the crimes with which men are charged, owing to inferior physical strength, and they resort to subtle rather than to violent methods. In homicide this is shown by the use of poisons by women, rather than the resort to physical means. In burglaries, assaults, and other crimes requiring much strength, women are instigators rather than committers. Statistics substantiate the belief that physical strength is an important element, for in Italy, where the percentage of crime against the person is so large, women contribute only nine per cent. of the total, while in England, where the crimes are largely against property, their proportion rises to eighteen per cent.† Where woman has equalled man in her capacity for conceiving and strength for executing crime, and where there has been a deficiency in the maternal instinct, she has even exceeded him in the violence and cruelty of its commission.

Woman's incentives to many crimes differ from those of man, being due to emotional causes, love, hate, revenge, vanity, etc., rather than to those arising from economic, social, and political conditions, and this because woman's emotional nature has been developed to a greater extent. The former would produce a greater number of petty crimes and acts injurious to an individual rather than to the community directly. The *gravity* of an offence does not necessarily argue a lower moral standard, for the *nature* and *quality* of the act are equally important.

By reason of this inferior physique and nervous system,

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* In this connection, consult "Essay on Population," Malthus; "Woman's Share in Primitive Culture," Mason.

† "Crime and its Causes," Morrison.

criminal tendencies in women often culminate in neuroses,* developing into hysteria, insanity, immorality, epilepsy, and sexual anomalies. They do not develop into crime because the psychic centres in women are less active, and the irritation consequent upon degenerative processes in her is neither so intense nor so constant. This is illustrated by the fact that while excess of passion in man, not directed into proper channels, leads to assaults and sexual perversion, in woman its existence more frequently culminates in mental degeneracy or physical disease.

The criminal age in woman is less than in man, depending upon functions peculiar to women. This operates particularly in such crimes as abortion, infanticide, etc., and is more remotely related to crimes of passion and prostitution, women becoming sexually indifferent at an earlier age than men. Women show a greater persistency in crime when once they have become criminal, this being partially due to the greater social ostracism of a degraded woman, but also to her lesser resistance to evil, when not protected by the safeguards man has thrown about her. Love in women is a frequent cause of crime, and operates to produce the same crimes as passion in men, but, as it leads her to instigate men to crime rather than to commit it herself, it is not so much in evidence. This was illustrated in the recent Thorn-Nack trial in New York city.

The crimes of women are more insidious. Prostitution, infanticide, abortion, and allied crimes exist to an alarming degree among women, and, from the view of public policy alone, are among the gravest, as they strike at the very root of society by decreasing population. The seriousness of the crime of abortion is twofold,—it lowers the moral standard of the women of a nation, and it destroys the physical health of the mother, who, when a child is born, transmits her own deficient physical condition. The fact that abortion is so prevalent among married women is of the gravest importance,† as it

* Consult "Criminal Sociology," Ferri.

† This is based upon facts gleaned by original investigation among reputable and trustworthy physicians and alienists.

shows a decrease in the maternal sentiment which has preserved woman from much crime and degradation, and which is distinctly recognized as the crowning honor of womanhood.

In juvenile crimes, where the sociologic conditions do not operate so unfavorably upon the male sex, and where the maternal instincts and woman's protected position do not influence the rate, the statistical contrast is much lessened, the males incarcerated in juvenile reformatories being 11,535, as against 3311 females, there being 142,630 more males than females in the United States, between the ages of five and nineteen years. Among adult prisoners the rate is 75,924 males, as against 6405 females.*

Criminal women do not possess the physical anomalies characteristic of criminal men, and for this reason women are said to be occasional, rather than born, criminals. The Italian school of criminal sociology very strenuously asserts that there is a correlation between mental and physical conditions and processes, and that criminals are thus characterized by some corresponding physical anomalies.† Granting that this is true (and it is by no means conclusively proven), does the fact necessarily lead to the conclusion that there is less criminality among women, or that they do not inherit criminal tendencies? It must be remembered that many of the crimes in which women predominate and excel, as swindling, shoplifting, prostitution, etc., require a pleasing personal appearance, and women thus become more skilful in concealing physical defects. Prostitutes, by the nature of their crime, leave few offspring to inherit their defects and criminal tendencies. That criminal tendencies are inherited equally by the two sexes has been ably demonstrated in Dugdale's study of the Jukes family. According to the existing knowledge of heredity,‡ latent criminal tendencies in the one generation

* United States Census Report, 1890.

† "Uomo Delinquente," Lombroso.

‡ In this connection, consult Strahan on "Marriage and Disease;" Galton on "Hereditary Genius;" Ribot on "Heredity;" Weismann on "Essays on Heredity."

may become active agents in a more favorable environment in the succeeding ones.

Sociologic and biologic conditions are closely related, but what may be viewed as more distinctly sociologic are the following:

There are many crimes which the law, by reason of its unequal political privileges, has rendered woman incapable of committing. Illustrative of these would be, offences against the government, including violations of the election and postal laws; of the revenue laws; against public health, as adulteration of foods. Women also commit less crimes against public policy, by reason of their inferior position in the business world. Wherever they are entering vocations hitherto open only to men, crime is increasing among them. Women have not entered the industrial world to the same extent as men and public life in all its phases is less open to them. Where they have entered the field, their positions are subordinate ones, and so give only limited opportunities. In Greece, where the women live an almost entirely domestic life, there is a minimum amount of crime among them, whereas in Scotland, where they are allowed a greater industrial scope, the percentage rises to thirty-seven. The want of adaptation to the economic order arouses criminal instincts in the sex that comes most in contact with it, and, as woman is equally unadapted to this order, she becomes more criminal as she comes into more direct contact.

The greater temptations and opportunities given man are important factors. Illustrative of this are the responsible positions of trust and position in financial administration. Special opportunities develop special classes of criminals: thus banking furnishes the opportunity for embezzlement, absconding, defrauding, and forgery. This great field of finance holds but few women in positions of trust. There are places, as clubhouses, saloons, anarchistic societies, etc., which are favorable to the contagion of crime. These places are not generally frequented by women, not necessarily because they do not choose to, but by reason of habit and custom which are the result of the restrictions placed upon their freedom by man.

Alcoholic, cocaine, and allied habits are causes of crime, and man is more addicted to these than woman. Causes of this greater addiction include a consideration of his more social nature and greater prominence in the struggle for existence, these leading to habits and reactions, the latter culminating in pain which he seeks to escape. Men have more variable natures, and their need of diversion thus becomes greater. Women have less sensitive organisms (as experimental psychology has demonstrated, notwithstanding the prevailing contrary opinion), and they endure pain and privation better than men. It should be noted, however, that the increasing use of drugs among women is extensive, and particularly so among those exposed to an unfavorable environment or those seeking an anodyne for physical or mental suffering. There are conditions attending military life, or any organization composed exclusively of one sex, which tend to produce crime.

The combative attitude required in the struggle for existence is destructive to the higher instincts with which we credit women. Refinement, culture, and morality are cultivated best when the struggle for existence is not so great. Ambition and pride lead many men into crime, whereas vanity is the predisposing factor in women, as is seen from the large number of servants who are prosecuted for thefts, traceable to this cause. That women endure want longer before resorting to crime is not due necessarily to a superior morality, but to a more anabolic organism, which endures rather than exert itself into activity. This assertion, together with that of woman's lower sensitiveness, finds support in the manner in which women submit to surgical operations. They are more indifferent to the pain, rather than possessed of superior self-control or will-power.

In connection with this struggle for existence it must also be remembered that not a small proportion of women in the business world have excellent homes, and there is not the temptation to exceed the limits of salary which comes to a large number of men. Suicide, which is allied to criminality,

is shown to be more prevalent among men, and Morselli * ascribes a large proportion of suicides to the sharpness of the struggle for existence.

The attitude of protection which man has assumed towards woman, and which is the refinement of the feeling which held her successively as beast of burden, slave, servant, subject, is incalculable in its influence upon her moral nature and its development, and it must not be forgotten that but a few decades have elapsed since in criminal law a woman was considered a part of her husband and could not be tried separately for crime. What opportunity here for the exercise of criminal tendencies in woman!

The power of association is greater among men, primarily because they banded together, first in defence of family and later of the tribe, community, and state. Rarely have women's organizations existed for the perpetuation of crime, owing to a weak power of association, infidelity to members of their own sex, and to a deficiency of capable organizers and leaders. Among such organizations is one known to have existed at the time of the epidemic of slow poisoning in France and Italy, in the sixteenth century. For relentlessness, cruelty, and extent the work of this association has seldom been equalled, although the participation in and rapacity for blood-shedding shown by the women of the French Revolution are somewhat analogous. These associations are great influences in increasing crime and in shielding criminals. Where women have developed this spirit of association, as in houses of prostitution, crime has become more varied and extensive and has been more advantageously conducted.

Man's broader education has given him greater capability for devising forms of crime and has made him more susceptible to criminal contagion. This is seen in the avidity with which men read newspapers, with the consequent imitation of crimes by the morbidly inclined, who read the published details of unusual or atrocious crimes. Woman's imitation often takes the form of emulation. The morbid, sentimental, maud-

* "Suicide," by Morselli.

lin sympathy which women so often express in public and by direct personal acts, in regard to atrocious criminals, can be explained upon no other ground than latent, unconscious criminal tendencies expressing themselves in emulation rather than in imitation. By what freak of distorted imagination did the French populace, mostly women, "go wild" at the burning of Madame de Brinvilliers, and retain every atom of ashes, as those of a saint, to prevent evil coming to them? And this notwithstanding she had poisoned two members of her family and was attempting the lives of others, and all for a financial consideration! The scene is not surpassed, but is nearly paralleled by the flowers, visits, notes, and other expressions to which women resort in regard to the great criminals of to-day.

From the fact that crime exists to a greater extent among unmarried women arises the necessity for a brief consideration of the causes. These may be found in the fact (1) That maternity operates to a greater extent than paternity in preventing crime. Maternity is more developed because the relation of the mother to the child is more intimate, and because the greater part of her life has been given to it. Maternity should not be confounded with love, which is often a cause of crime. Maternity sometimes operates to the extent of determining the nature of or mitigating the crime, but is seldom or never the predisposing cause. (2) The sexual indifference of women, particularly mothers, where passion is held in abeyance by the demands and drains of motherhood, operates to prevent crime. (3) The greater predominance of religion among women, owing to their more superstitious natures and unwillingness to yield faith to reason. It may be said that woman's religion rather than her superior morality restrains her from committing crime. In her religion there is generally a large element of fear of incurring divine displeasure, and this operates as a bar. Religion has been a great source of epidemic crime, but it has usually been fanatically prosecuted in behalf of some fixed belief. (4) Married women are less subjected to the influences incident to a struggle for subsistence, their energy being largely given to domestic and social duties.

University of Chicago. Frances Alice Kellor.

BOOK REVIEWS.

SOCIAL AND ETHICAL INTERPRETATIONS IN MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. A Study in Social Psychology. By James Mark Baldwin. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1897. Pp. xiv., 574.

This volume is, as the author informs us in the preface, a continuation of the studies in genetic psychology begun in his previous work, "Mental Development in the Child and the Race." That it was crowned with the gold medal of the Royal Academy of Denmark adds to the expectation with which Professor Baldwin's readers will approach the present work. While the sub-title makes it clear that the book is primarily a psychological essay, the main title indicates that its interest is not merely psychological, but social and ethical as well. The social and ethical "interpretations" of mental development are always in the author's mind, and to the student of ethics and sociology who is interested in the psychological basis of his science (and what genuine student of these sciences is not?) this book will prove not less instructive and stimulating than to the psychologist. It must be remembered, however, that the psychological limitations of the inquiry forbid its extension into the fields of ethics and sociology. The interpretations offered are still psychological rather than ethical or sociological. The author's intention obviously is to keep strictly within the confines of psychology,—ethical and social,—although doubtless his own interest in the proper questions of ethics and sociology has stimulated his curiosity as to the psychological laws which govern the ethical and social processes. And while the reader can hardly fail to find between the lines of Professor Baldwin's discussion constant suggestions as to the content and significance of the facts and processes described, it must be admitted that, on the whole, he keeps well within the margin of his purpose, and forbears from the attempt at any extra-psychological explanation of the phenomena whose genesis he is undertaking to make clear.

The aim of the entire investigation is "to inquire to what extent the principles of the development of the individual mind apply also to the evolution of society," and the method is, as already indicated, "the genetic: the form of that method which inquires into the psychological development of the human individual in the earlier stages of his growth for light upon his social nature, and also upon the social organization in which he bears a part."

(Introd.) The main question falls into two phases: (1) what are the principles which the individual shows in his mental life; (2) what additional principles, if any, does society exhibit in its forms of organization, progress, and activity? These two phases of the question dictate the division of the work into two books: Book I. dealing with "the Person, public and private;" Book II. with "Society." This division, however, is merely methodological, not real. For in reality the process of the personal life and that of social life imply one another, and the chief lesson of the entire inquiry is that either, without the other, is impossible and unintelligible. Not only do society and the person interact, but a non-social person, on the one hand, and an impersonal society, on the other, are unreal abstractions. Psychology, at any rate, as a real science, must view the person and society in their concrete unity and in their common life.

The great bond between the individual and society is, according to Professor Baldwin, the imitative tendency. This is the key to both the intellectual and the moral life. Even "the inventive person," the genius, is still, in the last analysis, only a variation of "the imitative person." The idealizing activity itself is but a more complex form of the same process. "Imitation runs through it all; imitation is, indeed, the essential method of growth in this active stretch of our energies towards the ideal. For the interpretations which our past actions express were secured by the imitative absorption of the personal suggestive copies of the social environment; and the projective part of the ideal set us by others is, in so far as we picture it at all, a reconstruction, in an imitative way, of the same material. And when the actor goes on to attain a new growth which brings him farther towards the ideal, it is again by actually finding in the social circle better illustrations of righteousness, beauty, etc., which he takes to himself by imitation" (p. 296). Thus the moral sense is "essentially a social thing." "The sense of obligation brings to consciousness two antithetical thoughts of personality: that of the self as it stands, more or less complete in habit, with its well-known tendencies to action; and over against this the sense of the ideal self, the being perhaps temporarily embodied in father, priest, or whoever-else, the better self from whose actions the copy is to come for the further reduction of the selfishly or generously capricious self to order and goodness. I feel that I ought to be like the better person" (pp. 297–98).

All this is argued with the author's well-known skill of analysis,

acuteness of observation, and fertility of illustration. So far as its ethical interest is concerned, it reminds the reader most readily of Professor Bain; but the argument is greatly improved and brought up to date, it is applied more broadly, and more justice is done to the part played by the individual in the process of moral growth. For Professor Baldwin, the individual is, after all, just as important a factor in the case as society; without individual initiative social progress would be impossible. Nay, he goes so far as to admit the existence of a "circle" in the argument. The ethical sentiment, he says, "is in society because it is in all the individuals; but it is in each individual because it is already in society. It is one of those 'arguments in a circle' with which nature so often reasons out the development problem" (p. 304). But if the individual and society are two terms equally important and reciprocally implied, is it not going too far to lay the stress so entirely on the social factor of the case as to find in "imitation" the key to the entire situation? No doubt we need to be reminded of the essentially social character of the individual life, and imitation is certainly an important, and hitherto much neglected, feature of individual growth. But one can hardly help feeling that, in the ardor of his pleading for the recognition of this factor, Professor Baldwin has, like Professor Bain and Professor Royce, placed an undue emphasis upon a single aspect of a very complex problem, and thus made its solution appear more simple than it really is. The "dialectic of personal growth" is too subtle to permit of its reduction to any such single formula.

The study of the social life itself which is undertaken in Book II. leads to a further recognition of the *rôle* of the individual. "If we use the phrase 'social forces' to indicate the more broadly distinguished influences at work in society, when it is considered as a progressively organized whole, we may distinguish those influences which have their locus of origin *in the individual* from those which seem to have their point of departure *in the social organization*" (p. 449). These two forms of social force are distinguished as "the particularizing social force" and "the generalizing social force" respectively. "The individual produces the new variations, the new things in social matter" (p. 455). "The individual particularizes on the basis of the generalizations which society has already effected" (p. 456), and since he "particularizes for the future and for society," his activity "supplies the essential material of all human and social progress. This takes

the place of the survival of the fittest in the organic sphere" (p. 460). On the other hand, "society generalizes what the individual has already particularized" (p. 466). It follows that "the real progress of society is measured, not by the individual's particularizations directly, but by society's generalizations" (p. 471), and "the advance on the social side, thus tested and measured, must result in a constant suppression of the individual's sanctions, as far as they remain in conflict with those of society" (p. 473).

The path of social progress is thus determined. "Only when both these conditions are fulfilled—when old social matter is particularized by an individual and then again generalized by society—can new accretions be normally made to the social content, and progress be secured to the organization as a whole" (p. 511). But, since the social generalization becomes, when particularized, the moral ideal of the individual, it further follows that the social progress which is mediated by this particularization "is necessarily in the direction of the realization of ethical standards and rules of conduct" (p. 519). Yet a final ethical conflict between the individual and society is admitted. "The final and irreducible antinomy of society" is "that in the ethical realm the individual may rule himself by rules which are in advance of those which society prescribes, and also exact them. This is common, not only with the moral seer, but in the life of us all" (p. 540). This conflict "is soluble only by the actual growth of society itself in the particular case, or by the suppression of the individual who revolts. And society solves it only to renew it always" (p. 544).

It is impossible here to discuss the many questions raised by Professor Baldwin in the course of this inquiry. The aim has rather been to call attention to the importance of the inquiry itself, conducted as it is with admirable patience, fulness of information, and skill in the scientific interpretation of the elusive phenomena of the mental life. If the reader is not persuaded, he is at all events provided with important materials for a decision, and he cannot fail to gain a good deal of fresh insight, as well as great stimulus to further thought, from the study of the volume.

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH. JAMES SETH.

THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE MORAL INSTINCT. By Alexander Sutherland. Two volumes. London: Longmans, 1898.

In this work Mr. Sutherland, already known in Australia as a geographer and colonial historian, comes before the wider English-

speaking public as an ethical writer. We cordially welcome his book, not only for its intrinsic value, but as an indication of the growth of thought in Greater Britain. We have already a young Australian school of painting; let us hope that before long we shall have an Australian school of philosophy.

The general plan of the work is as follows: Beginning with the lower forms of life, such as fish, the author remarks that among those species which take no care of their young an enormous and wasteful fertility is requisite to maintain the species. This huge fertility absorbs a great deal of the parents' vitality and stands in the way of all progress. But when fish begin to take care of their young, a vastly diminished progeny suffices for race-preservation and allows opportunity for the development of general intelligence. The same reasoning is applied to the higher animals. The higher they are, the more marked is their parental care. This operates for progress in two ways: firstly, by lessening the drain of reproduction on the parents; secondly, by allowing the offspring a longer childhood, during which their mental faculties may develop and ripen far beyond the level of the humbler and quicker-maturing species.

It is in warm-blooded creatures that parental care begins to undergo a change of the most far-reaching character. From mere instinctive attention it transforms itself into conscious solicitude, in other words, into sympathy. Now, sympathy, according to Mr. Sutherland, is the Moral Instinct. Thus parental solicitude, developed with increasing power as we ascend the stages of warm-blooded life, is the root of that conduct which in man we term morality.

The same line of reasoning is applied to mankind. The lowest races are marked by weak parental solicitude, high fertility, great infant mortality, early maturity of children, and defective education. The higher races are marked by strong parental solicitude with consequent improvement in all the other respects. The growth of sympathy is therefore a necessary condition not only of moral progress but of intellectual and material progress as well.

A similar argument is developed in regard to conjugal sympathy or love between spouses, and social sympathy or affectionate relations between neighbors and fellow-citizens. From these three forms of sympathy, parental, conjugal, and social, is formed the whole content of our morality. The sentiment of Duty is merely the systematization or standardizing of sympathy, moral enthusiasm

merely the admiration for the higher forms of sympathetic conduct. The latter part of the book is occupied with the author's views on responsibility (wherein he avows himself a mechanical determinist), on the relation of morality to law, and on the nervous basis of the emotions. This latter part appears to us to be of considerably less value than what precedes.

It will be seen that Mr. Sutherland's book deals only in a minor degree with moral philosophy in the usual sense of the term. Moral philosophy is the explanation of conduct as the judgment and act of a personal moral agent. But Mr. Sutherland is interested rather in setting forth the natural-history conditions of morality and with what may be called sociological ethics, or the study of the moral habits and institutions of societies. It is in the moral-philosophic part of the book that his argument is least convincing. For example, his "hard" determinism with its denial of responsibility in the ordinary sense is repellent enough in itself; but he makes it more unreasonable by following it up with a profession of subjective idealism (ch. xxiv.). He is quite innocent of the often demonstrated fact that hard determinism and subjective idealism are maintainable, each by itself, but are mutually destructive in combination. But his great mistake is to suppose that out of mere animal sympathy we can get such conceptions as duty, self-respect, or moral beauty. These imply an appreciation of good conduct as a thing admirable in itself, which mere sympathy can never give us. Again, the title of the work itself is surely a misnomer. By "moral instinct," as already explained, Mr. Sutherland means sympathy. Now sympathy, as he himself points out (vol. i. p. 18), may sometimes make us do wrong. Hence the curious result that the moral instinct may dictate what is immoral. We want, then, a further criterion to decide upon the morality of the moral instinct, and where this is to come from Mr. Sutherland does not tell us.

In the natural-historic and sociological parts of the book there are evidences of more careful study, and the results achieved are proportionately more valuable. In his general theory Mr. Sutherland bases himself on the solid foundation of Darwin, and much of the best of his writing is a working out of hints and outlines contained in the third and fifth chapters of the "Descent of Man." Some of the technical terms he has invented are both ingenious and useful. For example, "perihestic" morality is the morality which grows up round the family hearth between the members of

the same household; while "aphestic" morality lies in the legal relations of fellow-citizens to each other.

It need hardly be said that even after Mr. Sutherland's labors there is still a great deal left for other workers in the same field. Up to the present time the subject of the historical development of morality has suffered the most extraordinary neglect. A glance at the bibliographies will verify this. In Mr. Fortescue's indexes from 1880–1895 there is only one work which pretends to be complete,—Letourneau's "Évolution de la morale,"—and not more than three or four German pamphlets. Nor is the deficiency made up by previous writers. Mr. Lecky's "History of European Morals," learned and interesting as far as it goes, is but a fragmentary study of one curious epoch. The historian of morality has in fact not yet appeared before the world, and a most magnificent literary and philosophic opportunity still remains unseized. Such facts as these are a sufficient answer to sceptics who ask whether, in view of the length of time that men have been philosophizing, there can be anything left for philosophy to do. The main problem may be briefly stated. In civilized society there is recognized a certain moral ideal, or norm of moral conduct, regulating all conduct concerned with family life, property, civic intercourse, the state, and so forth. Among savages we find a vastly different ideal, much more rudimentary and greatly different in its features. Now, how is this difference to be accounted for? For what reasons, by what processes, through what variations, under what influences, has this mighty change taken place in the most vitally interesting of all matters of human action? To this great question we have as yet nothing but fragments of an answer. For Mr. Sutherland's contribution, welcome though it be, cannot claim to be more than an instalment of the whole.

HENRY STURT.

OXFORD, ENGLAND.

THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS, AS BASED ON THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. By Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Translated by A. E. Kroeger, edited by the Hon. Dr. W. T. Harris, Commissioner of Education. London: Kegan Paul, French, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1897. Pp. xii., 399.

It is difficult to imagine what can justify the publication of such a book as this. So far as mere familiarity with German is concerned, Mr. Kroeger would, indeed, seem to be sufficiently equipped

for the task he has undertaken; for it is not very often that he has totally mistaken the sense of any particular sentence. But his inaccuracy and unfaithfulness to his original are so gross as to render his translation absolutely useless, as a substitute for the German, to any serious student of philosophy. It may, indeed, be doubted whether a student, whose object was to learn German and philosophy together, might not get as much good as harm, by using this translation *with* the original; but some false notions he could hardly fail to get from it; and Fichte's German, by itself, is far from difficult. For the general public the difficulty of the book itself must be a bar to its utility; and any one who hoped to get from this translation any notion of Fichte's simple and forcible style would be sorely disappointed; for Mr. Kroeger has, with great consistency, omitted those turns of phrase which are the most charming and characteristic in his author; and has, on the other hand, crammed his own style with barbarisms not to be met with in the German.

These charges are so serious that some substantiation of them seems owing alike to the two gentlemen whose names appear upon the title-page, to the readers of this JOURNAL, and to myself. I propose, therefore, to tabulate, with a few examples, those faults which seem to me most conclusive against the pretensions of this book to be considered an adequate translation. (1) Mr. Kroeger has adopted a division of the book into chapters and sections which seems to differ needlessly from that of Fichte. This division frequently prevents the reader from discovering the author's own classification of his matter. Thus, Fichte divides his book into *three* main parts; Mr. Kroeger into *two*. To take a more important instance: Fichte develops the Content of the Moral Law in *five* distinct steps (pp. 280–307, Ed. 1798); Mr. Kroeger proceeds with him to the end of the third, and then begins a new chapter in which Fichte's IV. appears as a new I. (p. 241), and, what Fichte treats as a part of V. (p. 311), is elevated by Mr. Kroeger into a new III. (p. 246.) On this head we may add that Mr. Kroeger arbitrarily rearranges the titles and paragraphs throughout, misleading in the former case, and losing much in the latter, since Fichte is accustomed to denote subsections within paragraphs by dashes, which Mr. Kroeger generally either omits altogether or elevates into new paragraphs. The sectional numbering, which runs throughout the whole of the original and is a considerable convenience for reference, is entirely omitted by this modern translator. (2) Mr. Kroeger frequently omits two or three whole sentences at a time, without

leaving any sign that he has done so; and also, though less frequently, inserts sentences of his own. His object is apparently to make the sense plainer, and to reject superfluous repetitions; but this is certainly not translation, and moreover he appears to follow no principle in it. For instance, he omits on p. 32 a most significant note on the transcendental stand-point; and further instances may be found on pp. 25, 41, 51, 59, 85, 310, etc. For a specimen of his explanatory insertions we may refer to p. 307, where will be found eight lines of matter which have no place in the German. Omissions of mere clauses are too numerous to call for special mention. (3) Of the desperate inaccuracy of Mr. Kroeger's terminology we may give the following instances. "Selbst-ständigkeit" is throughout translated "self-determination," and so rendered indistinguishable from "Selbst-bestimmung:" in one place, indeed, Mr. Kroeger uses "self-sufficiency," but never the proper equivalent, "self-subsistence." "Causality" is made to serve not only for "Kausalität," but also frequently for "Wirksamkeit," and even for "Thätigkeit" (p. 3). For "Wirklich" and "Real," "actual" and "real" are used quite indiscriminately; and similarly for "Lust," "Genuss," "Befriedigung," which Fichte pointedly distinguishes, "enjoyment" and "satisfaction" (pp. 153, 154). "Empfindung" is consistently rendered "perception," and thus in no way distinguished from "Wahrnehmung." In particular instances you can never be sure what German word you have to deal with: *e.g.*, "thinking" in one place (p. 63) represents "Vorstellung" (and "Vorstellung" in italics, too), whereas in many others it represents "Begriff" (p. 47); and who would guess that "actions" (p. 61) stands for "Wollen"? To pass to a more disputable point, it seems a pity that the title "Sittenlehre" should have been translated "Science of Ethics," since "Lehre" has none of the connotations of our word "science:" Mr. Kroeger has himself used in the text (p. 2) the appropriate translation, "doctrine." Finally, we come to some examples which border on our next division—that of bad English. For "Sollen," "shall" (and Mr. Kroeger does not shrink from "*shall*-ing;" cf., too, "the canning" (p. 282), is much more often used than "ought," the only word which represents its ethical meaning in English; and the use of "a thinking," "this thinking," for "ein Denkendes," "dieses Denkende," as well as for "ein Denken," "dieses Denken," is as misleading as it is barbarous (p. 23). (4) This latter barbarism of using an English adjective to represent the substantival use of the German

neuter with the article occurs throughout the book. For other examples of faulty English we may quote the following: The German construction of "wenn wir uns . . . bewusst zu sein glauben" (p. 73) repeatedly rendered "we believe to be conscious," instead of "we believe that we are conscious;" phrases such as "In simply a *formaliter* way" (p. 155), "It involves a twofold" (p. 183; cf. p. 355), "An absolute first, and in itself grounded somewhat" (p. 29), "Injurious, and all true morality-eradicating (sic) pretexts" (p. 330), "the all-to-his-wife sacrificing (sic) generosity of the husband" (p. 347); solecisms like "oppositedness" (p. 26), "objectivating" (p. 156), "continuating" and "esteemable" for "estimable" (p. 332, foll.); finally, vulgarisms, such as "shew up," "hunt up," "look up" (*passim*), and "sneak" (p. 207), which, in the sense in which Mr. Kroeger uses them, I cannot believe to be classical even in America. (5) Mr. Kroeger, while, as we have seen (p. 158), he ventures to omit some of Fichte's own explanations as unnecessary, has added just four notes of his own. The first of these (p. 102), in which he explains that the original points through which the Ego acts on nature are "a plurality of first men," is a mere absurdity, since Fichte immediately explains that they form the body as such. The second (p. 122), in which he identifies Fichte's natural organic totalities with Leibnitz's Monads, is also manifestly wrong; since Fichte allows to them neither consciousness nor complete independence. (Along with these, in point of falseness, may be reckoned the explanatory addition "or God" on p. 171.) The third note (p. 188), despite its irrelevant dogmatism, is at least questionable; since Fichte would appear to be speaking rather of the history of an individual than of "human history." The fourth (p. 350) would seem only to obscure what in the text was clear; unless, indeed, its reference to a man's "reason" as "reflected from some external thing" may be taken in connection with the curious remarks on "introspection," which occur in Dr. Harris's Preface (pp. vi. and vii.), as giving us some information about that sytsem of "rational psychology," which we are surprised to learn was established by Kant's Critique (*ib.*). (5) The number of misprints alone would suffice to prove the gross carelessness with which this book has been prepared. Omitting such as are of a common order, specimens of some interest may be found on the following pages: 2, 18, 41, 112, 135, 179, 219, 223, 227, 229, 252, 255, 265, 331, 349, 364, 384, 386, 392, etc.; we may instance "part" for "fact," "anxious" for "conscious," "private" for "finite," "located" for "treated,"

"spirit" for "speech," "greater" for "preacher," "reorganize" for "recognize." (6) Absolute mistranslations, due either to carelessness or to misapprehension of the general sense, are not uncommon.

I have given so much space to exposing this so-called translation, that little can remain for discussing Fichte's work. And yet, perhaps, some praise is due to Dr. Harris and Mr. Kroeger for calling attention to it. I cannot, indeed, agree with the former that "Fichte's writings form the classics of introspection," nor that "Fichte's insight into freedom . . . is the foundation-stone of the subsequent philosophies of Schelling and Hegel; in which . . . the psychology movement comes into harmony with the ontology movement, both reach the same highest principles, namely, the personality of God, human freedom, and responsibility, individual immortality in an eternal church invisible." I hope I may be nearer the mark in saying that the "Sittenlehre" contains the most thoroughgoing attempt ever made to build a complete ethical system solely on the basis of freedom. Fichte throughout refers all his conceptions to freedom; whereas with Kant and other moralists, who explicitly adopt that basis, the direct emphasis is often thrown on other principles, the connection of which with freedom is by no means immediately evident. For this reason Fichte's Ethics are at the same time more systematic and more paradoxical. He allows, for instance, that the profession of a scholar is "higher" than that of a merchant; but he would appear to leave no possible meaning for such a phrase, since the scholar is neither more of a means to the "Rational End" but as a mere "tool" precisely equal in value with the merchant, nor can anything in the world be regarded as an end in itself: Fichte generally carries out rigorously this latter point of view.

With regard to the Preface and the lengthy deductions which form the first two divisions of the book, I must confess myself totally unconvinced of their main object,—the establishment of the Ego as something outside Nature, subject-object, and possessed of Freedom. The main point would seem to lie in this: Whether anything can be thought at all without thereby being made into an object, a "thing" (p. 33), a "being." If not, then, neither can the Ego, nor "thought" itself. That everything which is, is for consciousness in some sense, may be admitted; but it does not follow that consciousness itself *is* in another sense, as Fichte seems to assume. He confesses that he can only answer the "opposers of

Freedom" by another presupposition (p. 174); and has only to say on his side that his presupposition enables him "actually to construct a philosophy" and "has intuition on its side;" both which advantages may be equally claimed by the other side. Similarly, when he comes to deal with conscience, he recognizes excellently, to begin with, the difficulty of finding an "absolute criterion of the correctness of my conviction about duty" (pp. 211–213); he proves that there must *be* such an one, and that it will appear as a feeling of harmony between the "original and actual Ego," and will hence compel our belief; but he spoils all by omitting to prove that nothing but such a harmony can thus compel belief (pp. 214–218). In short, we can follow him so long as what he says tends merely to show that something must be our duty, and that that something we must do; but he fails us entirely before the entirely different question—what that something is.

G. E. Moore.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

Studies in Philosophical Criticism and Construction. By Sydney H. Mellone, D.Sc. William Blackwood & Sons. Pp. xxii., 426.

In this book Mr. Mellone has undertaken "a general critical survey of the whole field of philosophy, as this term is now understood by all who make it a special department of study." Such an ambitious aim argues on the part of the writer great intellectual maturity or the reverse. After perusing the book, we cannot say that the author's attempt to traverse the ground with seven-league boots is justified by its results. The book consists of a series of papers on particular points in psychology, logic and epistemology, ethics and metaphysics. In no sense is it a whole; and the attempt to bring together isolated discussions only makes more plain the unsystematic character of the thought.

Without entering into problems of general philosophical interest, which are not germane to this Journal, we turn to the ethical discussions which occupy the last part of the book. In these Mr. Mellone has been chiefly influenced by Mr. Bradley, Dr. Martineau, Professor Seth, and Green. And it is one of his conspicuous traits as a writer that he is sympathetic towards such divergent lines of thought; but I think one has a right to complain that, in the main, he is sympathetic towards each one in turn, and that he makes no really serious attempt to fuse such diffusive intellectual sympathy into an intelligible whole.

In the chapter on the Method of Ethics the discussion starts from the fact of moral judgment. "We say of an act that it is 'right,' our 'duty,' 'ought' to be done; or, again, that it is 'wrong,' 'ought not' to be done." We have, further, certain characteristic emotions attaching to these. And the aim of ethics is, generally stated, to seek for the meaning of these characteristics of our nature. The conclusion the writer reaches is that neither duty nor pleasure can be regarded as good for its own sake: "They are good only in so far as they contribute to the realization of the highest type of personality." The question, then, is, What is the supreme ideal of human life? This "ideal of personality," we are told, "is realized by that activity of consciousness which tends to promote the harmonious *efficiency*, as a whole, of those functions of consciousness by which truth is attained, beauty created and appreciated, and the social consequences of our conduct —its effect on other selves—adequately comprehended. In this regard the most fundamental quality needed is sympathy." This sympathy, or sympathetic insight, as it is called elsewhere, fills a large place in Mr. Mellone's theory, and the author claims that his form of statement "gives a rather more concrete content to our conception of what man's better nature is than Green's statements do." What, then, is the nature of the moral end? The writer tells us that it is self-realization,—"the progressive realization of the faculties of our nature as a whole, where the lower desires are given their proper place in the service of the higher." But he is careful to explain that the "self" which *he* has in view is "essentially the individual self." Two pages farther on we are told, still more decidedly, "the term 'self' should be reserved for the personal life of the individual: which is not something in *se ipso totus teres atque rotundus*, but is conscious of itself as imperfect, finite, and dependent, and, therefore, of itself as ruled by an ideal of infinite and absolute worth." Mr. Mellone asserts that "by Green and others the term self-realization is used in a much more extended significance: the self which is to be realized is held to be infinite, to be rational, to be social." The apologetic interpretation of these predicates, however, by which the author tries to show what Green understood, or at least should have understood, by them might have been spared. To take but the last. The writer tells us that "it is not in the least to be denied that man is only moral, and indeed only human, in society;" yet, when "the community that is to be realized is identified with the actual social organiza-

tion, the whole contents of morality disappear into the external routine of my social station and its duties, and human selves are regarded simply as the products of society; they are products of a general life of humanity which uses them as its vehicles, but which cannot be said to be realized in them." "A man's personal perfection is not essentially and immediately, but only partially and in effect, manifested in the performance of the duties determined by his civic or social position. The effective performance of these is a consequence of his growth in perfection, although this growth would be impossible were he not in the society of his fellows" (p. 346). "The adequate fulfilment of the duties of a man's social position is not the most fundamental form of his good. . . . It is a hopelessly inadequate account of his good to regard it as realized simply in working out the functions determined by the political and social institutions of the community in which he actually finds himself. When limited thus, duty becomes an external routine; the concrete good of any and every case in actual life must contain far more than this" (p. 348). "We reject the view that the individual human life is a mere correlate of the general social life, and is an unreal abstraction if regarded as in any way independent of the latter" (p. 349).

Now, this view of the moral end seems to us to err as seriously in what it affirms as in what it denies. It holds up to us an abstraction called "social life" or "society" as if it were a something apart from the individuals within it, and being able easily to make this out to be an all-devouring monster,—for in fact it is anything you please, since it is nothing at all,—we are thrust back upon the individual self for salvation. But the description of this harbor of refuge is not an inviting one. So far as we can discover, it is nothing but a bundle of negations. What ethical content self-realization has when the self is independent of all other selves we are not told. Realize your *self*, your *individual* self; this command tells us nothing: if it does tell us anything, that something is immoral. We are not surprised, therefore, to discover that our author is forced gradually by the pressure of his own theory to bring in almost all that here he casts out. For example: "In this capacity of man's nature, from which *moral* activity springs, the individual seems to transcend his finitude, or go beyond himself more completely than in the pursuit of science and art" (p. 383). Now, obviously, a man cannot go beyond him*self* altogether; he may go beyond a narrower self to a wider, a more universal, a less self*ish*, a more social,—call

it what you will,—but so long as man does anything and can be the subject of moral predicates, he is expressing or realizing him*self*. Mr. Mellone's argument, therefore, must be that to be moral a man must transcend his *self*,—not to become selfless, but to become unselfish. The self which he transcends, therefore, is the particular individual self, which, whatever homage it may command in epistemology, cannot pass the outer court of ethics, since in the simplest moral act we are already beyond it. The remaining portion of our author's discussion is in fact but the proof of this. On page 385 he tells us that "the *essential being* of all who constitute human society is the same;" and (quoting from Dr. Martineau) "the process of social evolution so implicates together the individual agent and his fellows that we can scarce divide the causal factors into individual and social; . . . spiritually he is not him*self* without them. . . . He has no self which is not reflected in them." On page 387, "The social bond is a concrete spiritual life penetrating its members." Again (p. 389), "The 'social impulse' is a tendency uprising from the very roots of our being, and expressing itself in every direction of mental activity. Reason is *social*, in that my reason cannot work unless it works together with the reason of my fellow-men; for its structure and laws are identical in all of us." This last sentence reveals, however, in what a gingerly way Mr. Mellone has grasped the conception of the individual as essentially social; for an identical reason in each of us would be *of itself* rather a ground for separation than for union. And we are not surprised to be told, immediately afterwards, that "in order that reason and knowledge may go to work there must be different personalities to work it out: my reason is my own, your reason is your own, though in all it has a common root." For, even admitting the truth of this, what enlightenment is there in telling us, first, that reason is social, and then that each man's reason is his own, unless in some way these aspects are shown to stand in an essential relation to one another. It may indeed keep a problem in equilibrium if we buffet it first to the one side and then to the other, but it does not make it any more intelligible. What we want to know is why and how *both* of these are true, and how they stand to one another. We may readily agree with the writer when he says (p. 393), "What we have to seek is a *common good*. Whatever be the different ways in which men may seek their own or others' good, whatever divergence there may seem to be between these two, we have to take our stand upon this, that no man can find the highest good for himself unless he so lives that his life

helps others to find that same good. . . . This is the primary condition of realizing the end and aim of life." But we ask, and in my judgment ask vainly, from the writer some logical or consistent account of the possibility, to say nothing of the necessity, of this transition from man and his individual good to man as social. And the fact that, in the later pages of his book, Mr. Mellone swallows the principle of idealism at one gulp does not make one at all certain that it will purge his system of its crudities. For while the finite self of the earlier stage of the inquiry is changed later into a self which is essentially and *distinctively* a sharer in or a partaker of an infinite and eternal life, this change is not logically evolved, nor is its significance realized or appreciated by the writer himself.

ROBERT A. DUFF.

UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

UNFORESEEN TENDENCIES OF DEMOCRACY. By Edwin Lawrence Godkin. Archibald Constable & Co. 6 shillings nett.

These essays are a latter-day criticism of Democracy. They try to take stock of its gains and losses. Nothing is more remarkable to the student of politics than the change that has taken place in the course of the last century in men's views on popular government. It has now few open enemies, but, on the other hand, it has few ardent advocates. It has ceased to be feared, but it has also ceased to be praised. No one would now write as Burke does against it. On the other hand, no one would write with the exuberant faith of Paine in its defence. Mr. Godkin is not concerned with the triumphs but with the failures of Democracy. Taking this general disillusionment as his starting-point, he seeks to explain it. It is due he thinks in part to a false estimate of ordinary human nature. The supply of wisdom and public spirit that it contains was lamentably overestimated by early reformers. On the other hand, it is due to a false estimate of the nature of the problem. The multitude and complexity of the interests that a modern government must take account of were lamentably underestimated. This has become especially conspicuous in the case of "the large masses of population called cities." As Mr. Godkin puts it, "it cannot be said, in the light of history, that the new men are giving communities worse government than they used to have, but government in their hands is not progressing in the same ratio as the other arts of civilization, while the complexity of the interests to be dealt with is steadily increasing."

Mr. Godkin's analysis refers chiefly to America. But in spite of the difference of circumstance, the English student of politics has much to learn from the defects he brings to light in the working of the American system. Moreover, he devotes a special chapter to Australia, the *enfant terrible* of modern democracy. We are here asked to observe what the English democratic system can be when released from the restraints imposed upon it by the traditions of the old country on the one hand, and a written constitution, such as America has enjoyed from the beginning, on the other.

The three most important essays are those on The Nominating System, The Decline of Legislatures, and Peculiarities of American Municipal Government.

Americans do not require to have the eccentricities of the American Democracy in the arrangements it has made for procuring the nomination of candidates explained to them. The English student who knows his Bryce will recall the description there given of the "Primary,"—"the vulgar figures in good coats, the universal *cameraderie* with no touch of friendship about it; something between a betting-ring and the flags outside the Liverpool Exchange,"—that is the keystone of the American political structure. That a freedom-loving people should sit down contentedly under so egregious a system is always a puzzle to newspaper-reading people in England. Mr. Godkin offers them an explanation of the paradox. It comes of the amount of nominating that has got to be done. If there is a deal of voting work to be done people have to be got to do it. The only means hitherto invented of getting them is the appeal to party loyalty. But there are loyalties and loyalties, and to the reader who asks why party loyalty works out in one way in England and in another in America, Mr. Godkin gives further excellent analysis in reply. In America there is a written constitution which removes whole classes of the most interesting questions that can exercise the human or at any rate the political mind from discussion. In America, also, there is a committee instead of a cabinet system which also acts as an extinguisher to debate. In America, again, it is required that the candidate shall be a local man. All this means there is no large spontaneous supply of public-spirited men to undertake the duties of government. Politicians don't grow, they have to be made, and it is the distinction of American Democracy to have invented a "machine" to make them. Of the quality of these machine-made politicians Mr. Godkin tells us more elsewhere. In concluding the chapter upon

the "primaries" he suggests some remedies. But construction is not a strong point of this able book, and it strikes the reader as somewhat inadequate. To purify the *rôle* of voters with the power the law gives you is an obvious reform. But Dr. Clarke's further suggestion of companies of voters selected by lot is rejected. The ground given is that it would leave no place for party loyalty; but is not the example of Mr. Low's independent candidature in New York, which Mr. Godkin recommends for imitation, open to precisely the same objection?

The contrast between expectation (see *The Federalist* and De Tocqueville) and event is nowhere more striking than in the *personnel* of the Legislatures themselves. Mr. Godkin begins his essay on these with an interesting comparison between the European system of government by cabinet and the American of government by committee. The former gives every man his chance—in England, of supporting or opposing a government bill; on the Continent and in Australia, of bringing in a bill of his own. It is true that in America any one is free to propose what he likes; but he sends in his bill to the committee as a student sends in his theme to the professor, or an artist his picture to the hanging committee of the Royal Academy. He has no power of advocating its claims. What this implies let those reflect who are inclined to echo Carlyle's observations upon the talkativeness of the British House of Commons. The American committee has the merit of discouraging debate, but this, as Mr. Godkin points out in vigorous language, has its disadvantages. It makes it the grave of honorable ambition and the Legislatures themselves "scenes of obscurity, hard work, and small pay," with the consequence that "it is increasingly difficult to-day to get a man of serious knowledge on any subject to go to Congress if he have other pursuits and other sources of income. To get him to go to the State Legislature in any of the populous and busy States is well-nigh impossible." One would have thought that such a system would have acted as a discouragement to legislative zeal on the part of such men as go. On the contrary, it encourages legislation. The multitude of acts and resolutions throughout the States that are annually passed is incredible. Mr. Godkin estimates them at some sixteen thousand. The explanation is simple. A legislator is paid to legislate, and legislate he must on pain of losing his seat. If he has no special talent that way, he falls back, like the legislator in Kansas, upon the Ten Commandments and proposes to embody them in the

State legislation, or like the legislator in Nebraska, he consults his wife, and proposes to make the wearing of corsets a criminal offence.

Mr. Godkin's remedies for this state of affairs are again disappointing. His suggestion for the State Legislatures that they should have fewer meetings suggests Carlyle's remedy of locking the door of St. Stephen's. If there is no genuine business for these Legislatures, by all means let them be suppressed, but if a State is a real entity and has real business, surely this is a case where cure is better than prevention. It is not a cure for an ill-fitting coat to go without one, nor for an ill-acting method of government to go without any at all. The suggestion of the extended use of the referendum is perhaps good, but we require definition and illustration. The alteration of the time of the elections with a view to bringing it closer to the time of entry upon office is an obvious reform.

Coming to Municipal Democracy, we might have expected *a priori* that New York or Chicago instead of Glasgow or Birmingham would have become the model of all that a corporation ought to be, and the Mecca of the political reformer. The American city has no vested interests, no inveterate abuses to contend with. Democracy has here a clean slate. How is it that these cities have become a by-word for political corruption? Mr. Godkin explains it as the result of the subjection of the city to the State Legislature. Whereas in England and in Europe generally the municipality may be said to have existed before the state, in America the great modern cities have sprung up within it. The result has been that the State Legislatures have always regarded the cities with suspicion. This feeling has been encouraged by preachers and poets (what of Walt Whitman?) on the theory presumably that God made the country and man made the town. It has been further increased by the habit of choosing the political capital without reference to industrial importance, with the result that the boss and his doings are removed from healthy criticism. This explains why three-fourths of the American States have denied the townships the right of autonomous government in manifest contradiction to Democratic principles. To deliver the Prometheus of city government from the vulture that preys on its vitals is a labor worthy of a modern Hercules.

The chapter on Australian Democracy is less convincing. The author has not been there, and is dependent on second-hand in-

formation. Yet what he says is well worth reading. The chief differences between Australian and American Democracy he traces to the different circumstances under which they respectively rose. America took as its model the English system of government as it existed in the time of George III. and before the idea of cabinet government, as we understand it, had arisen. Australia, like the new European Democracies rising later, has reproduced the main features of the English cabinet system. Two questions face her: 1. Is this system workable without the party loyalty which has given governments stability in England? Australian experience is not more encouraging here than European. The kaleidoscope in South Australia has given us forty-two governments in forty years, in New South Wales twenty-eight, in Victoria twenty-six, in the same period. 2. Will it bear the strain of being applied to a federal system? Experience is not yet to hand, but it may be shortly, and we shall see.

Another difference between Australia and America is the absence in the former of a written constitution. This is a direct encouragement to rash governmental experiments. "A law paramount drawn up by picked men assembling for the purpose at stated intervals of twenty years or less, and safeguarding all the primary social rights against popular passion or impulse or legislative corruption, and interpreted by the courts, is a device peculiar to the United States. It is the only really valid check on Democracy ever devised." In its absence Democracy in Australia and New Zealand has gone on unchecked in the path of social experiment. Capital is lent by government to societies and individuals on imperfect security; lands are let; provision is made for cheap transport; bonuses on produce are paid; work is provided for the unemployed; had it not been for the action of the governor of Queensland in 1867 they might to-day have been floundering in the quagmire of inconvertible paper currency. Many of these experiments have undoubtedly been notorious failures. They all point in a direction which Mr. Godkin strongly disapproves, the alteration of existing society in the direction of Socialism. Will the colonies learn by experience and stop in time? Three grounds of hope are suggested: first, the hold that the competitive system has taken of the Anglo-Saxon race; secondly, the very rapidity with which experiments succeed one another and develop their consequences; thirdly, the seriousness, ability, and purity of the press.

The merits and the limitations of Mr. Godkin's book are clearly

marked in this last essay. Mr. Godkin is not a philosophical writer in the technical sense. He has no theory of the state or of the precise limitation of its sphere. Where he touches on questions that presuppose some view on these questions he falls back on a somewhat uncritical individualism. There is thus no attempt to discriminate between social experiments, such as limitation of hours, enforcement of sanitary legislation, which make for national wealth and progress, and others like the creation of work for the unemployed, inconvertible notes, bonus on exports, which make for poverty and reaction. This somewhat detracts from the value of his criticism of Democracy in Australia and New Zealand. On the other hand, he has made a close study of the actual working of Democracy as a whole, and, though he regards its present state in all parts of the world as sufficiently serious, he writes with a hopefulness which one misses in some of the recent critics of Democracy in England. Even the abuses in the Great Republic of which he is a citizen are not inveterate. He despairs of an immediate remedy. But he cherishes a robust faith in the ultimate soundness and energy of popular opinion. In this he reminds one of the great saying of Lincoln, which he quotes: "You can fool part of the people all the time and all the people part of the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time,"—an altogether sound and inspiriting creed.

J. H. Muirhead.

Birmingham.

Anarchism: A Criticism and History of the Anarchist Theory. By E. V. Zenker. Translated from the German. London: Methuen & Co., 1898. Pp. xii., 271.

The author tells us that his work originated in an impromptu lecture which he gave (? in Vienna) on the day of the bomb outrage in the French Parliament. His purpose is to clear up the widely prevalent ignorance as to the real nature of Anarchism,—an ignorance typified in the statement of an American author of a large book on the subject (Mr. Schaack) that "all Socialists are Anarchists as a first step, although all Anarchists are not precisely Socialists." Mr. Zenker's chief difficulty has been in the fact that Anarchist literature is, as a rule, not to be found in the great public libraries, and cannot easily be procured through the ordinary channels. Those who have attempted to make a study at first hand even of the calmer writings of Socialists have often encountered the

same difficulty. The book before us is divided into three parts: Part I. deals with early Anarchism, the Anarchist movements in the middle ages, etc., Proudhon, "Max Stirner" (Caspar Schmidt), etc. Part II. is entitled Modern Anarchism. One chapter is devoted mainly to Bakunin, another mainly to Kropotkin and Elisée Reclus, while a third gives a brief account of recent Anarchist writings in Germany, England, and America. This chapter is confessedly incomplete so far as America is concerned, as even a personal application to Mr. Tucker failed to procure a copy of his journal, *Liberty*. Some account is given of Mr. Auberon Herbert's "Voluntary State;" but nothing is said of the sentimental anarchism of Mr. Edward Carpenter. Part III. treats of the Relation of Anarchism to Science and Politics. One chapter is devoted to a proof that the sociological stand-point of Mr. Herbert Spencer differentiates him completely from the unscientific idealism of the Anarchists. Another chapter deals with the spread of Anarchism in Europe, and the book concludes with some very striking remarks on the attitude that civilized society should take towards Anarchism, theoretical and practical. The bibliographical notes appended to each important name are a valuable feature of the work.

"Anarchy means," says Mr. Zenker, "in its ideal sense, the perfect, unfettered self-government of the individual, and, consequently, the absence of any kind of external government." If this definition be accepted, theoretical anarchism has been the creed of many saintly and of some philosophical persons in many different periods. The author shows that Anarchists are not a new product of modern unrest, but have their precursors in the anarchist communists of the middle ages. With reference to that remarkable woman, Louise Michel, the perfectly sound remark is quoted, "If she had lived in the middle ages, she would without doubt have been the foundress of a new religious order" (p. 170). Anarchism might be traced even farther back than the middle ages or the early Christian centuries. The "Egoism" of Max Stirner, according to which property is "that over which I can assert my power" (a principle widely accepted in practice), is a theory at least as old as the Callicles and the Thrasymachus of Plato's Dialogues; and the philosophy of Proudhon, of Stirner and Bakunin, in spite of its use of Hegelian formulæ, is only a survival of the crude individualism of the Cynics and of the more audacious Greek Sophists. Mr. Zenker's history of theories is not always accurate. It is a mistake to represent Hobbes's form of the Social Contract

theory as necessarily involving monarchy (p. 14). It is absurd to call "Hooker, the ecclesiastic," a pioneer of Anarchism (p. 16), while scornfully rejecting any recognition of the genuinely Anarchist element in Mr. Herbert Spencer's political thinking (pp. vi., 106, 201–212). But on the whole the work seems very carefully done and is written in a spirit of great fairness and impartiality. Of practical importance is the clear recognition of the antithesis between Anarchism and Socialism; and the author shows how Anarchism in its most dangerous "active" form is most prevalent in those countries where Social-democratic parties are weak or divided. Mr. Zenker finds a social value even in extreme Anarchist theories as a protest in favor of individual freedom against the Socialist tendency to make the state all powerful. The criminal Anarchist, he argues, should be treated as an ordinary criminal, or perhaps as a lunatic. Exceptional legislation is mischievous and exceptional severity only turns scoundrels into martyred apostles. The Anarchist assassin is no new type, though modern chemistry has supplied him with new weapons. At the Reformation time he used religious formulæ; now he uses those of anarchical theory. "The state cannot, of course, allow itself to look on at Anarchist crimes and to shorten its arm; but it must not delude itself with the notion that it will remove such crime or stop the Anarchist movement by means of the guillotine. Does this mean that society is helpless in face of Anarchism? It is, if it possesses only the force to suppress and not the power to convince; if society is only held together by compulsion, as the present state partly is *and the Socialist state would be still more*, and threatens to fall to pieces if the apparatus of compulsion were given up; if the state, *instead of trying to redress the unfortunately unalterable natural inequality of its members*, only intensifies it by legalizing all kinds of new inequalities, and if it regards its institutions, and especially the law, as instruments for the unalterable conservation of all present forms of society with all their imperfections and injustices" (pp. 262, 263). Is the criticism on Socialism, implied in the first passage I have here italicized, quite consistent with the undoubtedly Socialistic ideal put before the state in the second passage? Mr. Zenker seems to adopt the assumption of Mill and Spencer that all compulsion as such is an evil, a view which is hardly compatible with the attempt "to redress the natural inequality" of mankind. To *alter* the *unalterable* natural inequality is what a sane Socialism will not attempt.

The translation is fairly done, but is disfigured by a good deal of carelessness and awkwardness. Thus, it is absurd in an English translation to give the title of Marx's criticism of Proudhon in German, "*Das Elend der Philosophie: An Answer to Proudhon's Philosophie des Elends*" (p. 60, *note*). H. Spencer's book should not be cited as *The Individual versus the State*. And in the account of Spencer the following sentence almost needs retranslation into German before we get the correct English:—"When the *régime* peculiar to militarism, the status, has disappeared, the *régime* of convention appears in its stead." For "the status" read "status," and for "convention" read "contract." Truly, as Roger Bacon said long ago, a translator ought to know not only the language from which and the language into which he translates, but also the subject with which his author is dealing.

DAVID G. RITCHIE.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

POLITICAL CRIME. By Louis Proal. London: T. Fisher Unwin; New York: Appleton & Co., 1898. Pp. 355.

The theme of M. Proal's interesting and valuable book is that politics cannot be divorced from morality. Science without conscience, Rabelais has said, is the ruin of the soul; and M. Proal endeavors to enforce the maxim that politics divorced from morality is the ruin of society. In the opening chapter of his volume M. Proal points out that immoral political maxims date much farther back than the times of Machiavelli. The doctrine of two moralities—one for public and another for private affairs—is a doctrine which has come down to the modern world from Greek and Roman times. All that Machiavelli did was to state this theory and to show how craft and treachery might be utilized to acquire and retain political authority. The doctrine of two moralities is put forward by one of the characters of Euripides when he says, "If it be needful to resort to injustice to attain power, let us have recourse thereto: but under all other circumstances let us be honest." Reasons of state is the modern form which this ancient maxim has assumed. Injustice is defended on the ground that in the particular circumstances the welfare of the state demanded it. Politicians are accustomed to use this expression as a cloak for every iniquity. It was for reasons of state that Socrates was condemned to drink hemlock, that the early Christians were subjected to martyrdom, that the Protestants were massacred by

Charles IX. and banished by Louis XIV. In fact, reasons of state can always be alleged with a certain show of plausibility for the most abominable crimes. The ultimate standard to which public opinion must make politicians conform is not reasons of state but the permanent principles of justice. "It is false," says Cicero, "to assert that states cannot be governed without violating justice: it is by absolute justice and justice alone that it is possible to govern states." A Nemesis overtakes nations which allow themselves to be governed by reasons of state. It is a policy which on purely utilitarian grounds does not pay in the end. Many instances of the truth of this will be found in M. Proal's pages, and the unhappy condition of Spain to-day is in no small degree due to the politicians, who suppressed intellectual liberty among their countrymen for pretended reasons of state.

M. Proal very truly points out that the moral standard of political rulers is determined by public opinion. It therefore rests with the public to purify the political atmosphere where it has become polluted by refusing to support unscrupulous candidates for power, and unscrupulous methods of political action. But in order to do this effectively the public themselves must be permeated and animated by genuine and deep moral principles. At the present moment the clash of national interests and of class interests is in many ways a menace to civilization. The only manner in which these conflicting interests can ultimately be reconciled and harmonized is by bringing the combatants together on the common meeting ground of justice. All other methods are more or less Machiavellian in character and can only terminate in confusion and strife.

Readers of M. Proal's book may regard it as one-sided on certain points, and perhaps as unduly alarmist as far as regards the power for evil of certain extreme political tendencies and doctrines. In my view he is unnecessarily alarmed at the developments of Anarchism and Socialism. The deep-rooted conservatism of the human race is too strong for the political theories of the apostles of socialism on the one hand or anarchy on the other. The comparative study of man makes it quite plain that the lower down we go in the scale of civilization the more fixed and rooted are human habits and modes of thoughts. Of all sections of the population the masses are the most closely attached to the habits of the past, and if a tolerable amount of economic well-being is assured to them, there is no likelihood whatever that political doctrines which strike at

the root of immemorial habits will secure a practical footing in their minds.

W. D. MORRISON.

LONDON.

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY. By Sidney and Beatrice Webb. 2 vols., crown 8vo. Longmans, 1897.

The authors have thoroughly and skilfully used their almost unique opportunities;—apart from all else, their book is a valuable record of facts, never before presented together and many of them never before presented at all.

The first section, on the Structure of Trades Unions, with its history of the gradual growth of the present dominant type, a democracy tempered by bureaucracy, gives us a series of experiments in self-government. Various deductions are made. The *referendum*, for example, is rejected. The notion that a representative should be a delegate is refuted. The experience of Trades Unions in their own domestic government is said to point to their eventual representation in parliament "by a class of expert parliamentary representatives" on the model of their own expert officials (I. 66). Representation of the working-classes must in fact become a profession. The authors do their best to distinguish this professional representative from a mere delegate (69).

To the student of political philosophy this is one of the most interesting sections of the book; it should be compared with the concluding chapter of the second volume, on Trade Unionism and Democracy (807 *seq.*). The next, on the Function of Trades Unions, includes a description of the ways and means of trades societies, their "method of collective bargaining," their fight for a standard rate of wages, normal day, and protection of health and life, as well as their attitude to apprenticeship and machinery. It is strikingly brought out that, while the leading principles of trades unionists are substantially the same, as soon as they try to embody them in a policy for the united action of all they break up like other folk into "Conservatives, Individualists, and Collectivists" (II. 597). The sea is salt, wherever you drop in your bucket.

The third and last part of the book, on "Trade Union Theory," after an acrimonious chapter on the Economists, gives us the authors' view of the present position of parties in the industrial world. The manufacturer is strategically at a disadvantage before the wholesale trader, the wholesale trader before the shopkeeper,

the shopkeeper before the customer; all the rest are thus pressed to reduce expenses in every possible way, and they all bear down, like a pyramid on its base, upon the workingmen (II. 662–671). At least this would be so if each class of producers did not raise "bulwarks or dikes" against encroachments. Such bulwarks, however, exist in combinations, unions, or legislative monopolies (676–702). The picture is not all dark, after all.

It was, perhaps, natural that writers conscious of having done much for their subject should occasionally write as if no one else had done anything. There is a worse offence than this, however, in notes like that on page 357 of Volume I., where we are told that all economic manuals repeated the statement that unpleasant trades have high wages till the "refreshing originality" of Fleeming Jenkin told the truth about them in 1870. Mill's "Political Economy," perhaps the best known of all economic manua s in this century, contained the correction of the error as early as 1862 (5th ed., II. xiv, § 1). The major prophets as well as the minor should have their due.

J. BONAR.

LONDON.

THE SOCIAL TEACHINGS OF JESUS: An Essay in Christian Sociology. By Shailer Matthews, A.M., Professor of New Testament History and Interpretation in the University of Chicago. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1897. Pp. 235. Price, $1.50.

The main effort of Jesus, according to Professor Matthews, was to present ideals, and the present work concerns itself almost exclusively with his conceptions of what society may become and the means and processes through which the desired consummation may be reached. Entrance into a transformed society, "the kingdom of God," is the goal and reward of the individual's endeavor—in the view of Jesus. The "kingdom" is not a mere synonyme for personal holiness or righteousness. It stands for an ideal society or social order. In it the relation of men to God is that of sons, and (therefore) to each other that of brothers. Sonship means not so much descent from as likeness to God,—*i.e.*, practically, moral aspiration and effort; and brotherhood is not "universal brotherhood," in the modern sense, but the brotherhood of the members of the kingdom, of the sons of God.

Professor Matthews contends strongly that the kingdom was not something "post-mortem or post-catastrophic." Jesus did not

occupy "an exclusively eschatological point of view." The kingdom was to be an evolution, or at least the process by which it was to be reached was evolutionary. It is "the natural possibility for man's social capacities and powers." It may be (and was, indeed) established in the midst of the existing social order, though when completed the existing order will pass away. To the latter incident Professor Matthews refers only in passing, and misses thus the secret of the extraordinary power which the Christian gospel first had. Jesus said the kingdom was "at hand." It was this that startled and compelled the attention of men. The purifying and purging were to be done soon. The exact day or hour Jesus did not pretend to know, but the utmost boundary he set was the lifetime of the generation he addressed. Professor Matthews's exposition, in general so excellent, lacks in objectivity at this point. Indeed, little is said of the goal in general,—of the king coming in glory, of the judgment, of the consuming fire for the wicked, of the new order of nature in which marriage (and birth) and death would pass away,—though in Jesus's teaching the goal (at least, in its aspect of the judgment) is almost as prominent as the immediate present and gives an overshadowing awe to the present. Only on almost the last page of the book is the "cataclysm" distinctly recognized. But on the whole, and in many details to which we cannot refer here, the work is a welcome fruit of advanced Christian scholarship. It shows, we may add, discrimination and sense in incidentally dealing with the social agitations of the present day.

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

CHICAGO, ILL.

JEWISH IDEALS, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Joseph Jacobs. London: David Nutt; New York: Macmillan & Co. Pp. 242.

A JEWISH STATE. An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question. By Theodore Herzl. London: David Nutt, 1896. Pp. 102.

These two little volumes are written by two Jews, and deal with the Semitic problem in modern Europe from two entirely different points of view. Herzl is of opinion that this problem is insoluble so long as the Jews reside among the Christian populations of the West. He considers that the Jews have lost the power of assimilating with the European races. He also considers that the Jews produce a great number of mediocre intellects who can find no wholesome outlet either upwards or downwards for their energies.

If the Jew goes down, he becomes a member of the revolutionary party. If he rises to wealth, he immediately begins to exercise the terrible power of the purse. He is hated by the peoples among whom he takes up his abode because he will not assimilate with them. He is also hated because he either develops into a revolutionary or a plutocrat. Professor Herzl sees no prospect of the Jewish lamb and the Gentile lion consenting to lie down in peace together. He believes that the only solution of the anti-Semitic question is the solution advocated by the ancient prophets. Come out from among the heathen was their watchword. It is the watchword of Professor Herzl as well, and the greater portion of his interesting pamphlet is in the nature of an exposition of how this new exodus is to be effected. His proposal is that the Jews should leave Europe in a body and form a nation of their own either in Palestine or Argentina. This new state would be governed in accordance with Jewish ideals: it would absorb the floating Jewish proletariat which is now wandering over the world in search of a settled home. In it the Jew would be able to develop his individual and collective life in peace. Persecution of the Jew would cease, the Gentile world would be rid of him forever, Jew baiting would become a thing of the past. Such is the solution of the Jewish trouble which Professor Herzl proposes to his coreligionists, or, as he would perhaps prefer to call them, his fellow-countrymen.

Mr. Jacobs hopes to lay the demon of anti-Semitism by other methods. He admits with Professor Herzl that the Jews have not assimilated with the races among whom they have taken up their abode. So long as they are Jews they must cherish the Messianic hope, and as long as they cherish this hope they cannot assimilate and must remain apart. If a Jewish father or a Jewish mother believes the Messiah may spring from their loins or from the loins of their children, how is it to be expected that they will assimilate with the unclean Gentile? It is of the very essence of their religion that they should remain apart. Assimilation would mean the pollution and desecration of their most cherished ideals. Notwithstanding this unfortunate fact, Mr. Jacobs believes that the Jewish question may be solved by a less drastic process than the one recommended by Professor Herzl. He attributes the hostility of the Gentile to the Jew to what he describes as the "Jew's Eye." According to Mr. Jacobs, this is an organ which is never at rest; it is perpetually on the watch, keen to perceive, never relaxing in its intensity. "In whatever relation of life you meet a Jew, his eye is

forever unslaked in brilliancy, and his soul ready for the conflict, and as a necessary condition of conflict ready and desirous to get the better of the fight." "To have that eye upon you at all times, even in moments of relaxation, is enough to goad the Goy into perpetual irritation. The Jew carries on the conflict of life into affairs where there should be no conflict. He converses on politics, the theatre, a friend's character, or what not; he is never content unless he comes off victor, or at least has the last word. If you want to stop a Jew's talk, a friend once said to me, agree with all he says; without the stimulus of conflict he cannot continue." Mr. Jacobs in these passages gives us to believe that the dislike of the Jew arises from the aggressiveness of his character. Get rid of this aggressiveness and the Jewish question would disappear. In order to effect this end, Mr. Jacobs advises his coreligionists to adopt different ideals in the education of their children. He bids them remember Kingsley's line, "Be good, sweet maid, and let who will be clever;" and he asks them to inculcate the lesson which this line teaches on the hearts and minds of the Jewish youth. It is probable that Mr. Jacobs' solution of the Jewish trouble is more feasible and practical than Professor Herzl's. It is to be added that Mr. Jacobs's volume is not confined to a discussion of the relations between Jew and Gentile. It contains a number of interesting and cleverly written essays on other Jewish topics.

W. D. Morrison.

London.

Various Fragments. By Herbert Spencer. 8vo. Williams & Norgate, 1897. Pp. 156.

As its title indicates, this volume consists of sixteen "fragments," reprinted from magazines and other sources, on miscellaneous topics and of very varying lengths. Those concerned with ethical subjects are, all but one, replies to criticisms made by different men of science on special parts of Mr. Spencer's system. Of the non-ethical writings, most are letters and articles republished from the *Times* on questions of political and social interest, such as Anglo-American Arbitration, the Parish Councils Act, etc. Some of these are rather interesting as characteristic of the author's way of thought than intrinsically important. The letter on the "Bookselling Question," and the "Views concerning Copyright," have practical significance in view of recent controversies; but of these,

too, the interest for the general reader is chiefly biographical. The details which they disclose concerning the production and profits of Mr. Spencer's works increase our respectful admiration for the tenacity of purpose and self-confidence (in the best sense) with which he has planned and executed his life-work. They will scarcely, however, encourage the impecunious to follow philosophy as a profession, or even as an inexpensive luxury, showing as they do that if Mr. Spencer had not happened to possess private means, the laws of Survival of the Fittest and Free Trade would have strangled the Synthetic Philosophy in its cradle.

One of the most interesting Fragments is that called "An Element in Method." This lays down a method by which men may guide themselves in forming true scientific hypotheses. Mr. Spencer does not say of his method that *exæquat fere ingenia*, but his bold attempt to analyze and reduce to rules the workings of scientific intuition suggests the Baconian parallel.

Of the ethical pieces, the most important is a criticism of the latter portions of Huxley's Romanes Lecture. Mr. Spencer argues first, that Professor Huxley gives two inconsistent accounts of the relations between the cosmic and the ethical process; and, secondly, that one of these is closely similar to his own account of the matter, and cannot therefore have been intended as an attack upon his doctrine. His argument can only be understood by quoting the passages at issue. On page 33 of the Lecture, Professor Huxley says, "The practice of that which is ethically best—what we call goodness or virtue—involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence." But in Note 19 he adds, "strictly speaking, social life and the ethical process, in virtue of which it advances towards perfection, are part and parcel of the general process of evolution, just as the gregarious habit of innumerable plants and animals, which has been of immense advantage to them, is so." Mr. Spencer points out the inconsistency of these two passages, the latter of which he accepts as a statement of his own view. But he does not quote the whole of Note 19. A reference to the Romanes Lecture shows that, after enlarging on the social habits of animals, Professor Huxley goes on: "To this extent the general cosmic process begins to be checked by a rudimentary ethical process, which is, strictly speaking, part of the former, just as the 'governor' in a steam-engine is part of the mechanism of the engine."

This explains clearly enough in what sense it is meant that the ethical process is at once opposed to and part of the cosmic process. Even so, however, it must be admitted that Professor Huxley, as was natural perhaps in a popular lecture, has expressed the antagonism of "nature" and "spirit" somewhat too broadly, since that which regulates and "modifies" the cosmic process cannot rightly be said to have "no sort of relation" and "be in all respects opposed" to it.

The main object of this discussion is the same as that of the short paper on "Social Evolution and Social Duty," and of the replies to the criticisms of Professor Cairnes and M. de Laveleye,—viz., to point out the important place which has been given in the Spencerian system to the altruistic activities and social agencies, and to rebut the charges of a "brutal individualism" brought against it. The disadvantage to the general reader in following these discussions is that only one side is given; and, although large questions are involved, the argument turns directly on statements and expression of which he has not the text by him. Another drawback to the reprinting of magazine controversies between zealous philosophers is that they are apt to be conducted with an acrimony to which it seems a pity to give permanence. This is notably the case with the fragment entitled "Professor Tait on the Formula of Evolution."

The close student of Mr. Spencer, however, will no doubt find it useful to refer to the volume for further elucidation of those points of his system which have called forth most criticism.

ELEANOR RATHBONE.

LIVERPOOL.

THE APPLICATION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION. By J. F. Herbart. Translated and edited, with Notes and Introductions, by Beatrice C. Mulliner, B.A. Lond. Pp. CXXV., 229. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

THE HERBARTIAN PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO EDUCATION. By John Adams, M.A., B.Sc. Pp. iv., 284. London: Isbister & Co.

"Herbartian literature," says Mr. Adams, "is springing up in almost alarming luxuriance." But all who believe in a science of education will be glad to offer a more or less unqualified welcome to such literature. For at the present time any scientific treatment

of education is sure to be to some extent Herbartian in form, if not in idea. At the same time the thoughtful educator who is not a mere partisan cannot but recognize the existence of a danger of an uncritical acceptance of Herbart's doctrines. For Herbart's educational theory is the outcome of the union of his psychology and his ethics, and his psychology is inseparably connected with his metaphysics. But his metaphysics seems to us to be false, and his ethics insufficient and unsatisfactory. Moreover, Herbart's psychology was, in his own view, nothing if not mathematical—a statics and dynamics of mental life. But the futility of his efforts in this direction is now generally recognized. Whilst, then, we may accept much of Herbart's work as offering a convenient description of many aspects of mental life, we cannot accept his psychological hypothesis as a satisfactory explanation of that life. Those who agree with us in this must decline to accept Herbartianism as a true and complete theory of education. They may recognize much of the highest value and importance in it, they may thankfully accept its help in organizing the work of instruction, but after all they must refuse to find in it the whole truth. "The soul," says Herbart, "has no capacity nor faculty whatever, either to receive or to produce anything." Those who thoroughly accept this position must also accept Herbart's doctrine when he says, "I confess to have no conception of education without instruction." Indeed, all education is instruction if the mind is to be built up of ideas according to the Herbartian psychology, for even example and "discipline" can only be efficacious if they supply ideas which can attain and hold a dominant place in that internecine strife of ideas which is, for Herbart, the totality of mental life. Doubtless, it is difficult to consistently maintain this position of soul passivity, and the most thorough-going Herbartian may even speak—as Miss Mulliner does—of mind as "giving the unity" to complexes of impressions; the soul with no activity but that of self-preservation is found insufficient when one comes to deal with actual human life.

It is for reasons such as we have indicated that we believe more good will be done by books like that of Mr. Adams than by translations such as Miss Mulliner's. In her Preface to the latter, Miss Beale says, "It would be contrary to the spirit of the Master if we adopted his system as a complete whole," and she adds: "We must have, so to speak, a 'native' ministry." This is exactly what we ourselves feel. We must take what we find valuable in Herbart

and leave the rest, whether, indeed, our selection is "contrary to the spirit of the Master" or not. This is what Mr. Adams does, and does consciously, saying, indeed, that "no doubt the old philosopher would turn in his grave did he know that we were dropping what he considered the most essential part of his work." Mr. Adams recognizes that "Herbartianism has weaknesses;" hence, though his essays "are written with a Herbartian bias," yet "it does not follow that the writer is a Herbartian." Indeed, he shows that—at any rate, in his opinion—the greatest contributions of Herbartianism to pedagogy may be reached on quite a different psychological hypothesis from that of Herbart's elastic, indestructible, and essentially unchangeable ideas. Mr. Adams's position towards theories of psychology is indeed of a somewhat cavalier character: "There may be a one true and living psychology before which all the rest must bow, but in the meantime it has not made good its claims." All existing systems may, therefore, be regarded as hypotheses, and the teacher should select that which promises to be most useful in meeting his needs. Of course, this is open to the retort that if education is really to be an application of psychology, then, unless the psychology is true, the education must be mistaken. To take a psychology because it fits in with educational practice is largely to invert the relative positions of the two sciences. No doubt, Herbartian psychology, when treated and applied as in Mr. Adams's book, becomes educationally fruitful, even if it does not remain strictly Herbartian. Indeed, we know of no more suggestive and stimulating book among the publications of recent years than this of Mr. Adams. It is everywhere marked by a pretty humor, and the illustrations are such as really illustrate. We think it would have been even better had the statement of psychology in Chapter III. been less Herbartian in form, for many of the conclusions are such as can only be called Herbartian by a use of the term so wide as to be misleading. Indeed, as Mr. Adams himself says at the end of his book: "This outcome of his work would no doubt have greatly surprised Johann Friedrich Herbart." He ends by suggesting that it is in a synthesis of Herbart and Froebel on Hegelian principles that the true educational doctrine is to be found. This we believe to be the case, but then we cannot get such a synthesis without breaking away from Herbart's atomistic psychology. Mr. Adams thinks such a synthesis "would not be excessively difficult." Whilst grateful for what he has given us, we wish he would undertake that task also.

Of quite a different character is Miss Mulliner's book. It consists of an excellent translation of Froebel's unfinished "Letters on the Application of Psychology to the Science of Education," with useful explanatory notes and an introduction giving an outline of Herbartianism in all its aspects. Miss Mulliner is apparently a very enthusiastic disciple of the school of Jena, and her Introduction is pitched in a key of the warmest eulogy. But in such a brief space it was, of course, impossible to be either deep or thorough, and considering that several excellent general introductions to Herbartianism already exist, Miss Mulliner would, perhaps, have been better advised in limiting the extent and increasing the intent of her remarks. For we cannot help thinking that those who will profit from the letters will not benefit from the milk for Herbartian babes offered in the Introduction, whilst those who need the latter had better avoid for a time the strong meat of the former. For, indeed, these letters are by no means easy reading. Miss Mulliner scarcely seems to recognize how difficult they are, for she apparently thinks that the greater part of them will find acceptance with "the general reader" (cf. notes, pp. 148, 182). We doubt this very much, whilst we do not doubt at all that the same "general reader," were he to read them, would find them largely unintelligible. For Herbart assumes a knowledge of his own psychological positions and writings of which the general reader would certainly be innocent. References to his "Psychology" are scattered throughout these letters, and the acceptance of Herbartian mathematical psychology is taken as a matter of course. And we must go further and say that for those who are familiar with Herbartianism, these letters will be disappointingly bare of suggestion and inspiration. They are unsystematic, they are dull and heavy, they involve a large amount of obsolete physiology, and they really seem—in Herbart's own words—"to take us no further than to a repetition of that which every experienced practical teacher already knows." No doubt the professed Herbartian will be glad to have some more of the Master's work in an English dress, but we do not think any others will derive either pleasure or profit from the letters. We are sure that a perusal of them will not aid the inexperienced teacher in his work, whilst the student of pedagogy will not find in them anything with which he is not already familiar.

J. Welton.

The Yorkshire College, Leeds, England.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SUGGESTION: A Research into the Subconscious Nature of Man and Society. By Boris Sidis, M.A., Ph.D., Associate in Psychology at the Pathological Institute of the New York State Hospitals. With an Introduction by Professor William James. D. Appleton & Co., 1898. Pp. vii., 386.

Dr. Sidis opens with a discussion of the phenomena of suggestion, including in it the results of some interesting and original experiments, develops upon this foundation his theory of the dual nature of man, and concludes by applying that theory to the explanation of many more or less closely related groups of phenomena, notably those of insanity and of crowd and mob psychology.

While Dr. Sidis's theories are not novel in their essential traits, his book is written in a vigorous and forceful style, and contains much fresh illustrative material which will repay examination.

His theory is essentially an extension of Pierre Janet's doctrine to the field of the normal. Not only in the hysteric, but in the normal human being as well, there exist realms of mind distinct from the empirical consciousness. This unknown region should not be conceived with Myers as the transcendent reserve of a spiritual personality,—rather does it represent the functioning of cortical cells disassociated from the central coherent system which constitutes the physical basis of the empirical consciousness. The processes of the subwaking consciousness are usually unknown to us, although their effects are frequently traceable in the normal life, but occasionally, in dream, trance, and hallucination, the actual content of the subwaking is intruded into the normal upper consciousness.

In its character the subwaking consciousness is far inferior to the normal, and it usually lacks personality. Dr. Sidis has clearly grasped the conception of impersonal consciousness, and his description of the six chief types of conscious organization is one of the best things in the book.

The best opportunity of studying the traits of the subwaking self is in hypnosis and in some forms of insanity. In the mob, also, we see the activity of the upper self temporarily quiescent, while the hitherto dormant lower bursts out in outrage and excess.

This attempt to explain mob violence by reference to a secondary consciousness is akin to Le Bon's statement that the individual member of the mob is in a state analogous to the hypnotic, but is

not to the present writer convincing. No such *deus ex machinâ* is needed to explain the irresistible instinct to conform one's conduct to that of the crowd,—for that, natural selection suffices. Even if there were no evidence for a native instinct, the changed conditions in which the individual finds himself, the total removal of the social sanction (or, rather, its attachment to an unusual class of conduct), would sufficiently account for the temporary suspension or intensification of the ethical instincts based upon it. The experimental evidence also which Dr. Sidis has amassed, although showing both ingenuity and patience, falls far short of proving the existence of the subwaking self in the normal individual.

Dr. Sidis's book is marked throughout by a degree of confidence in the doctrines set forth which seems to the present writer a little premature in view of the scantiness and ambiguous character of the evidence now in our possession. But if he can supply us with more experiments like those on the hyperæsthesia of vision here reported, and more cases like that of the Rev. Thomas Hanna, he will put the world of psychologists in his debt.

WILLIAM ROMAINE NEWBOLD.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

A CONCISE HISTORY OF RELIGION. By F. J. Gould. Vols. I., II., and III., pp. 154, 209, 292. London: Watts & Co.

In these volumes, "issued for the Rationalist Press Committee," Mr. Gould makes an able and laborious attempt to accomplish what seems an impossible task—that of writing a history of religion which shall be at once "concise" and satisfactory. Something, of course, depends on what is meant by conciseness. Bernier, in the seventeenth century, wrote an "abridgment" of the philosophy of Gassendi in eight large volumes, to which he added other seven by way of supplement. But Mr. Gould is concise on quite another scale. He puts the whole of religion, except Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism, into a small volume of about one hundred and fifty octavo pages. Even the cleverest manipulation can hardly make that satisfactory, and the result must inevitably be either jejune or indigestible. Doubtless Mr. Gould has in view the plain man who is interested in religion but has no time to read voluminous histories. Yet somehow one cannot help feeling that here is another case of the current fallacy of "essences," the fallacy that a large amount of physical or intellectual nourishment can be so boiled down that it may be carried in a man's waistcoat pocket.

The "essences" of physical food, though they contain little nourishment, are safe stimulants, and I have no doubt that Mr. Gould's book, which contains a vast amount of information, will be intellectually stimulating to its readers. The evils of too great condensation are to a great extent alleviated by the excellent list of books appended to each volume, and Mr. Gould's work thus becomes a useful guide to the whole literature of the subject.

Volume I. deals with the "Chief religions of the world, with the exception of Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism." About half of the volume is devoted to the earliest and lowest forms of religion, Animism, Ancestor-worship, Fetishism, Totemism, worship of natural objects, etc., while the remainder of the volume, following the order of Tiele's "*Outlines*," treats of the religions of the various great races and nations. Volume II. is a chronological review of "Judaism and Jewish sacred literature," concluding with an account of the "environment of early Christianity," that is to say, the various religious and philosophical systems which contributed to the formation and development of Christian belief and worship. Volume III., on "Christian Origins," treats Christianity as the outgrowth of a Puritan Jewish sect, "the New People," who cherished Messianic hopes and who had much in common with the Essenes. In connection with the development of this sect the utmost importance is given to the work of Paul, a Pharisee of Tarsus, not educated in the gentle and liberal school of Gamaliel, but a zealot for the law and a persecutor of the New People, until their excellence, in spite of their disregard of Mosaic observances, opened his eyes to the vision of a new liberty, a "moral franchise" that was independent of the law. Mr. Gould's account of Jesus and his disciples comes afterwards, and the latter part (more than half) of the volume is devoted to the question of the origin and meaning of the Gospels and other New Testament writings and to a careful account of Jewish and Christian literature to the end of the second century.

The book increases in interest as it goes on. The first volume (probably owing to the vain effort at condensation) is somewhat dull. It is to a large extent a record of facts regarding the external features of the religions it deals with, and it leaves no very clear impression on the reader's mind. In the second and third volumes the reader gains by having the background of the Bible; but, apart from that, there are fewer scrappy, indigestible facts, and there is much more of living interest,—more of the soul and spirit

of the people, which make their religion worth understanding. The volumes are full of controversial matter, which cannot fittingly be discussed here. The value of the book seems to me to lie in the importance it gives to the social, as distinct from the purely individual, factors in the development of religion. Every religion seems inevitably to involve devotion to a real or ideal person; but the share of the worshippers in the making of the religion has been too often minimized. Mr. Gould's book will help to correct this. It will not commend itself to the orthodox, but it is carefully and reverently written, in a clear and simple style, and it puts into small compass a great amount of reading in the best authorities.

ROBERT LATTA.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS.

IN TUNE WITH THE INFINITE; OR, FULNESS OF PEACE, POWER, AND PLENTY. By Ralph Waldo Trine. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Company, 1897.

An amiable spiritual pride, a humane but essentially immature idealism, an edifying vagueness, a somewhat dilute solution of the ancient lore of mystical faith,—these are the constituents that go to make the doctrine of this not at all unattractive little volume. The type to which it belongs is well represented in the American popular literature of to-day. This book is by no means a poor or unworthy representative of its class.

Every one is "building his world from within." "The optimist, by his superior wisdom and insight, is making his own heaven." "The great central fact of the universe is that Spirit of Infinite Life and Power that is back of all, that animates all, that manifests itself in and through all." "There have been and are highly illumined souls who believe that we receive our life from God after the manner of a divine inflow. And, again, there have been and are those who believe that our life is one with the life of God, and so that God and man are one. Which is right? Both are right; both right when rightly understood." God's relation to man (p. 14) is like that of an "inexhaustible reservoir on the mountain side" to a smaller reservoir "in a valley." Both contain the same water. They differ in the amount of the water. So man's life is the "same in essence" as God's life. There is only a "difference in degree." The practical result is that if man "opens himself to this divine inflow," he "approaches" God, and "takes on the God-powers" (p. 15). The "only limitations man has are the limitations he sets

to himself by virtue of not knowing himself." "Ignorance is the most potent factor in setting limitations to the majority of mankind." The cure for this ignorance is "the operation of thought," defined in the well known mystical fashion. The "soul life" is "direct from God" (p. 23). The "physical life" "relates us to the material universe about us." "The thought life" connects the one with the other. It is this that "plays between the two." Thought is "a vital living force" as we nowadays prove "in our very laboratory experiments" (p. 24). "We are all living in a vast ocean of thought." The true spiritual art consists in closing myself to "all things below," and making myself "receptive to all higher influences." "Bodily health and vigor" (p. 42 sqq.) result from such opening of the self to the divine inflow, and our author devotes a considerable space to the discussion of the mental causation and cure of disease. "Mental therapeutics" (p. 51) must now be studied by every doctor. "Many absurd and foolish things have been claimed and done" as to mental healing, but the "great underlying laws" themselves remain. The author knows "*personally*," as he assures us, of cures belonging to this type. Meanwhile "one may cure another, but to be *permanently healed* one must do it himself" (p. 53). "Suffering is designed to continue only so long as sin continues; sin not necessarily in the theological, but always in the philosophical sense, though many times in the sense of both." Exercises for the improvement of health through mystic communion are hereupon discussed, with that curious tendency to encourage chronic spiritual hypochondria which too many lovers of mental healing seem nowadays disposed to indulge. The length of the chapter upon this topic (pp. 42–88) indicates the author's general position as to this whole subject. "Love," "Wisdom and Interior Illumination," "The Realization of Perfect Peace," "Coming into Fulness of Power," "Plenty of All Things —The Law of Prosperity," and "How Men have become Prophets, Seers, Sages, and Saviours," are the titles of later sections of the book. And here it is that the amiable spiritual pride aforesaid finds plentiful and not ungracious expression. "Miracles have abounded in all places and at all times" (p. 201). Anybody who "lives in the realization" of the "oneness of his life with the Source whence it came" becomes "a prophet, seer, sage, or saviour," and can presumably work miracles (p. 152). Among the author's friends are numbered several people who seem to have reached very beautiful elevation of life and character, and in such

company one thinks little of many attainments that on the "physical plane" would seem impossible. "Whatever can't be done in the physical can be done in the spiritual."

The new mysticism, very prevalent at this time in America, is thus, indeed, not ill represented by this very pleasant book. Critical thinking there is none, of course, from one end of the volume to the other. There is the simple assumption that this is what any philosophical Idealism must come to,—an assumption that the present reviewer has several times dealt with at some length in the course of discussions on Idealism. As a fact, this gentle optimism, with its well known opposition of "lower plane" and "higher plane," of the "physical plane" and the "invisible," becomes often rather painfully dualistic at the very point where a sound idealism, facing the problem of evil with a true sense of its gravity, is most needed to give a practical unity to the concrete life and warfare of humanity. The new mysticism, like the old, is selective, and appeals only to a portion of mankind; but the old mysticism—the doctrine of the Hindoo forest sages, of the mediæval mystics, or even of our own earlier Transcendentalists —had an historical background, an energy of life, and an originality of expression and of experience that one has almost wholly to miss in our recent disciples of mental therapeutics, and of the "higher plane." The new doctrine saves its invalids, and has already given us a few really valuable contributions both to poetical literature and to the literature of direct personal experience; but it has yet to produce its "prophets."

JOSIAH ROYCE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE DYNAMICS OF RELIGION. An Essay in English Culture History. By M. W. Wiseman. London: The University Press, Limited, 1897. Pp. 340

This book is an attempt to criticise the movement of theological thought in England since the Reformation from the atheistical stand-point. According to the writer, religion is a disease, priests are impostors, and the "main forces in the making and unmaking of churches are those of personal and pecuniary interests." At the end of the eighteenth century these conceptions of religion and ecclesiastical institutions had a certain vogue; but it is rather remarkable to find them dug out of their graves towards the close of the nineteenth to serve as an explanation of the dynamics of reli-

gion. "The fortunes of religion," says Mr. Wiseman, "are determined by ignorance, by avarice, by self-interest, by fashion, by carnal organization, by anything rather than reason, argument, conviction, or good faith." Mr. Wiseman's powers of denunciation are not confined to belaboring religious institutions: wherever he sees a head he cannot resist the temptation of hitting it, no matter whose head it happens to be. He tells us that Newton and Locke were guilty of dissimulation, that Berkeley was a hypochondriac, that Mr. Morley and Mr. Lecky lack logic and coherence, and that Mr. Morley's rationalist propaganda has been damped down by the indirect pressure of personal interest among other things. Mill's final leanings to theism were probably due to "a contraction of the understanding or shrinkage of the spirit with growing age." Mr. Leslie Stephen's attitude towards rationalism is "intelligible only as either a survival of early prejudice in a critic trained for the Church or an apprehensive propitiation of the orthodox reader." The last thing which Mr. Wiseman is prepared to concede to a man or an institution is a certain measure of sincerity and good faith. In fact, he opens his book with the assertion that man is a liar, and his criticism of men and movements in England during the last three hundred years is dominated by this belief.

It seems impossible for a writer with an ethical outlook of this character to do justice to any individual or any institution. The judgment is warped as effectively by a suspicious and cynical temper as by credulity and superstition. It is to be regretted on many grounds that Mr. Wiseman has approached his subject in such an unfortunate frame of mind. He has plenty of literary ability, and a considerable amount of knowledge. But these gifts are to a large extent spoilt by an aggressiveness, a cocksureness, and a supercilious acerbity towards all manner of men and things. Men win acceptance for their ideas as much by the ethical temper in which they are expressed as by the intrinsic power of the ideas themselves. It is rather curious that a writer of so much ability as Mr. Wiseman should at this time of day assume religion to be little else than a form of mental disease, concocted and kept alive by priests. No doubt history shows that priesthoods have not always been the friends of religion and that religious beliefs have been sometimes exploited by them for selfish purposes. It is not an unknown thing for mothers to starve or even murder their children, but these unnatural acts do not force us to the conclusion that the

maternal sentiment is an exploded superstition. The misdeeds of priests are a scandal to religion but not an argument against it. Besides, religions have existed in which, as far as can be discovered, there were no priests. How does this fact fit in with the view that religion is a priestly imposture? If religion is an imposture, it is remarkable that it should have existed so long. We find it in every stage of human history; among the most backward as well as among the most progressive races. Surely, if this great element in human life and conduct were of the spurious character which the writer of this book assumes it to be, some nations at some period of their history would have abandoned it. But it is useless arguing against positions which have been abandoned long ago by almost all serious students of religious history. In spite of much acute criticism on the theological controversies of the last three hundred years, Mr. Wiseman's general estimate of things ecclesiastical is of the same character as an anarchist's estimate of the existing order of society. Hitherto the doctrine of universal destruction, whether in the religious or the political sphere, has not appealed to the common sense of mankind, and there is no likelihood that it ever will.

W. D. MORRISON.

LONDON.

AFFIRMATIONS. By Havelock Ellis. London: Walter Scott, 1898.

This book has borrowed its title from Friedrich Nietzsche's writings, and, without any doubt, it will be mainly read for the essay on that German philosopher which fills the first eighty-five pages of it. Whatever follows them—essays on Casanova, Zola, Huysmans, and St. Francis and others—is of comparatively minor importance. Mr. Ellis is one of the few Englishmen who really feel the greatness of Nietzsche's intellectual achievements. For him Nietzsche stands in the first rank of the distinguished and significant personalities our century has produced, and he has too generous a turn of mind to condemn Nietzsche's philosophy because Nietzsche's life ended in insanity. "No doubt it was once a consolation to many that Socrates was poisoned, that Jesus was crucified, that Bruno was burnt. But hemlock and the cross and the stake proved sorry weapons against the might of ideas even in those days, and there is no reason to suppose that a doctor's certificate will be more effectual in our own," are his own words. They express an attitude towards the subject very different from that taken up by almost the entire English criticism ever since Nietzsche's writings

have begun to appear in English. Mr. Ellis divides his able attempt of giving an account of Nietzsche into three parts. In the first he merely gives an extract from the biography of Nietzsche, written by his sister, and, therefore, is least original. All his acuteness and breadth of view, however, become apparent in Part II., in which he analyzes the writings of Nietzsche's middle period from 1876 to 1883. It is with the writings of that time that he sympathizes most heartily, and it is these which he has studied most carefully. He therefore gives an admirable account of the leading ideas laid down in "Human, All-too-Human;" "Dawn of the Day," and "Joyful Science." But he, apparently, feels less sympathy for the Nietzsche of the time after 1876. Whilst the "Antichrist" is characterized correctly, full justice is not done to "Beyond Good and Evil," "Genealogy of Morals," and "Thus Spake Zarathustra." More especially to the study of the latter most difficult book he has not devoted the time required for penetrating into its secrets. Here even many things are incorrect. Not to mention small matters, as that German *kultur* means in English civilization, and not culture; that not *Beyondmen* assemble in Zarathustra's cave, but the *Higher Men* (which Nietzsche very definitely distinguishes from the former), he entirely leaves out of account Nietzsche's inferences from Darwinism and Jordan's poetry, his theory of eternal recurrence; his position towards the various shades of individualism; and the interesting and often strange conflicts which arise from a collision of these different mental currents. He altogether treats Nietzsche too much as an isolated fact, failing to give him his place in the intellectual development of our age, both as regards his services and as regards his suggestions. Nevertheless, Mr. Ellis's essay on Nietzsche can be heartily recommended as a good introduction into Nietzsche's philosophy.

ALEXANDER TILLE.

UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS TO HIMSELF. An English Translation, with Introductory Study on Stoicism and the Last of the Stoics, by Gerald H. Rendall, M.A., Litt.D., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, Principal and Professor of Greek, University College, Liverpool. Macmillan & Co. Crown octavo. Pp. cxlvi., 188.

In this book the "English Translation" and the "Introductory Study" form two fairly equal portions. The object of the former

is to "give Marcus Aurelius to English readers with scholarly precision and in becoming dress." This is the main object of the book, to which the "Introductory Study" is "strictly supplementary." The latter, that is to say, has for its aim, "not to give a complete or balanced exposition of Stoicism as a whole, but to consider so much of it as remains implicit or explicit in the words of Marcus Antoninus, so that the reader of the 'Thoughts,' in approaching the dogmas and the formulas which they contain, may have in mind their origin, their meaning, their development, and their eventual content for Marcus and his contemporaries."

In both respects Professor Rendall may, we think, be congratulated. The English reader has a rendering the scholarly accuracy of which he may trust, and from its style may gather much of the tone, at once so simple, so manly, so sad, of the "Thoughts." This is a task which it was (in the words of the Preface) "worth while to do," and it has been done well.

The Historical Introduction consists of five chapters, entitled respectively: Origins of Stoicism—Birth of Stoicism—Stoic Dogma —Stoicism in History—Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. It thus falls naturally into two parts,—(1) a History of Stoicism, (2) a personal study of the emperor himself. In both the limitations the author sets himself, viz.: the needs of the English reader, are adhered to, but within these limitations the work done is excellent. The best part of the historical account is the second section of Chapter II., where the relation of Stoicism to Cynicism, and the difference between them, especially with reference to their respective interpretations of the word "Nature," is well drawn out; but the whole of this part of the Introduction is clear, accurate, and straightforward. There are occasional statements about other schools of thought which seem open to question, and one especially (on page lxiv.) about Plato and Pantheism which few would accept, but these are small blemishes and do not affect the value of the account given of Stoicism itself.

The study of Marcus Antoninus is discriminating, thoughtful, and sympathetic. The early influence of his life, the "conservative" school of statesmanship in which he was brought up, his loyalty to duty so steadfast amid the awful loneliness of his position as emperor, his clear sense of the hollowness of mundane things, with the unswerving determination to be "till God sounds the withdrawal, still ready for the march," are worked out with force and truth. The author's final verdict is that "Marcus Aurelius

Antoninus survives as perhaps the loftiest exemplar of unassisted duty whom history records—unalterably loyal to the noblest hypothesis of life he knew." With this verdict few will quarrel, and Professor Rendall's translation will help to bring it home to many readers who would otherwise only know the "Thoughts" through the inadequate medium of some history of philosophy.

W. H. FAIRBROTHER.

LINCOLN COLLEGE, OXFORD.

THE MORALITY OF MARRIAGE, and other Essays on the Status and Destiny of Woman. By Mona Caird. London: George Redway, 1897.

It is difficult to review with justice a book like Mrs. Caird's. It consists of a number of essays published in the first instance separately at intervals extending over a period of nearly ten years. During those ten years the subject treated of has undergone the most striking changes both as regards the conditions of women's work and the attitude of those who approach the consideration of her "status and destiny." These changes are but little reflected in Mrs. Caird's essays. It is difficult for the student of the subject as it now is to put him or herself completely at the point of view of ten years ago; but it may, perhaps, be doubted whether the frankly partisan attitude adopted by the writer was the wisest or most serviceable even at a time when custom was harder and prejudice more unbroken than they are now.

The earlier part of the book recounts at wearisome length the marriage customs of savages and semi-civilized peoples; the latter part advocates many good and desirable ideas of reform and development in married life; ideas, however, common to-day not only to the literature of the subject but to actual married life itself. Mrs. Caird mars her advocacy of these good things by basing it on the, alas! painfully familiar misconception of freedom as the absence of all interference or restraint. It is, perhaps, this very abstract method of approach which induces in Mrs. Caird her startling pessimism as to the condition of married women among us to-day. When one thinks of the multitude of mentally active married women one knows who are neither slaves nor drudges nor puppets nor dolls, who bear an active and weighty part in the formation of the common will and judgment which directs and controls home life, and who take an ever-increasing share in the formation of the rational will and judgment of the wider

community also, one cannot help thinking that if this brilliant writer devoted her thought more to life and less to theory she would back her admirable sympathies by sounder arguments and have more hope of the fulfilment of a more rational ideal.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

PORT-ROYAL EDUCATION. Extracts, with an Introduction, by Félix Cadet. Translated, with an Index, by Adnah D. Jones. Pp. 260. Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

Most students of the history of education are familiar with M. Cadet's useful monograph on the educational work and doctrines of the Port-Royalists. We have here a translation of the work into English, which, so far as we have tested it, is correct if not brilliant. So thoroughly is it a translation, indeed, that a passage from Dr. Bain's "Education as a Science" is retranslated from the French into English altogether different from that of the original, and the page reference given is, we presume, to the French edition; at any rate, it differs from that in the English original by one hundred and nine pages. It seems strange, too, to read in a note on page 181 of Plato's "Lois," as if the Greek philosopher wrote originally in French. Similarly on page 2 we are referred to the "Œuvres Sociales" of Channing. As to the work of M. Cadet, but little need be said. There is a sensible introduction, which recognizes the limitations as well as the merits of the Port-Royalists, and this is followed by extracts from their writings, generally, though not quite entirely, dealing with education. There is much that is admirable in the educational doctrines set forth,—the deep religious and moral aim, the self-devotion of the teachers, the gentle firmness of the discipline, and the generally intelligent conception of method. In the last point, the plan of teaching in the mother tongue was the greatest reform advocated. In all these particulars they had, indeed, been anticipated by the great English writers on education of the preceding century, but in most of them they were preaching a doctrine new to French ears; and, indeed, to Continental ears in general. But their system had serious limitations; the isolation of the pupils from ordinary family life, the constant supervision by the masters, the deliberate restriction of education to a very few carefully selected children, the monastic repression and monotony of the pupils' lives, the neglect of physical training, are most serious blots, and prevent us from placing the Port-Royalists—able as they

were—in the front rank of educators. No teacher can, however, read the extracts which M. Cadet gives us without receiving stimulus and suggestions, and we are glad to commend this translation to those who cannot conveniently read the original.

J. WELTON.

THE YORKSHIRE COLLEGE, LEEDS.

THE SEVENTH EARL OF SHAFTESBURY AS SOCIAL REFORMER. By Edwin Hodder. London: Nisbet & Co., 1897.

Mr. Hodder has done well to attempt some abridgment and selection from the larger "Life and Work" of Lord Shaftesbury which he published some ten years ago. The present volume is a new book, and confined to that aspect of his career which has made the name of the seventh Earl of Shaftesbury a household word. It is, in fact, a brief and popular *résumé* of the philanthropic movements to which he devoted his life. It is certainly a striking story that is told, and its effect is heightened rather than diminished by the plain and matter-of-fact way in which it is set out.

SIDNEY BALL.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

A SKETCH OF MORALITY INDEPENDENT OF OBLIGATION OR SANCTION. By M. Guyau. Translated from the French by Gertrude Kapteyn. London: Watts & Co., 1898.

THE NON-RELIGION OF THE FUTURE: A Sociological Study. By Marie Jean Guyau. London: William Heinemann, 1898.

THE MAKING OF RELIGION. By Andrew Lang, LL.D. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898.

[A somewhat elaborate investigation of early phases of religious belief. A work of great value to students of anthropology, and also to all who are interested in "psychical research." The main results are summarized as follows (p. 331): "On the hypothesis here offered to criticism there are two chief sources of religion: (1) the belief, how attained we know not, in a powerful, moral, eternal, omniscient Father and Judge of men; (2) the belief (probably developed out of experiences normal and supernormal) in somewhat of man which may survive the grave. This second belief is not, logically, needed as given material for the first, in its apparently earliest form. It may, for all we know, be the later of the two beliefs, chronologically. But this belief, too, was necessary to religion: first, as finally supplying a formula by which advancing intellects could conceive of the Mighty Being involved in the former creed; next, as elevating man's conception of his own nature. By the second belief he becomes the child of the God in whom, perhaps, he already trusted, and in whom he has his being, a being not destined to perish with the death of the body. Man is thus not only the child but the heir of God, a 'nursling of immortality,' capable of entering into eternal life." The first of these two beliefs does not seem to be as thoroughly dealt with as the second; and hence the interest of the volume for the student of Ethics and Philosophy is considerably less than that for the student of Psychology and Anthropology.]

THE WONDERFUL CENTURY: Its Successes and its Failures. By Alfred Russel Wallace. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1898.

[The "successes" include progress in the mechanical arts and in physical science. The "failures" consist in the neglect of Phrenology, of Hypnotism, and of Psychical Research, the enforcement of Vaccination, the growth of Militarism, and the extension of economic injustice. Distinctly an interesting book.]

FOOTSTEPS IN HUMAN PROGRESS, SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS. A Short Series of Letters to a Friend. By James Samuelson. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898.

THE FIRST PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE: An Edition and Translation of the remaining Fragments of the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, together with a Translation of the more important accounts of their opinions contained in the early

epitomes of their works. By Arthur Fairbanks. London: Kegan Paul, French, Trübner & Co., 1898. [A work of the greatest value to the student of ancient philosophy.]

THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH DEMOCRATIC IDEAS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. By G. P. Gooch, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge. [*Cambridge Historical Essays*, No. X. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1898.]

PROBLEMS OF MODERN INDUSTRY. By Sidney and Beatrice Webb. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898. [A series of Essays on Women's Wages, the Sweating System, the Reform of the Poor Law, Co-operation and Trade Unionism, Socialism, etc.]

COSMOPOLITAN DUTIES. A Paper read before the Liverpool Philomathic Society. By Professor MacCunn, M.A., LL.D. Liverpool: D. Marples & Co., 1898.

AN ESSAY ON WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN ITS ECONOMIC ASPECTS. (*Ancient Times.*) By Prof. W. Cunningham, D.D. (*Cambridge Historical Series.*) Cambridge: C. J. Clay & Sons, 1898.

NEO-MALTHUSIANISM: An Enquiry into that System, with regard to its Economy and Morality. By R. Ussher. London: Gibbings & Co., 1898.

CREED AND LIFE. A Critical Enquiry concerning the Ancient Orthodox Creed, and a Declaration of its Contents in proof of its capacity to meet the Needs of Modern Life. By the Rev. C. E. Besby, B. D. Oxon, Beverley, E. Yorks.: John Wright & Co., 1898.

PHILOSOPHY IN RELATION TO LIFE. A Lecture delivered at the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy. By Professor J. H. Muirhead. Reprinted from the *Ethical World*. London: The "Ethical World" Publishing Company, 1898.

THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE. By Professor Wesley Mills, M.A., M.D., etc. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1898.

THE STATE AND CHARITY. By Thomas Mackay. London: Macmillan & Co., 1898.

PURE ECONOMICS. By Professor Maffeo Pantaleoni. Translated by T. Boston Bruce. London: Macmillan & Co., 1898.

DANTE'S TEN HEAVENS: A Study of the Paradiso. By Edmund G. Gardner, M.A., Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. Westminster: Archibald Constable & Co., 1898.

THE MEANING OF EDUCATION; and other Essays and Addresses. By Nicholas Murray Butler, Professor of Philosophy and Education in Columbia College. London: Macmillan & Co., 1898.

DEBATEABLE CLAIMS: Essays on Secondary Education. By John Charles Tarver. Westminster: A. Constable & Co., 1898.

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[Among the contributors are Messrs. A. L. Smith, J. Gow, P. E. Matheson, etc.]

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Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:
Prof. E. Boirac, 51 Rue Jeannin, Dijon, France.
Prof. Fr. Jodl, 45 Porzellangasse, Vienna, Austria.
Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, Merchiston, Llanishen, near Cardiff, Wales.
Prof. Josiah Royce, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.